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Ladies and Gentlemen Representatives of Security Council member countries
Ms. Annalena Baerbock, President of the General Assembly (opga@un.org)
Ladies and Gentlemen Representatives of General Assembly member countries
Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Representative of the European Union (delegation-new-york@eeas.europa.eu)
Mr. Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Edrees, Representative of the African Union (AU-Newyork@AfricanUnion.org)

Poitiers, 25 June 2026

Subject: My candidacy for the position of Secretary-General

PDF available at: FR <http://www.pierreenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let2-UNSC-FR-25-6-26.pdf>.
: EN <http://www.pierreenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let2-UNSC-EN-25-6-26.pdf>.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. Since February, I have sent several letters to the permanent representatives of UN member states to seek their support in the form of a nomination for the position of Secretary-General (UNSG). I am writing to you today for three reasons: (1) to share a few observations on the responses received and on the informal dialogues already held; (2) to provide you with further information on my candidacy and my platform of proposals; and (3) to put forward a few concrete suggestions.

1. Progress of efforts undertaken since February

2. In February, I contacted the permanent representatives of the countries chairing this year the groups that my strategic vision ([Att. 1](#), EN [Att. 1.2](#)) and the six proposals of my platform ([Att. 2](#), EN [Att. 2.2](#)) concern most directly: LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS and the G77+China. I asked them for their support. None expressed particular interest, even though the platform offers, as I detail further below, significant benefits for their countries. I then extended my efforts to other permanent representatives, whether or not members of these groups, with the same result.

2. The informal dialogues in April and the role of AI

3. I followed the first informal dialogues in April closely. Several representatives speaking on behalf of groups of countries (LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS, Africa) asked candidates how they intended to contribute to the objectives set out in official UN reports (Doha, Awaza, Antigua and Barbuda) or the African Union's Agenda 2063. These reports are long and technical; the two or three minutes allotted to each answer do not allow for a genuinely relevant response. I have not, moreover, heard any candidate present a concrete proposal capable of generating significant revenue or providing precise solutions to the problems identified in these reports.

4. I therefore asked several artificial intelligence systems to assess to what extent my strategic vision and the six proposals of my platform could contribute to these objectives. Their answers are unambiguous: implementing my platform would contribute significantly to a great many of them. The cross-analyses between my strategic vision, my six proposals, and the following documents are attached:

- [Doha](#) Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries ([Att. 5](#), EN [Att. 5.2](#))
- [Awaza](#) Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries ([Att. 6](#), EN [Att. 6.2](#))

- [Antigua et Barbuda Agenda for Small Island States \(Att. 7, EN Att. 7.2\)](#)
- [Global Resources Outlook 2024 \(Att. 8, EN Att. 8.2\)](#)
- [Pact for the Future \(Att. 9, EN Att. 9.2\)](#)
- African Union [Agenda 2063 \(Att. 10, EN Att. 10.2\)](#)

These analyses show that my proposals would bring concrete benefits not only to LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS and Africa, but to all States, including the most advanced.

3. A major collective investment, both financial and human

5. The lack of interest shown so far by the representatives of these groups seems surprising to me in light of these results. In 2016, during the first informal dialogue of the UNSG selection process, the President of the UNGA, Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, emphasized the historic nature of this exercise: for the first time, candidates were able to present their vision publicly before member states, and countries were able to highlight their difficulties and ask candidates what solutions they propose. This is an essential moment, even though the complexity of the problems facing the UN sometimes makes it difficult to formulate perfect solutions.

6. The cross-analyses I am presenting represent considerable intellectual work, particularly for the longest reports such as the Global Resources Outlook 2024 or Agenda 2063; even an expert would devote a great deal of time to them. I believe they deserve to be taken into account for two reasons: the value of a strategic vision accompanied by concrete proposals, and the role that AI can now play in informing the selection process.

7. Some of my proposals could raise important questions that would be difficult to answer in two or three minutes. I would therefore be glad to receive your written questions and to answer them in writing, ahead of any informal dialogue, and to make those answers public. AI can also help to explore certain technical aspects further: estimates of data volumes, scenarios regarding the number and size of data centers required, cost estimates, and possible financing plans.

8. I want to stress that this platform represents a major collective investment — financial (approximately 30 billion dollars per year, serving billions of people and the fight against climate change) and human. Implementing the six proposals will require sustained work on your part and that of your colleagues in the coming years: drawing up specifications for the three new global applications proposed, decisions on the location and size of data centers, and many other matters. It would be valuable for the groups of countries concerned (LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS, G77+China, African Union, European Union) — who have shown clear interest in achieving the objectives described in UN reports and elsewhere — to state their position on the platform, whether in support of or with reservations about the analyses presented.

4. Exchanges with the US Congress

9. I recently presented my strategic vision, the platform and the cross-analyses to Senator Thune, Majority Leader of the US Senate, emphasizing the advantages of the platform for advanced countries such as the United States ([Att. 15](#)). One further element would, however, be useful to the US Congress, which is directly concerned by any change in Internet governance: your technical assessment, as representatives of the LDC, LLDC, SIDS, G77+China, African Union and European Union groups, of the six proposals and the cross-analyses, together with a signal of your interest in becoming involved in their implementation should the platform be adopted.

5. My candidacy and France

10. I have requested a nomination from a significant number of you, the most recent being addressed to Mr. Bonnafont, Permanent Representative of France, who has not responded to date (letter of 17 June 2026, [Att.](#)

[14](#), EN [Att. 14.2](#)). In the absence of a prompt response, I hope that another member state will agree to nominate me, the platform being, on reading the attached cross-analyses, in the interest of all countries — LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS, African countries, and all those who have not yet nominated a candidate.

11. I address separately, in a dedicated letter of 12 December 2025 ([Att. 11](#) , EN [Att. 11.2](#)), the serious concerns I otherwise hold regarding the French legal aid system, based on evidence documented in particular in a 2019 parliamentary report indicating (on p. 20) that several European countries spend, per capita, several times the amount spent by France (7 times for Sweden, 6 for the UK, 5 for the Netherlands). I am not claiming any connection between this matter and the lack of a response to my nomination request; I am simply noting that I remain available to discuss it with any interested party.

12. On this point, I would like to ask the Permanent Representative of the European Union, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis — who emphasized during the informal dialogues the importance of investing more in human rights, an area that represents only about 1% of UN expenditure — to kindly assess proposal No. 3 of my platform, which, combined with proposals 1 and 2, would help increase the resources devoted to this area worldwide, and, if he considers it appropriate, to advocate for the platform and my nomination among the member countries of the group he represents.

6. Request to the African Union

13. Finally, I would like to ask Mr. Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Edrees, Representative of the African Union to the United Nations, to study the cross-analyses with Agenda 2063 and the Doha, Awaza and Antigua and Barbuda reports. Thirty-two African Union countries are members of the LDC group, fourteen of the LLDC group, and five or six of the SIDS group. The African Union's view on my platform's capacity to help African countries achieve their respective objectives would be valuable to me, as would, should that assessment prove positive, encouragement directed at certain African countries to consider a nomination.

Conclusion

14. This platform, I believe, brings concrete benefits to all countries, and represents a major collective investment — financial and human. It would be valuable for the groups of countries concerned (LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS, G77+China, European Union, African Union) to express their interest in, and willingness to become involved in, its implementation. I remain entirely at your disposal to provide in writing any clarification that may be useful on each of the proposals.

Please accept, Ladies and Gentlemen, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Pierre Geneviev

PS: If you have difficulty accessing certain documents attached via Internet links, please let me know and I will send them to you by email.

Attachments:

Att. 1: Strategic vision of 30-1-26, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/vision-strategique-30-1-26.pdf>]
: EN (1.2), [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/vision-stratement-EN-30-1-26.pdf>].

Att. 2: Platform of 30-1-26, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/Plat-prop-V2-FR-30-1-26.pdf>]
: EN (2.2), [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/Plat-prop-V2-EN-30-1-26.pdf>].

Att. 3: Résumé of 20-1-26, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/CVFR-cand-unsng-20-1-26.pdf>]
: EN (3.2), [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/CVEN-cand-unsng-20-1-26.pdf>].

Att. 4: Differences between the strategic visions of 12-4-26, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/differences-visions-fr-12-4-26.pdf>]
: EN (4.2), [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf3-2-21/differences-visions-en-12-4-26.pdf>].

- Att. 5: Cross-analysis between vision statement and Awaza Report, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Awaza-3-6-ver-fr.pdf>]
: EN (5.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Awaza-3-6-ver-en.pdf>].
- Att. 6: Cross-analysis between vision statement and Doha Report, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Doha-5-6-ver-fr.pdf>]
: EN (6.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Doha-5-6-ver-en.pdf>].
- Att. 7: Cross-analysis between vision statement and Antigua and Barbuda Report, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Abas-5-6-ver-fr.pdf>]
: EN (7.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Doha-5-6-ver-en.pdf>].
- Att. 8: Cross-analysis between vision statement and GRO 2024 Report, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-GRO2024-13-6-ver-fr.pdf>]
: EN (8.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-GRO2024-13-6-ver-en.pdf>].
- Att. 9: Cross-analysis between vision statement and Pact for the Future, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Pact-Future-6-6-ver-fr.pdf>]
: EN (9.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Pact-Future-6-6-ver-en.pdf>].
- Att. 10: Cross-analysis vision statement / Agenda 2063, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Agenda2063-18-6-ver-fr.pdf>]
: EN (10.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AC-Agenda2063-18-6-ver-en.pdf>].
- Att. 11: Letter of 12-12-25, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-UN-EU-ios-poli-FR-12-12-25.pdf>]
: EN version (11.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-UN-EU-ios-poli-EN-12-12-25.pdf>].
- Att. 12: Letter of 21-6-21, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UNGA-UNSC-CPIM-COE-2-FR-21-6-21.pdf>]
: EN (12.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UNGA-UNSC-CPIM-COE-2-EN-21-6-21.pdf>].
- Att. 13: Letter of 23-5-21, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UNGA-UNSC-CPIM-COE-FR-23-5-21.pdf>]
: EN (13.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UNGA-UNSC-CPIM-COE-EN-23-5-21.pdf>].
- Att. 14: Letter to Mr. Bonnafont, 17-6-26, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-France-UN-PM-FR-17-6-26.pdf>]
: EN (14.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-France-UN-PM-EN-17-6-26.pdf>].
- Att. 15: Letter to Senator Thune, 17-6-26, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-Senator-Thune-17-6-26.pdf>].