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Mr. Vassily Nebenzia, President, and Representatives of member countries of the UN Security Council
Mr. Dennis Francis, President, and Representatives of member countries of the General Assembly (UNGA)
Judge Tomoko Akane, President, and the Judges of the ICC
Mr. Prosecutor of the ICC
Ladies and Gentlemen, Representatives of the Member States of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute
Mr. Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the UN
Ladies and Gentlemen, Heads of State of UN Member States

Poitiers, July 10, 2024

Copy: UN Advisory Body on AI, Gladstone AI Inc., Mr. Jan Brauner, Ms. Inger Andersen, Mr. Janez Potocnik, and Ms. Isabella Teixeira.

Object: New elements supporting the launch of (- and request made to the ICC to launch -) *phase II of the preliminary investigation* into the 10-2-21 complaint for *crimes against humanity of persecution* related to the LA law's unconstitutionality; request made to the Security Council and to the representatives of member countries of the ICC to transmit this complaint of 10-2-21 (...) to the ICC on the basis of these new elements; **new proposals** made to the member countries of the UNGA and **comments on Recent reports on AI** [[Governing AI for Humanity, 12-2023](#) , [Gladstone Action Plan, 2-2024](#)] and the *Global Resources Outlook 2024* ; and comments on, - and **peace plan to resolve** -, the conflict in Ukraine (...). [PDF : <http://www.pierreenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-to-UNSC-UNGA-ICC-EN-10-7-24.pdf> ; French version : <http://www.pierreenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-to-UNSC-UNGA-ICC-FR-10-7-24.pdf>].

Dear Mr. Vassily Nebenzia, and Dear Representatives of member countries of the Security Council,
Dear Mr. Dennis Francis, and Dear Representatives of UNGA Member Countries,
Dear Ms. Tomoko Akane, and Dear Judges of the ICC,
Dear Mr. Prosecutor of the ICC,
Dear Representatives of the ICC Member States,
Dear Mr. Antonio Guterres,
Dear Heads of State of UN member countries.

1. Following (a) the complaint for *crimes against humanity of persecution* related to the unconstitutionality of legal aid (LA) law and the obligations of the ministry of a lawyer (OMLs) in France of 10-2-21 ([PJ no 1](#) , EN [PJ no 1.2](#)) [complementing the letters of 10-7-20 ([PJ no 5](#) , EN [PJ no 5.2](#)) and of 23-11-20 ([PJ no 4](#) , EN [PJ no 4.2](#))] , (b) the decision of the ICC of 6-5-21 [([PJ no 1.4](#)) , then the decision of 12-5-22 ([PJ no 1.6](#)) following the letter of 10-9-21 ([PJ no 1.4](#) , EN [PJ no 1.5](#))] and (c) my other letters on this subject, on the war in Ukraine, and on my proposals made to the international community, among others [of 23-5-21 ([PJ no 3](#) , EN [PJ no 3.2](#)) , of 21-6-21 ([PJ no 2](#) , EN [PJ no 2.2](#)) , of 15-1-22 ([PJ no 7](#) , EN [PJ no 7.2](#)) , of 23-3-22 ([PJ no 8](#))] , I am writing to you **(1) to present to you new elements** which establish, according to a recent French law, that the ICC (...) could or should **launch Phase II of the preliminary investigation** into the complaint of 10-2-21 (and its supplements) as if it were presented by France, and **(2) to request** (a) Madam President, the Judges, and the Prosecutor of the ICC to take these new elements **into account in order to launch Phase II of the preliminary investigation** into the complaint of 10-2-21 as if it were submitted by France, and (b) to the Representatives of the Member States of the ICC, and (c) to the Representatives of the Member States of the Security Council **to take into account** these new elements **to transmitting** the complaint of 10-2-21 (...) to the ICC so that it can launch *Phase II of the preliminary investigation* into this complaint (and if it has already done so, to support its action) , **(3) to make** some comments on the LA systems of the ICC and of most of the Member States of the ICC, and **to provide** new evidence of the unconstitutionality of LA law in France and of the merits of the complaint for *crimes against humanity* related thereto, **(4) to present new proposals** to help all countries and the UN **achieve the SDGs and convergence and to maintain international peace and security** [described here and in the letters of 23-2-23 ([PJ no. 9](#)) and 7-7-23 ([PJ no. 10](#)) and to the ICC ([PJ no. 10.2](#))] , **(5) to comment recent reports on AI** [[Governing AI for Humanity, 12-2023](#) , [Gladstone Action Plan, 2-2024](#)] and the *Global Resources Outlook 2024* ([GRO 2024](#)) , and **(6) to briefly discuss** the **war in Ukraine** and present a **peace plan** to resolve this conflict in Ukraine and all other ongoing conflicts in the world.

I The SAPIN II law of 2016 protecting whistleblowers, my status as a whistleblower, article 40 of criminal procedure code and their consequences on the complaint for crimes against humanity linked to French LA law.

A One of the objectives of the SAPIN II law and its 2022 amendment, and my status as a whistleblower.

2. The SAPIN II law [[law no. 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016](#) on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of economic life] allows, among other things, to protect **whistleblowers** who are defined as follows in its article 6 [[Ref ju 5](#) no 11 ' ... **the whistleblower is defined as "a natural person who reveals or reports , disinterestedly and in good faith , a crime or offence , a serious and manifest violation of an international commitment regularly ratified or approved by France , of a unilateral act of an international organisation taken on the basis of such a commitment, of the law or regulation, or a serious threat or harm to the general interest , of which he or she has had personal knowledge "** ' ; no 17 ' The whistleblower must have had personal knowledge of the facts . ' ; and no. 33 ' **Law No. 2022-401 of March 21, 2022 amended Article 6** of the "Sapin II" law to this effect. This makes it possible to address some of the reservations expressed above, by giving access to whistleblower status to persons with an interest in the disclosure , when this interest is indirect or when it is not financial. This particularly concerns victims of the actions reported as well as persons deriving an indirect financial benefit from the alert, either because it harms a competitor or because it was launched as part of a paid professional activity. '] ; so there is no doubt, I think, that, as a poor victim of the unconstitutionality of the LA law and of the *crime against humanity of persecution* linked to the dishonest LA law and OMLS and other offences that I denounce before you, I can be considered as **a whistleblower (1) for the accusations** (a) of unconstitutionality of the LA law presented (i) first to the AApC of Paris in 1999 (...), then more recently (ii) before the various French jurisdictions (QPCs on the LA law and other forms of accusations on this subject presented from 2014-today) and (iii) to the ICC and the UN Security Council (2020-today), **(2) for the accusations of attempts to cover up the unconstitutionality of the LA law** [' **Law No. 2022-401 of March 21, 2022 amended Article 6** of the "Sapin II" law to include, among the behaviors that may be the subject of an alert, **the attempt to conceal the violation of a commitment or a normative text** . '] brought against the supreme courts, which committed fraud during my QPC proceedings on the LA law in 2015 and 2019, and the deputies and senators, among others, who remained silent on these accusations [see accusations of fraud during my QPC proceedings against the AJ described in [the observations of 30-4-23, no 7-19](#)], **(3) for the revelations** , - linked to the fraud of Mr. Dugoin and the politicians of the CG91 (from 1993 to 2004) who stole travel expenses from the CG91 -, which I made (a) to the AC of Versailles in 1998, (b) to the AApC of Paris during the appeal proceedings in 1999, and (c) to the CAC of Paris in 1999 which judged Mr. Dugoin's appeal of the judgment of the criminal court (on his frauds, [letters to CAC of Paris](#) , and [August](#)), and **(4) for recent accusations of concealment of obstruction of the referral to justice (...)** and of *concealment of crimes against humanity* brought against the current (and former) leaders of the CG91 [see [PJ no. 13, no. 40-58, PJ no. 21, no. 24](#)], because I made these accusations and made these revelations **in good faith** (and not only in my own interest) and because I made these various **reports to the competent administrative and judicial authorities** [and I also contacted competent bodies for the LA law's unconstitutionality (...) such as the Defender of Rights, the UN, the OHCHR, the ICC ...], in accordance with the directives of article 8 of the SAPIN II law [[Ref ju 5](#) no. 45 ' b) **Reporting to the authorities** 1) **Recipients of the report to the authorities § 45 Judicial and administrative authorities** . Professional orders – In addition to reporting internally to the hierarchical superior; article 8, II of the law of December 9, 2016 provides **the possibility for the whistleblower to make his report to the judicial authority , the administrative authority or professional orders** '].

B The types of protection and new rights provided to whistleblowers by the SAPIN II law.

3. The SAPIN II Act protects **whistleblowers** from various forms of retaliation for the accusations they make (such as unlawful or unfair dismissal) or from disadvantageous or unfair or prejudicial treatment related to the reports made [see details in **Article 10-1** of the SAPIN II Act ' **I. Persons who have reported or publicly disclosed information under the conditions set out in Articles 6 and 8 are not civilly liable** for damages caused as a result of their reporting or public disclosure provided that they had reasonable grounds to believe, when they did

so, that the reporting or public disclosure of all of this information was necessary to safeguard the interests at stake.'; and **II. Persons to whom** Article L. 1121-2 of the Labour Code, Article L. 135-4 of the General Civil Service Code or III of Article L. 4122-4 of the Defense Code may not be subject, as reprisals, to the measures mentioned in the same articles, nor to the retaliatory measures mentioned in 11° and 13° to 15° of this II, for having reported or disclosed information under the conditions provided for in Articles 6 and 8 of this law .

' **Under the same conditions, persons other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of this II may not be subject to retaliatory measures, nor to threats or attempts to resort to these measures** , in particular in the following forms: 1° **Suspension, layoff, dismissal or equivalent measures** ; 2° Demotion or refusal of promotion; 3° Transfer of functions, change of workplace, reduction in salary, modification of working hours; 4° Suspension of training; 5° Negative performance evaluation or work certificate; 6° Disciplinary measures imposed or administered, reprimand or other sanction, including a financial penalty; 7° Coercion, intimidation, harassment or ostracism; 8° **Discrimination, disadvantageous or unfair treatment** ; 9° Failure to convert a fixed-term employment contract or temporary contract into a permanent contract, where the worker could legitimately expect to be offered permanent employment; 10° Non-renewal or early termination of a fixed-term employment contract or temporary contract; 11° **Harm, including damage to the person's reputation, in particular on an online public communication service, or financial losses, including loss of business and loss of income**; 12° Blacklisting based on a formal or informal agreement at sectoral or industry level, which may imply that the person will not find employment in the future in the sector or industry; 13° Early termination or cancellation of a contract for goods or services; 14° Cancellation of a license or permit; 15° Abusive referral to psychiatric or medical treatment. Any act or decision taken in breach of this II is null and void.'].

4. And **the rights granted** are, among others , the possibility (a) to **appeal against retaliatory measures** and (b) to impose proof of the facts on the opponent of the whistleblower, and also (c) to obtain **an advance on costs of the proceedings** to be borne by the opponent of the whistleblower and financial assistance [III.-A.- *In the event of an appeal against a retaliatory measure mentioned in II, as soon as the applicant presents factual elements which suggest that he reported or disclosed information under the conditions provided for in Articles 6 and 8, it is up to the defendant to prove that his decision is duly justified* . The judge forms his conviction after having ordered, if necessary, all the investigative measures which he considers useful. Under the same conditions, the applicant may ask the judge to award him, at the expense of the other party, **an advance on costs of the proceedings** based on the respective economic situation of the parties and the foreseeable cost of the procedure. or, where his financial situation has seriously deteriorated due to the reporting or public disclosure , a provision to cover his subsidies . The judge shall rule promptly. The judge may decide, at any time during the proceedings, that this provision is definitively acquired.]. Finally and also, according to article 12-1 of the SAPIN II law, **any act** (decision, etc.) taken in breach of these rules **is automatically null and void** [art. 12-1 ' *The rights relating to this chapter may not be waived or limited in law or in fact in any form. Any stipulation or act taken in breach of the first paragraph is automatically null and void* . ']. The Court of Cassation (CC) has found a way to protect whistleblowers **for facts prior to the first law of 2013** protecting whistleblowers (and therefore **prior to the SAPIN II law of 2016**), indeed, in its decision of 7-7-21 ([PJ no. 27.10](#)), the Social Chamber of the CC uses **Article 10-1 of the ECHR** (on freedom of expression) in a dismissal case to protect the employee dismissed in 2012 who had reported to his employer *facts which, if established, would be of a nature to characterize criminal offences* before the launch of the procedure for his dismissal; and the legal reference of September 2021 ([PJ no. 27.9, p. 26-27](#)) comments on this decision; I will return to this subject below (no. 26.1).

C How can this new law and CPP 40 help to establish that the complaint to the ICC should result in the launch of phase II of the preliminary investigation as if it had been submitted by France.

5. In France, according to article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (**CPP 40**) ' *any constituted authority, any public officer or civil servant who, in the exercise of his functions, acquires knowledge of a crime or an offence **is required (by legal obligation) to give notice thereof without delay** to the public prosecutor and to transmit to this magistrate all information , reports and acts relating thereto* . ' , so, in theory, when I wrote 2 times to **Mr. Macron** in 2022 before the presidential election [on 17-1-22 ([PJ no. 7](#)) and 23-3-22 ([PJ no. 8](#)), and even before that in 2021 (23-5-21, [PJ no. 3](#) , EN [PJ no. 3.2](#)) and 2020 (10-7-20, [PJ no. 5](#) , EN [PJ no. 5.2](#) , and 23-11-20, [PJ no. 4](#) , EN [PJ no. 4.2](#)) in the letters (/complaints) that I also sent to the UN and to Mr. Macron (directly or indirectly)], and I spoke about the complaint to the ICC and his (Mr. Macron's) responsibility in the commission of *the crime against humanity of persecution* linked to the unconstitutional LA law and about the difficulty in obtaining the launch of the *Phase II of the preliminary investigation* at the ICC, Mr. Macron (as a **public officer** and **even constituted authority**) had a **legal obligation** to transmit the complaint to the ICC on behalf of France

so that *Phase II of the preliminary investigation* could be launched, **according to CPP 40** [the French prosecutor not being competent or impartial for this kind of complaint], **yet Mr. Macron did not do so (a)** to, among other things, cause me harm (and even, perhaps, in retaliation for the accusations I made against him and other politicians), (b) to escape possible prosecution, and (c) to conceal these accusations from the French, **manipulate democracy** and increase his chances of being re-elected. CPP 40 does not provide for sanctions for failure to report criminal charges to the prosecutor [which poses a problem for some legal experts, see article from 2018 in [PJ no. 27.4](#)], but the penal code includes articles [(1) **article 434-1 of the penal code** which provides that *failure to report a crime whose effects can still be prevented or limited constitutes an offence that could give rise to prosecution* ; (2) **article 223-6 paragraph 1 of the penal code** which punishes failure to help the person who has been attacked when one can do so without risk to oneself; and (3) **article 121-7 of the Penal Code, which is** defined as follows: ' *An accomplice to a crime or offence is any person who knowingly, by aid or assistance, facilitates its preparation or commission. Also an accomplice is any person who by gift, promise, threat, order, abuse of authority or power has provoked an offence or given instructions to commit it.* ', and which requires **active behaviour and does not allow omission to be assimilated to commission**] which can be used to punish the failure to report certain criminal charges (based on CPP 40) in certain cases [see legal reference on CPP 40 ([PJ no. 27.5](#))]. Even if Mr. Macron believed that he had not committed *the crime against humanity* related to the dishonest LA law, he should (or should have) at least forwarded the complaint to the ICC to avoid being accused of having committed the offenses described in CP 434-1 and CP 121-7 (...).

6. Then, **in July 2023** , when I wrote to (a) **Mrs Borne** , the Prime Minister, (b) the parliamentarians and (c) the union officials on 7-7-23 ([PJ no 10](#)), and I explained in even more detail why the accusations of *crimes against humanity of persecution* linked to the unconstitutional LA law were well-founded, Mrs Borne (and the deputies ...) also had (as a public officer and even constituted authority) **a legal obligation** to have the complaint transmitted to (the prosecutor of) the ICC by France because of CPP 40 (the French prosecutor not being an impartial jurisdiction for this kind of complaint), **yet she** (and they) did **not do so either** in order, among other things, to cause me harm (and even in retaliation for the accusations that I made against the French officials who maintain this dishonest LA system to steal from the poor) **In theory** (at least) or to respect the spirit of the SAPIN II law, the ICC could therefore judge that the refusal of Mr Macron and Ms Borne (...) to transmit the complaint was **a form of reprisal** or **disadvantageous and unfair treatment**, who caused me serious harm, for having denounced the commission of *the crime against humanity of persecution* by senior French political officials (among others), and therefore that this decision not to transmit the complaint to the ICC is **null and void** under Article 12-1 of the SAPIN II Act [see no. 4, **art. 12-1 of SAPIN II** ' *The rights relating to this chapter may not be waived or limited in law or in fact in any form. Any stipulation or act taken in breach of the first paragraph is null and void.* '], or constitutes the commission of one or more offences, and now **justifies** the ICC launching *Phase II of the preliminary investigation* as if the complaint had been transmitted by France.

D The appeal against a retaliatory measure and the request for an advance payment of costs of the proceedings to be borne by the whistleblower's opponent.

7. As seen above, the SAPIN II law allows *whistleblowers* to **appeal against a retaliatory measure** before the competent court; and here the only competent court in the context of this complaint linked to dishonest LA law (...) is the ICC because the French justice system is (at least) necessarily accused of being **an accomplice of the crime against humanity of persecution** , and not only (a) because its highest judges (Council of State, Constitutional Council and Court of Cassation) are accused of having prevented the judgment on the merits of my QPC so as not to have to admit that the LA law is unconstitutional, but also (b) because the various French courts operate the LA system with lawyers, and judge with lawyers, among other things, the LA requests in the various legal aid offices (LAOs). So I am filing (at the ICC) *this appeal against a retaliatory measure* by France and the French leaders who refused to forward the complaint to the ICC in 2022 and 2023 to harm me and/or in retaliation for the serious accusations I brought against them,

when *they were required to do so* (they had a **legal obligation to do so**) under **CPP 40** because the accusations of unconstitutionality of the LA law and the OMLs and of *crimes against humanity of persecution* linked to the unconstitutional AJ (...) presented to the ICC are supported by numerous evidence; and I ask the ICC to find France's **refusal to forward the complaint to the ICC unjust and therefore null and void** on the basis of Article 12-1 of the SAPIN II law, and, thereby, to launch *Phase II of the preliminary investigation* into the complaint as if it had been forwarded by France. Of course I am not sure that the ICC can **legally** use the French SAPIN II law to justify the launch of the preliminary investigation, but, **at least** , it can *judge* (1) that, according to French law (CPP 40, SAPIN II law), France's behavior constitutes *an obstruction of the referral of justice* and/or the offense described in CP 434-1 because this behavior prevented the ICC from launching a preliminary investigation into (and **limiting the effects of the commission of**) a *crime against humanity of persecution* allegedly committed by French government officials, among others, and therefore (2) that, implicitly, it can (according to the spirit of SAPIN II ...) and must launch this preliminary investigation of its own accord as it has the power to do (or as its prosecutor has the power to do, it seems). Of course, I also ask the member countries of the UN Security Council to take into account this fault committed by *France* (according to the SAPIN II law) and the new elements that I presented in the letter of 7-7-23 ([PJ no. 10](#) , see communication to the ICC, [PJ no. 10.2](#)) which I speak about below, to organize a vote at the UN Security Council to transmit the complaint to the ICC [as I had done in 2020, ([PJ no. 5](#) , EN [PJ no. 5.2](#)) and on 23-11-20 ([PJ no. 4](#) , EN [PJ no. 4.2](#))], and to the member countries of the ICC to use their prerogatives (as members of the ICC) to also request the launch of *phase II of the preliminary investigation* into the complaint to the ICC (and if it has already done so, to support its action).

*** 8. **Whistleblower** status is *similar* (or *equivalent*) to the UN (OHCHR) and Council of Europe Human Rights **Defender status**, so **I had already tried to obtain this status** (1) from the UN (OHCHR) **in 2019** when I wrote [on 30-3-19, [PJ no 30](#)] to **Mr Forst** (the OHCHR Human Rights Defender in 2019) and to Ms Bachelet (the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights); and **in 2020** (2) from the Council of Europe , and in particular from Ms Dunja Mijatovic, who had already intervened before the ECHR to help *defenders of rights* , when I wrote [on 15-5-20, [PJ no 5.3, no 9](#)] to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and to her Commissioner for Human Rights, to ask for their help and protection, but these two organisations had refused to help me, and when I spoke on the phone with someone from the OHCHR, I was told that *the defenders of rights* were mainly associations and lawyers, and therefore that Mr Forst could not speak with me (!). In France, it is only since 2022 (March 21, 2022 to be exact) that whistleblowers, **victims** of the accusations they denounce, can be legally considered whistleblowers (see above no. 2, [Ref ju 5](#) no. 17), but I still think that the OHCHR and the Council of Europe were in bad faith on this subject when they refused to help me because they should have denounced the dishonesty of the LA law in France, and *the crime against humanity of persecution* linked to it, besides I mentioned it in the complaint to the ICC of 10-2-21 ([PJ no. 1, no. 57, 49-59](#) , EN [PJ no. 1.2](#)), and I suggested that they also be added to the list of suspects who facilitated the commission of the crime against humanity of persecution linked to the unconstitutional LA law.

8.1 I believe that the refusal of the OHCHR and the Council of Europe (including the ECHR) to denounce the unconstitutionality of the LA law and related OMLs and *the related crime against humanity of persecution*, [and, to date, the refusal to investigate this crime by the ICC] constitute **a threat to the public interest** (no 2, [Ref ju 5](#) no 11) because **it leads**, among other things, **to a biased analysis** by these organizations and their member countries and their public opinions and the people of the world, **on the war in Ukraine** and **on the responsibilities of each** in the conflict (and in the commission of the crimes related to the conflict that the ICC is currently investigating, I believe) and because **it makes** the resolution of the conflict more difficult; **threatens for the general interest** that I denounce before **the only competent jurisdiction**, I think, the **UN Security Council** , **which also makes me a whistleblower** according to the SAPIN II law (no. 2, [Ref ju 5](#) no. 11). ***

II Comments on the ICC and French LA systems, and new evidence of the legal aid (LA) law's unconstitutionality (a concrete example...) and the merits of the related ICC complaint.

A The ICC and French LA systems, and the new evidence provided.

1) The ICC's LA system pays lawyers based on the difficulty of the cases, the French system does not.

9. In the letter of 23-5-21 [[PJ no 3, no 48-51](#), EN [PJ no 3.2](#)], I had commented on the ICC's response (of 6-5-21, [PJ no 1.3](#)) to the complaint of 10-2-21 [([PJ no 1](#) , EN [PJ no 1.2](#)) supplementing the letters of 10-7-20 ([PJ no 5](#) , EN [PJ no 5.2](#)) and 23-11-20 ([PJ no 4](#) , EN [PJ no 4.2](#))] which, in my opinion, was not properly motivated. The 2nd decision of 12-5-22 ([PJ no 1.6](#)) in response to the letter of 10-9-21 ([PJ no 1.5](#)) was also not properly motivated, I think; yet the ICC should easily understand that the legal aid law in France, which is based on **the charity of lawyers**, among other problems, is dishonest to the poor (unconstitutional) because the ICC itself uses (or will use in 2024, at least, [PJ no 10.3](#)) an LA system **(1) which** clearly pays lawyers **according to the legal and factual complexity of the cases** in which they have to intervene [[PJ no 10.3](#) , page 7 ' **Principle 3 – Objectivity: The legal aid system allocates resources on the basis of the requirements of the case** , particularly **the complexity of the work and the stage of the proceedings, and not on the basis of subjective requirements** ' (contrary to the French LA system); see also **page 10 a) Defense teams ' (ii) Number and nature of charges and complexity of legal and factual arguments** deriving from them, including any novel legal issue arising from the case; **(iii) Number and nature of the modes of liability proposed by the Prosecutor** and/or confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Confirmation of Charges Decision; **(iv) Number of accused joined in one case ; (v) Number and nature of the evidence disclosed** , particularly where the evidence assessment requires the involvement of experts '], and **(2) who pays** significant fees [[PJ no 10.3](#) , page 16] in comparison with what the LA system pays to French lawyers [see the method of calculating lawyers' fees described in the LA law in articles 27, 29, 31 (calculation method: **reference value unit** (set at **36 euros** in 2022, article no 27) **x** (multiplied by) **coefficient by type of procedure** ..., [PJ no 28.1](#) version of 9-3-23, (see [PJ no 28.2](#) for the initial version of the law in 1991; in this initial version, the value unit was given separately in the finance law each year); for *lawyers at the Councils* the amount is fixed (**382 euros**), and it is defined in article 90 of the implementing decree of the LA law, version of 2020, [PJ no. 28.3](#)); and **the values of the coefficients for each type of procedure** are described in Annex 1 of the implementing decree of the law in 2020 ([PJ no. 28.3](#)), and these coefficients represent an insufficient number of working hours to effectively defend the poor in typical or basic cases in each area (see the initial 1991 version of the decree)]. The ICC's refusal to study the serious injustices linked to the unconstitutional LA system that I denounce is therefore particularly unjust.

*** 9.1 You will note in particular (and ' *coincidentally* ') that the amount paid to legal aid lawyer to help a **poor victim** of a crime or offence is limited to **8 units of value**, which represents very little money (**288 euros**), while the work to be done in this type of procedure (including writing the PACPC) is, most of the time, significant and technically difficult to do (as I have experienced), this means that poor victims of crime or offence systematically lose against the rich, administrations and companies, including in corruption cases against corrupt officials and politicians . ***

2) The other problems of the LA law in France and other evidence of the unconstitutionality of LA law.

(a) The refusal of the appointed lawyer to assist me on criminal matters and to take into account the facts of my case.

10. Furthermore, lawyers' remuneration is not the only issue affecting the quality of service provided to the poor as explained in the complaint to the ICC , and as the new evidence I recently provided in the ongoing proceedings at the Administrative Court (AC) of Versailles against the Department of Essonne (CG91) confirms it [the purpose of these proceedings is to obtain the reconstruction of my career from 1993 until my reinstatement in the administration, and, further down in section B, I study **in detail** this procedure against the CG91 (1) because it highlights the dishonesty of the LA system in France and explains how this dishonesty (unconstitutionality) of the LA law affects the chances of the poor to win their cases in court, and (2) because it also highlights **the serious**

injustices of which I was the victim (a) in the CG91 illegal dismissal procedure in 1993, (b) during the legal proceedings to obtain compensation for this illegal dismissal between 1998 and 2001, (c) in the USA between 2002 and 2011 after being granted refugee status, and (d) since my return to France in February 2011 until 2022, the year in which these proceedings against the CG91 began]. In these proceedings against the CG91, **the lawyer appointed** to assist me (an expert in administrative law) **has refused to assist me on the criminal issues** of the case, while these criminal issues **are crucial** in this case, among other things, **because** , according to the facts of the case, the dismissal is illegal for two different reasons: **(1) it is illegal** because I was dismissed for facilitating the travel expense frauds that were committed by CG91 politicians [which makes me a victim of the commission of crimes, a *criminal* offence], **and (2) it is illegal** because the CG91 did not prove (during the AC procedure) that it had deleted or even modified the profile of my IT project manager position as it had claimed to the AC and in the dismissal letter [an *administrative* offence, and the ground for illegality that had been retained by the Versailles AC in 1998].

11. Clearly, **the nature of the faults committed by the CG91** during the dismissal is not just *administrative*, it is also *criminal*, but the LA system in France does not allow 2 lawyers to be appointed to the same case (one specialist in administrative law and one specialist in criminal law), so when the appointed lawyer **refuses** (1) to help me on the criminal issues of the case [she says she is not willing and not competent to address this type of question, no. 17.1], and, implicitly, (2) to make a new LA request to obtain help from another lawyer on this subject [as we will see below, the Bâtonnier (President of the Bar) of Versailles refused to appoint another lawyer to help me on these issues or to help me himself on this subject], she is causing me serious harm [she is trying to make me lose the case (!) and it is very difficult for the poor man to defend himself in such conditions, especially when the judges take advantage of the situation]. I had the same problem **in 1999** in the AAPC procedure, the lawyer appointed on appeal refused (a) to help me on the criminal issues of the case, and (b) to take into account the fact that I was the first victim of the fraud committed at CG91 on travel expenses (...). The refusal of the lawyer and the President of the Bar to help me on these criminal matters is all the more unfair (1) because, in this case and as we have seen above, I am **a whistleblower** for several reasons [including the fact that I accuse my opponent the CG91 and some of its leaders of having committed crimes, and of having profited - and of continuing to profit - from the dishonest LA law and the crime against humanity linked to the dishonest LA law], and I explained that I was the victim of reprisals and/or disadvantageous and unfair treatment because of my criminal accusations and accusations against the LA law (!), and (2) that the SAPIN II law gives me new rights in this case (see no. 3-4). The appointed lawyer should have at least explained this to me and helped me on this subject of the SAPIN II law [she may have been afraid of also being the victim of reprisals ... for defending me, or she did not want to spend time doing this because the LA law does not already pay the lawyer enough in the context of a simple and normal case, so it does not cover the work and risks in a case with criminal issues in addition (!)]. The chances of obtaining effective help were therefore non-existent in this type of case, and what has happened to me since 1999 has confirmed this, even if I was lucky enough to find in 2023 the legal references on the SAPIN II law and to be able to explain the problem to you (because, as we will see, the AC judge ignored all the arguments that I presented).

(b) The risks associated with the defense of certain cases (of a whistleblower, etc.) are not remunerated by the AJ.

12. In addition to (1) the fact that the LA law does not pay the lawyer according to the factual and legal difficulty of the cases and that it already does not pay enough for a standard case ([PJ no. 10, no. 13](#)), (2) that LA decisions are not made based on the LA application file, (3) the other general problems that I described in the complaint and in the letter of 7-7-23 to [PJ no. 10, no. 14-15](#) , and (4) the fact that lawyers and judges of the BAJs have **conflicts of interest** in many cases and in particular when the poor person complains about the lawyer or the LAO or the LA system ([PJ no 10, no 16-17](#)), **we must add to the LA problems (5) the fact that the LA law does not take into account the risks associated** with the fact that the poor person is **a whistleblower** or presents serious criminal charges against politicians or civil servants (as the LA law does not pay lawyers enough in a normal case, it does not pay the risks associated with certain cases either, see explanations in [PJ no. 20, no. 8, 8.1, 8.2](#)). **So there is no doubt that the LA law is unconstitutional in France**, and that it systematically robs the poor when they come before the courts, but many countries,

including many ICC member countries, such as France, use LA systems that are partly (or even sometimes entirely) based on **lawyers' charity** [with the exception, it seems, and among others, of **Japan** which has a LA system that uses a group of civil servant lawyers specialized in LA (according to the country profile Japan p. 31 of the 2016 UN report), while allowing independent lawyers to offer their services for free in some cases], and this may have played a role in (a) the fact that none of the ICC member countries I contacted to ask them to refer the complaint to the ICC (Ireland, Canada, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden,) responded favorably to my request, and (b) in the fact that prosecutors (and judges, perhaps) of the ICC have not wanted, to date, to launch phase II of the preliminary investigation into my complaint. The fact that many countries have **defective LA systems** like France, does not diminish the merits of my accusations and the seriousness of these accusations , **on the contrary**, it should encourage the ICC to investigate the complaint and to advise ICC member countries and other (non-member) countries to use the standards that it applies to itself.

3) New evidence of the merits of the complaint to the ICC and the gravity of the crime committed.

13. The gravity of the crime committed is an important element for the ICC when considering charges that fall within its jurisdiction (as mentioned in its decision of 6-5-21), so I have presented **new evidence** on this subject of the gravity of the charges brought, among others, in the letter of 7-7-23 addressed to French politicians (PJ no. 10) and to the ICC (PJ no. 10.2) and in the documents of my proceedings against the CG91. Among other things, I explain that the charges *of crime against humanity of persecution* linked to the unconstitutional LA law, are not only serious **because** of the large number of direct and indirect (poor) victims of the crime and the gravity of the harm that these victims suffer (including death as it could be the case for me), but also because **of the large number of people** (including all French lawyers) and administrations and organizations who **profit from the crime against humanity of persecution** linked to dishonest LA law and who therefore commit **offences of concealment of crimes against humanity** [for lawyers probably **more than 10 million offences of concealment of this crime** have been committed since the vote on the LA law in 1991 (!); I will present concrete proof of this accusation in section B (which describes the procedure against the CG91) because the Department of Essonne, which I accuse of having profited *from the crime against humanity of persecution* linked to dishonest LA law between 1999 and 2000 in the procedure at the AApC of Paris, is clearly seeking to profit again from the dishonest LA law and *the crime against humanity* linked in the new procedure in progress, no. 21]. It can therefore be said that not investigating this complaint (situation) (and not developing the LA system usable by all countries that I propose to develop) constitutes (are) a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. The letter of 7-7-23 (PJ no 10, no 56-58) also explains why Mr. Macron can be considered a suspect in the commission of the crime, and why the facts can also be qualified *as a crime against humanity* using the definition of *crime against humanity* given in **article 212-1 paragraph 8 of the penal code** (the elements of the *crime against humanity of persecution* are slightly different from those used by the ICC and Article 7(h) of the Rome Statute, see Exhibit No. 10, No. 33-34). Finally, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine , the interest in investigating this complaint is even greater because, as will be seen below, the merits of the accusations *of crimes against humanity of persecution* or even of the accusations *of unconstitutionality of the LA law* remove from France, and indirectly from Europe, any legitimacy to sanction Russia and therefore gives it (them) (an increased) responsibility for the war in Ukraine.

*** 14. As we will also see in no. 61, **the effectiveness** of a country's judicial system is a **key element** in determining whether that country respects **the official 'values'** of NATO countries, which are based on the rule of law (including **the equality of citizens before the law**), and on respect for human rights (including the rights to a fair trial and an effective remedy, among others), because if a country's judicial system violates the rights to a fair trial and an effective remedy, as is the case in France and the USA (and in most NATO countries surely), the country does not respect NATO values, has **even less legitimacy** to sanction Russia (or any other country), and has a responsibility in the conflict in Ukraine (if this country has been sanctioning Russia since 2014 ...). It is therefore crucial that the ICC addresses this issue in the context of an official and public inquiry , if it wants to claim to be an impartial judge in the judgment of crimes committed in Ukraine by Russia (...). ***

B The proceedings against the Department of Essonne before the AC, a concrete example of the consequences of the LA law' unconstitutionality and the efforts made by the defense to take advantage of the dishonest LA law (...).

1) The request for career reconstruction sent to the CG91 and the request to the AC which followed.

15. Following (a) the request for career reconstitution of 1-4-93 until reinstatement in the administration sent **on 16-5-22** to Mr. Durovray, the President of the Departmental Council of Essonne (CG91), and (b) the letter from the CG91 acknowledging receipt of this request dated **23-5-22** [the absence of a response to the request made to the CG91 within the 2-month period is equivalent to the rejection of the request, therefore the implicit decision of rejection was born **on 23-7-22**], I filed **on 8-9-22 a request (PJ no 11)** asking the Versailles Administrative Court (AC) to order the CG91 to take into account (a) the content of the decision of the Poitiers Administrative Court of 17-7-13 (PJ no 11.2) and (b) the refugee status obtained in 2002 in the USA [on the basis, among others, (i) **of the illegal dismissal** of 1-4-93, (ii) **of the threats received** during the dismissal interview, (iii) of the persecutions, and (iv) of **the lack of protection** (among others, violations of the right to a fair trial and of the right to an effective remedy during the proceedings before the AApC and the CE between 1999 and 2001) of which I was the victim due to the political scandal linked to the fraud on the travel expenses of Mr. Dugoin (and other politicians) in the 90s] to reconstruct my career as an agent Departmental contract worker from 1-4-93 until reinstatement [including payment of (a) lost wages less income of any kind that I had during this period, and (b) retirement and supplementary retirement contributions linked to lost wages to retirement organizations during the period]. **The application (PJ no. 11)** also justifies the reconstruction of the career by the commission by the CG91 and its leaders **(1) of the offences** (a) *of obstruction of the referral to justice* in 1999-2000 [linked to the appeal of the judgment of 10-8-98 by the CG91 and to the deliberation authorising the appeal of 2000 unjustified (**unjust** ...) and motivated, among other things, by the desire to conceal the commission of offences by certain politicians of the CG91] and (b) *of receiving stolen goods in obstruction of the referral to justice* (by the CG91) from 2000 [linked to the profit from the proceeds of the offence of obstruction of the referral to justice , here, among other things, the theft of the 98 judgment and the compensation it granted me] and **(2) of the offence of concealment of crimes against humanity of persecution** linked to the unconstitutional LA law and OMLs [linked to the fact that the CG91 ... has benefited and continues to benefit from this crime linked to the unconstitutional LA law and OMLs]. A request for legal aid was submitted concurrently with the filing of the application and a lawyer was appointed **on 13-2-23 (more than 5 months later)**.

2) The CG91 defense brief of 31-3-23 and my observations on this brief of 30-4-23.

16. The Department of Essonne filed **a defense brief 31-3-23 (PJ no 12, 6 months later)** opposing each of the 4 grounds of the application [among others, it explains (1) that the decision of the Poitiers Administrative Court of 17-7-13 did not annul the dismissal decision of 18-1-93 and that only the annulment of the dismissal decision can justify the reconstitution of career, (2) that the CG91 was not even a party to the 2012-2013 proceedings at the Poitiers Administrative Court, and therefore that the refusal to reconstitute the career cannot prevent the execution of the judgment of the Poitiers Administrative Court, (3) that the CG91 cannot have committed *the concealment of a crime against humanity* linked to the LA law because the decision of the Paris Administrative Appeal Court (AApC) of 2000 annulled the judgment of the Versailles Administrative Court of 98 on the grounds that the application was time-barred, and (4) that the accusation that the CG91 committed *an obstruction of the referral to justice* in 1999 has no connection with the refusal to reconstruct the career, and therefore that the 4 grounds are ineffective] and concluding with the dismissal of the application (which it considers to be unfounded); and I have submitted **observations on this defense brief 4/30/23 (PJ no. 13)** which respond in detail to the arguments of the CG91 defence brief by pointing out the errors of fact and understanding (...) of the brief (among others), then by describing in detail: (1) the errors (frauds) committed by the AApC of Bordeaux, the CE and the Constitutional Council during the QPC procedure on the LA law of 2015 (in the case against PE) in order to avoid having to judge the LA law and the OMLs unconstitutional (**PJ no. 13, no. 7-18**), (2) the elements *of the crime against humanity of persecution* linked to dishonest LA law [see **PJ no 13, no 20-23** , which refers to the 2020 letter to the UN Security Council and the ICC explaining in more detail why these accusations are well-founded, and which describes the arguments supporting the unconstitutionality of the LA law at nos. 47-51]; and (3) this brief also briefly discusses the four-year disqualification and why it does not apply here [at the end of the

observations on the reminder of facts, nos. 24-25; this issue of the non-applicability of the four-year disqualification (statute of limitation) is complex in this case, so it is also addressed in more detail in the brief of 8-1-24 described below]. Then the observations section *on the discussion ...* of the brief (no. 26-58) returns in more detail to **the 4 means** justifying the reconstruction of career [means 3 and 4 based on the criminal accusations required, in the event that the CG91 did not present these accusations to the public prosecutor in accordance with CPP 40 and refused to resolve the case amicably, to present criminal proceedings in parallel with the administrative appeal, which is very difficult (impossible even for me) to do without the help of a lawyer, but the SAPIN II law of 2016 presents alternative solutions as we will see here]. The AC transmitted (at my request) this brief of 30-4-23 to the CG91 **on 18-10-23** (5 months after its submission), and the CG91 did not respond within the 1-month period allowed (and to date).

3) The position on the case and the proposed brief of Me Rochefort, the appointed lawyer.

17. **On 12-4-23** , the lawyer appointed under the LA law presented her position to me on the case (PJ no 12.2) and a proposed memorandum (PJ no 12.3) to regularize the procedure, **but, due to (a) the obvious** factual errors made by Mrs. Rochefort in her proposed brief, and **(b) her position** on the admissibility of the application which did not take into account a large number of (i) facts of the case [in particular what I did between 2011 and 2022 after my return to France from the USA where I was a refugee between 2002 and 2011, **the legal appeals** that I filed **including the one against Pôle Emploi (the unemployment agency) based on the same facts generating the claim against the CG91** , the QPCs on the LA law ...], (ii) rules of law, and (iii) case law related to this case, **I asked** Mrs. Rochefort (1) not to file her brief of 12-4-23 until we have agreed on the legal and factual issues of the case, and (2) to study the possibility that she has a ***conflict of interest*** in this case related to my accusations (a) of unconstitutionality of the LA law, (b) *of crime against humanity* related to dishonest LA law, (c) of fraud by the supreme courts during my QPC proceedings of 2015 and 2019, and (d) *of concealment of crimes against humanity* brought against lawyers who profit from the unconstitutional LA law and OMLs [see brief of 30-4-23, PJ no. 13, no. 23 and letter to the AC dated 16-4-23 (PJ no. 14, no. 3)]. And I immediately wrote to the AC on 16-4-23 (PJ no 14) (1) to explain why I had asked Mrs. Rochefort not to file her proposed brief, and (2) to ask it not to accept any documents from Mrs. Rochefort until we had agreed on the factual and legal issues in the case and on the issue of her possible conflict of interest in this case. And I also explained that I was going to present a brief (the brief of 30-4-23) to oppose the CG91 defense brief and to clarify the request of 8-9-22 .

*** 17.1 After receiving and studying the brief of 30-4-23, Me Rochefort informed me in her email of 19-6-23 (PJ no. 12.4) that the brief of 30-4-23 did not change her position on the case and that she did not want to help me on the criminal issues of the case [because she was not a volunteer and not competent on these issues], but she did not answer my questions on the possibility of a conflict of interest for her (...), and she did not comment on the accusations that I made, in particular those of unconstitutionality of the LA law (...), except to say that ' *it was not wise to criticize the senior judges (...)* '. I provided her with details on the concerns she had about the admissibility of the application (quadrennial forfeiture and authority of res judicata) on 26-6-23 (PJ no. 12.5), and I offered my services to help her argue these 2 issues, but, after 3 months of waiting, she responded (see email of 10-10-23) by maintaining her position and her refusal to help me on the criminal issues, and still not answering the questions I had asked her (in particular on the unconstitutionality of the LA law, the fraud of the supreme courts during my QPCs on the LA law, conflict of interest for her in this case, ...), **so** I was forced to complain to the Bâtonnier on 30-11-23 (no. 18).

17.2 In the dismissal proceedings before the Paris AApC **in 1999** , the lawyer appointed by the LAO to assist me had also refused to assist me with the criminal issues of the case; given the dishonesty of the LA system, this is understandable, but it is very unfair to me, and it was one of the main causes of the loss of the appeal in 2000, and it could still cause me serious harm today (letter of 27-2-24, PJ no. 27.3, no. 7). ***

4) My letters to the Bâtonnier (President of the Bar) dated 23-11-23 and to the AC dated 11-12-23.

18. On 30-11-23, I sent a letter to the President of the Versailles Bar ([PJ no. 16](#)) (1) to describe to him (a) the difficulties I was encountering with Me Rochefort, (b) the errors of fact and law that she was making in her position and her proposed brief, and (c) the importance of the criminal issues in the application in this case, in particular because of the SAPIN II law which makes me *a whistleblower* since 2022 in this case and which gives me new rights, and (2) to ask for his help in resolving the problems that these difficulties caused me in the procedure to obtain career reconstruction; I addressed the legal and factual issues in the case by presenting the appropriate research elements that I had identified on the subjects of (1) the inapplicability of the four-year disqualification ([PJ no. 16, no. 7-25](#)), (2) the inapplicability of the authority of res judicata ([PJ no. 16, no. 26-37](#)), (3) the accusations of *obstructing the referral of the matter to justice* and *concealing this offence* ([PJ no. 16, no. 38-47](#)), (4) the errors made by Mrs. Rochefort in her proposed brief, and the reasons why (a) I can be considered *a whistleblower*, and (b) L. 911-1-1 of the CJA and the SAPIN II law can be used to justify career reconstruction ([PJ no. 16, no. 48-56](#)), and (5) the unconstitutionality of the LA law and the OMLs, *the crime against humanity of persecution* linked to the LA law, and fraud during my QPCs on the LA law ([PJ no. 16, no. 57-60](#)). Then, in the letter of 11-12-23 to the Administrative Court ([Attachment no. 18](#)), I sent to the President of the 2nd Chamber of the Administrative Court of Versailles a copy of the letter to the President of the Bar ([Attachment no. 16](#)), I mentioned that the SAPIN II law, on its own, explained the many difficulties that I had encountered in the proceedings against the CG91 from 1999 to 2001, and since my return to France in 2001, and made it possible to justify the merits of the career reconstruction, and I informed her that I was concurrently filing an interim relief based on *appeals against a retaliatory measure* and the SAPIN II law and denouncing the unfair treatment of the CG91 of which I considered myself a victim.

5) The interim relief of 11-12-23 based on *appeals against a retaliatory measure* .

19. On 11-12-23, I therefore also submitted to the Versailles Administrative Court **an interim order** ([PJ no. 27](#)) to ask the Administrative Court to order the CG91 to pay an interim order of **200,000 euros** on the amount of the upcoming career reconstruction of approximately **2 million euros** because *the existence of the CG91's obligation was not seriously contestable*, in view of the arguments presented and the absence of opposition from the CG91 to the brief of 30-4-23. This interim relief presents *3 appeals against a retaliatory measure* based on Article 10-1 and 12-1 of the SAPIN II law and L. 911-1-1 of the CJA: (1) the **1st appeal** (at no 6-8) briefly explains (a) why I can be considered *a whistleblower* for the accusations that I brought before the AC, the AApC and the CAC of Paris, namely the fact that I was dismissed for facilitating the fraud on the travel expenses of Mr. Dugoin and other politicians, and implicitly that the CG91 was **complicit** in the fraud (see [brief of June 98](#), [letter of 10-9-99 to the CA of Paris](#), and letter of 26-2-24, [PJ no 27.3](#)), and (b) that the CG91's 1999 appeal to have the 1998 AC judgment set aside and the decision authorizing the 2000 appeal constituted **unfair and disadvantageous treatment** and even **a form of retaliation** for the accusations brought, and therefore that the AC can use L. 911-1-1 of the CJA to reconstruct the career; (2) **the 2nd appeal** (at no. 9) is similar, but it uses the accusations of *obstruction of the judicial system* against the CG91 (related to the unfair and dishonest 1999 appeal) to justify the use of L. 911-1-1; and (3) **the 3rd appeal** (at no. 10) is linked to non-opposition and non-transmission to the prosecutor according to CPP 40 of the accusations of *crime against humanity* linked to the dishonest LA law and *the concealment of this crime*, and uses article 12-1 of SAPIN II to have the refusal to reconstruct the career of CG91 annulled [in the brief of 8-1-24, I only present **2 appeals against a retaliatory measure** instead of 3 in the interim proceedings, and I slightly reorganize the arguments presented and add certain new arguments (see [PJ no. 21, no. 46-52](#))].

6) The closure of the instruction of 12-12-23 and the memorandum of 8-1-24.

20. The interim relief was not immediately forwarded to the CG91 by the TA, which instead sent *an order to close the investigation*. **from 12-12-23** ([PJ no 19](#)), so I filed a new brief **on 8-1-24** ([PJ no. 21](#)) (a) which takes into account the research elements on the case contained in the letter to the President of the

Bar, (b) which reorganizes the facts of the case described in the application in a clearer and more detailed format for the AC [see description of the facts of the case (or *facts giving rise to the claim against the CG91*), no. 1-29, and the summary (or summary list) of the facts giving rise to the claim in no. 24] and (c) which presents **4 (new)** grounds justifying the reconstruction of the career. These 4 grounds are **different** from the 4 grounds described in the application of 8-9-22 and the brief of 30-4-24: **(1) the first ground ([PJ no. 21, no. 31-45](#))** based (a) on *the application for annulment of the dismissal decision* of 18-1-93, (b) on numerous rules of law and appropriate case law, among others, and (c) on numerous facts which explain, among other things, in detail why *the four-year forfeiture* does not apply in this case ([PJ no. 21, no. 33-44](#)) and why *the authority of res judicata* and the decision of the AApC of 2000 (of that of the CE of 2001) do not prevent me from submitting this request for cancellation of the dismissal and for career reconstruction today ([PJ no. 21, no. 31-32](#)); **(2) the second means** (which requests the reconstruction of career using L. 911-1-1 of the CJA, [PJ no. 21, no. 46-49](#)) and **the third** (which requests career reconstruction using article 12-1 of the SAPIN II law, [PJ no. 21, no. 50-52](#)) are **2 appeals against a retaliatory measure** (equivalent to those of the interim relief) based on article 10-1 of the SAPIN II law; and **(3) the fourth ground ([PJ no. 21, no. 53-57](#))** requests the reconstruction of career on the basis of article L. 911-4 of the CJA and the annulment of the decision of the AApC of 2000 (proposal made on 12-4-23 by the lawyer, slightly modified).

7) The 2nd defence brief of CG91 of 2-2-24, my observations on this brief of 8-2-24, the request for recusal of Mrs Geismar and the request for reopening of the investigation.

21. The closing of the investigation was postponed **to 9-2-24** , and the brief of 8-1-24 was immediately forwarded to the CG91 which responded **on 2-2-24** with a 2nd brief in defense ([PJ no. 23](#)) (a) which is not precise, (b) which contains obvious errors of fact, (c) which ignores most of the arguments of fact and law that I presented in the brief of 8-1-24, **and (d) which does not oppose the 2 appeals against a retaliatory measure** , whereas these are 2 important grounds justifying the reconstruction of career. The CG91 mainly claims: **(1) that** the application and the briefs are inadmissible because they were not written and signed by the lawyer appointed under the LA law in accordance with R 431-1 of the CJA, and because the lawyer did not regularize the procedure (page 3-5), whereas (a) there is no *obligation to provide legal services* in this procedure, (b) I denounced the unconstitutionality of the LA law and the OMLs, (c) Mrs. Rochefort did not help me as she should have done as we saw in no. 17, and (d) I complained to the Bâtonnier and the AC about her behavior; **(2) that** I did not request the cancellation of the dismissal decision until January 2024 (1 year and 4 months after the request) and that it is too late, and that, in addition, I had already requested the cancellation of the dismissal decision in 1998 and therefore it is no longer possible (pp. 5-7), whereas (a) I had requested the cancellation of the dismissal decision in April 2023 (in the brief of 30-4-23, no. 16), and (b) it was also requested implicitly when I requested career reconstruction in 2022 [and, (c) I had not made this request in 1998 as the AApC explained in its 2000 decision and the brief of 8-1-24 (no. 31-32)] ; **(3) that** the application is time-barred, without addressing the specific arguments that I presented on this subject in the brief of 8-1-24. I opposed (urgently, 2 days) this 2nd brief in defense on 8-2-24 ([PJ no. 26](#)), and I also filed a copy of the brief of 8-2-24 in the interim relief proceedings.

*** 21.1 The argument **of CG91** , which asks the judge to rule the application and the briefs inadmissible because they are not signed by the lawyer appointed to assist me, **is clear evidence** that the CG91 seeks to take advantage of the dishonesty of the LA law and the OMLs to try to steal my right to career reconstruction, and that it commits *the offense of concealing a crime against humanity of persecution*.

21.2 On 7-2-24, I also filed (1) **a request for the disqualification** of Ms Geismar, the rapporteur (a) who sent the order closing the investigation and did not give me time to respond to the 2nd defence brief of the CG91, and (b) who had unfairly judged, I think, an interim relief application that I had filed in Poitiers **in 2022** in the case against Pôle Emploi ([PJ no. 25](#)), and (2) **a request to reopen the investigation ([PJ no. 24](#) ;** I did not know at that date that the interim relief would be transmitted to the CG91). ***

8) The response of the Bâtonnier of 19-12-23 and my comment on this letter to the TA of 15-1-24.

22. On 19-12-23, the President of the Bar responded to my letter of 23-11-23 in a brief letter ([PJ no. 17](#)) which claims **(1) that Me Rochefort had been appointed** to assist me in *a career reconstruction procedure*. to the Administrative Court, and is therefore **not intended to help me with the criminal** issues in the case ([PJ no. 17, p. 2](#)), **although this is necessarily false** because of the SAPIN II law and article **L. 911-1-1 of the CJA** which allow one to obtain from the administrative court the reinstatement in the administration of an agent (and the reconstruction of his career) when he has reported the commission of an offence or crime (...) to the competent authorities according to articles 6 and 8 of the SAPIN II law as I did in 1998 ([memorandum June 98](#)) and 1999 ([PJ no. 15](#)), and I am doing so again today (see also on this subject the response and explanations given in the letter to the Administrative Court of 15-1-24, [PJ no. 20, no. 2-5](#)). Then, he claims **(2) that Mrs. Rochefort has no conflict of interest** in this case and that I provide no evidence to justify the existence of this conflict of interest, **while this is also false** because I explained that according to ' *article 7 of decree no. 2005-790 of 12-7-05, 'the lawyer cannot be the counsel or the representative or the defender of more than one client in the same case if there is a conflict between the interests of his clients or, unless the parties agree, if there is a serious risk of such a conflict .',* and therefore that, in this case which denounces the unconstitutionality of the LA law, Mrs. Rochefort, the lawyer appointed by the Order, who represents the Order of Lawyers and me at the same time, necessarily has a conflict of interest (see response on this subject in the letter of 15-1-24 [PJ no. 20, no. 6-8.1](#)). Furthermore, I accuse lawyers of committing the offence of *concealing a crime against humanity* whenever they assist a client in a procedure involving an OML (no. 13), and this also necessarily creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer in this case.

23. Finally, the President of the Bar explains **(3) that he is authorized to give a point of view on the ethical aspect of the lawyer's behavior**, and **not authorized to make a judgment** or give advice on the strategy or on the argumentation retained by the lawyer (Mrs. Rochefort), **whereas this is also false**. Indeed, the position of, - or the argumentation retained by -, Mrs. Rochefort may constitute *negligence* or *a breach of trust*, and therefore constitute (criminal) behavior which does not necessarily respect the lawyer's ethics; and I gave specific examples of this fact in the letter of 15-1-24 ([PJ no. 20, no. 9-15](#)) sent to the Administrative Court of Versailles commenting in detail on the response of the Bar Association, opposing his arguments, and requesting that the interim relief be judged before the closing of the investigation of the main appeal and to allow me to submit *a request for an advance payment for costs of the proceedings to be paid by the CG91* (on the basis of article 10-1 of the SAPIN II law) if the interim relief was rejected or not judged, but the Administrative Court did not respond and the investigation of the main appeal was closed on 8-2-24.

9) The transmission to the CG91 of the interim relief (...) by the AC on 13-2-24 and the dismissal order of 22-3-24.

24. The interim relief ([PJ no. 27](#)), the letter of 15-1-24 ([PJ no. 20](#)) opposing the arguments of the Bâtonnier that I sent to the Administrative Court of Versailles in the main proceedings and in the interim proceedings, and the memorandum of 8-2-24 ([PJ no. 26](#)) in response to the 2nd defence brief of the CG91 also filed in the interim proceedings, were sent to the CG91 **on 13-2-24** requesting a response within the following month; and my letter of 27-2-24 ([PJ no. 27.3](#)) providing **legal clarifications** related to the use of CPP 40 and the operation of the SAPIN I law was sent to the CG91 on 27-2-24 requesting a response within 15 days, and an order to close the investigation was immediately sent and set the closing of the investigation for 14-3-24. The CG91 did not oppose the interim relief and the related documents within the time limits allocated by the court; and the order rejecting the interim relief was issued on 22-3-24 ([PJ no. 27.6](#)) and notified the same day ([PJ no. 27.7](#)), but this order is dishonest because it provides an imprecise, incorrect and biased description of the facts and it ignores and does not judge the various questions of law raised in the interim relief as we will see briefly now.

10) The imprecise and incorrect decision of 22-3-24 rejecting the interim relief and the appeal of 3-4-24.

25. First, the brief description of the facts in the order ([PJ no. 27.5, no. 1](#)) does not give an impartial view of the case; indeed, the facts of the case (threats received during the dismissal, political scandal and fraud committed by politicians, obtaining refugee status, etc.), and the legal issues related to these facts of the case (criminal charges, unconstitutionality of the LA law, crime against humanity, SAPIN II law, etc.) are particular and unusual, so they cannot be limited to the fact that I was dismissed in 93 and I am requesting the cancellation of this dismissal **31 years later** (see appeal of 3-4-24, [PJ no. 27.8, no. 11-14](#)). Then, the brief description of the procedure also **minimizes** the serious problems I encountered with the appointed lawyer, the serious errors she committed, and the little help she gave me, **and** completely ignores the unfair response of the President of the Bar who covered up the prejudicial behavior of Mrs. Rochefort and who refused to help me on the questions of the unconstitutionality of the LA law and *the crime against humanity of persecution* linked, among others (see [PJ no. 27.8, no. 14](#)). And, finally, the description of the grounds that I presented to justify the granting of the interim relief is completely erroneous; the Administrative Court explains (at no. 4) that ' *to establish the non-seriously contestable nature of his claim, Mr Geneviev indicates that he is a whistleblower with regard to three elements: the illegalities and actions committed by the Essonne department, the accusations that they allegedly made and the unconstitutionality of the legal aid system* ', which is, according to the description he uses, a crime against humanity of persecution. However, by the documents produced and having regard to the very purpose of the interim relief proceedings, the interested party does not establish the non-seriously contestable nature of the claim'; but this summary is factually incorrect and the conclusion contains an obvious legal error. For example, I do not indicate that *I am a whistleblower with regard to the 3 elements given in the order*; the definition of *whistleblower* given in the SAPIN II law in article 6 is precise, detailed and very specific (as we saw in no. 2), so I used this definition and studied each important point (as I did above in no. 2-3), and the AC had all the necessary elements to establish that I was indeed (or at least to judge precisely whether I could be considered as) *a whistleblower* for the reports that I made to the courts and to the competent bodies (or at worst to explain precisely why I was not a whistleblower, if that is what the judge thought, see [PJ no. 27.8, no. 15-34](#)).

26. Also, I did not qualify *the unconstitutionality of the LA law* as a *crime against humanity of persecution*; I first explained why the LA law and the related OMLs were unconstitutional, and I presented (a) several QPCs on the LA law to (try to) establish this before the courts, and (b) criminal complaints to denounce the problems that this unconstitutionality of the LA law (...) caused to the poor and to me in particular (...); and, then, because of the inappropriate and unfair responses that I received, I filed a complaint for *the crime against humanity of persecution related to the accusations* of unconstitutionality of the AJ (...). So I appealed the order rejecting the interim relief **on 3-4-24** ([PJ no. 27.7](#)) to explain in detail why the decision is incorrect and even (very) unfair because it does not address any of the arguments that I gave in the first instance, and it makes me lose a level of jurisdiction in which there is no obligation of the ministry of counsel by sending me to appeal, a procedure in which there is an obligation of the ministry of counsel. Furthermore, (a) as the CG91 did not oppose the interim relief and the related briefs in this interim

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relief procedure, and (b) that, in this type of procedure (*an appeal against a retaliatory measure based on the SAPIN II law*), it is the opponent of the whistleblower who must provide proof that the treatment of which the whistleblower is a victim was not unfair, **the non-opposition of the interim relief** is equivalent to an **admission** that the interim relief is well-founded and that the CG91 has *an incontestable obligation* to reconstruct my career as the case law requires ([PJ no. 27.8, no. 38](#)).

*** 26.1 I also filed (a) an application for legal aid on 4-4-24 because of the obligation to provide legal services and because of the procedural costs that I cannot pay, and (b) *a request for an advance on costs of the proceedings* to be paid by the CG91 as the SAPIN II law allows me to do ([Enclosure no. 27.11](#)); and I filed on 6-5-24 a supplement to the appeal ([Enclosure no. 27.12](#)) presenting a legal reference from September 2021 ([Enclosure no. 27.9, p. 27](#)) which explains that the Court of Cassation (CC) found a way to protect whistleblowers **for facts prior to the first law of 2013** protecting whistleblowers (and therefore **prior to the SAPIN II law of 2016**) in its decision of 7-7-21 ([PJ no. 27.10](#)) in which she uses **Article 10-1 of the ECHR** (on freedom of expression) in a dismissal case to protect the employee dismissed in 2012 who had reported to his employer facts likely to constitute an offence or a crime before the launch of the procedure for his dismissal, which further supports, I think, the merits of the interim relief and my request for career reconstruction because it confirms the serious misconduct that the CG91 and the AApC of Paris committed in 1999-2000 and the CG91 has been making since 2022. The legal aid request was forwarded to the BAJ, which requested additional information which, in my opinion, was not necessary, and which forced me to return it on 10-5-24 by Internet and by mail 27-5-24. ***

27. I believe that the appeal, the interim relief, and the application for career reconstruction are well-founded, and that they highlight the serious injustices (including misdemeanors and crimes) that I have suffered as a result of the political scandal in Essonne and during the legal proceedings from 1998 to 2001 (and after until today); and as explained [in the appeal at no. 34, 36 and 37](#) , I even believe that, because of my status as a whistleblower linked to the accusations brought against the LA law and the OMLs, the AApC could (1) rule *ex officio* that *imposing an obligation to provide a lawyer* would be unfair in the context of the AC's improperly reasoned decision (and therefore automatically null and void according to art. 12-1 of the Sapin II law), and (2) **grant** the interim relief **ex officio** without waiting for the LAO's decision and the appointment of a lawyer. But I have been and continue to be handicapped [because of (a) the accusations I made that make me a whistleblower, (b) the unconstitutionality of the LA law ...] in this procedure: (1) I contacted the CG91 several times to ask them if we could meet to discuss the amicable resolution of the case (questions of law and fact, and to clarify my briefs if necessary), but they never wanted to (and responded to the 1st request only); (2) the appointed lawyer, who could have possibly helped me obtain an amicable resolution with the CG91, did not want to help me on the criminal issues, and maintained a position on the case identical to that of the CG91 which did not take into account many facts and rules of law, and even after I opposed her point of view with precise arguments of fact and law (in the letter to the president of the bar, then in the brief of 8-1-24) which established the merits of my case, she refused to take them into account and therefore to help me

convince the CG91 (and the same thing could happen again if another lawyer is appointed); (3) the judge, vice-president of the court, who is surely an experienced judge, ignored, in her order on the interim relief, all the arguments of fact and law that I had presented [**in this kind of somewhat unusual procedure** (interim relief), if she had ruled in my favor, the CG91 could have appealed her decision directly in the main proceedings (if it did not want to go before the AApC), which would have forced the judge and the AC to rule on the interim relief and the main application at the same time, so it is possible that the judge knowingly dismissed my appeal to force me to appeal to the AApC and let the AApC rule on the questions of law of the interim relief which are, it is true, a little unusual and complex, **but** that does not change the fact that, after almost 2 years of proceedings, I still do not have precise answers to the solid arguments that I believe I have presented to support the merits of my application for career restoration, and that, more than 4 months after filing the appeal, the BAJ has not yet responded to the legal aid request, I do not know if the legal aid will be granted, and if a lawyer is appointed if he will help me or refuse to help me as the lawyer at first instance did]; (4) the president of the AApC of Versailles, who is judging the appeal, was rapporteur at the Constitutional Council in October 2015 when my QPC on the LA law was judged (unfairly, I think) by the Council, so if he participated in this decision of 2015, he might not welcome ' *favorably* ' my accusations of fraud in this procedure if he is brought to give his opinion or judged the LA request; and (5) I still risk being the victim of reprisals for the accusations against the LA law, of *crime against humanity* linked to the dishonest LA law, against the judges of the supreme courts who judged my QPCs (...) and against French politicians.

28. I hope that ' *you* ' (all of you, including the ICC of course) will understand the difficult situation in which **the poor people** who come before the courts because of unconstitutional LA law and OMLs find themselves (even when they make obvious efforts to find factual and legal arguments supporting their position before the judges as I have done); and that you will act to highlight this problem in France (...) and to improve legal aid systems everywhere in the world. I have spoken about most of the topics I have raised here to the French deputies and senators and government in the letters of 23-2-23 and 7-7-23, but they have not responded, and they have not responded either to the new proposals that I have presented to them and which I will now tell you about, **yet** they had **a legal obligation** according to CPP 40 to act and address the LA law problems that I have described; and they also had the possibility of improving my living conditions by encouraging Pôle Emploi to correct the injustice linked to the OMLs (and the legal aid law) of which I was a victim in 20213 and which made me lose 50,000 euros (among others), but they did nothing, they keep me in **extreme poverty**, while I work in the interest of all and make proposals useful to all, and they did not discuss these subjects publicly (before the election of 1 and 7-7-24). I will now present several new proposals and comment on the recent reports on artificial intelligence and the GRO 2024 which present important information for all countries.

III The new proposals presented here (and in the letters of 23-2-23 and 7-7-23) **and comments on the reports on AI** [[Governing AI for Humanity](#) , [Gladstone Action Plan](#)] and the Global Resources Outlook ([GRO 2024](#)).

A The contents of my letters of 23-2-23 and 7-7-23 and the reports on AI.

1) The link between the pension reform in France, the proposals I made to the UN and the conflict in Ukraine.

30. The letter of 23-2-23 (PJ no 9) first speaks of **the pension reform** in France which has been heavily criticized by the French, the unions, and most political parties because its main objective was to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64 to balance the income and expenditure of the pension system (in particular due to the aging of the population), **but** an important goal of (or an important reason behind) this reform was also to reduce public spending which has increased significantly in recent years because of the COVID 19 crisis and the war in Ukraine, which have resulted in significant exceptional expenditure for France (and many other countries, of course), and which, for the war in Ukraine, still results in significant (direct and indirect) expenditure which we do not know when it will stop because no real effort to end the war is being made, and because the decision to negotiate a possible peace or not is given to Mr. Zelensky and his government (!) ; **so this letter also speaks of the war in Ukraine**. The pension reform was (and is) also necessarily linked (1) to the work and proposals that I have made since 1997 and which I spoke to you about in my previous letters [in 1997, the proposal made to the European Inco-Copernicus programme to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data in the world ([PJ no 49.1](#), [PJ no 49.2](#), [PJ no 49.3](#)); and more recently the letter of 23-5-21 ([PJ no 3](#), EN [PJ no 3.2](#)) presenting a platform of proposal in the context of my candidacy for the post of CITO, and the letters of 15-1-22 ([PJ no 7](#), EN [PJ no 7.2](#)), of 23-3-22 ([PJ no 8](#)) speaking of my candidacy for the post of Envoy of the Secretary General for technologies, and of the war in Ukraine], and (2) to the accusations of crime against humanity of persecution linked to the dishonest LA law and OMLs which I also address in my last letters. Indeed, **(1) the proposals** made to the UN (and its member countries) aim **to help all countries** (a) **achieve the SDGs**, (b) **solve some of their** major problems (poverty, inequality, dysfunctional justice systems, the digital divide, maintaining international peace and security, etc.), and (c) **reduce their public spending** by pooling some expenses and developing ' *administrative* ' (such as LA) and IT (Internet) systems to make them more efficient, which can be used **by all countries** (including poor countries), and thus meet our (for rich countries) development assistance obligations (ODA) while improving **our** own systems and the functioning of administrations; and **(2) the accusations of crimes against humanity** linked to the dishonest LA law and OMLs highlight a justice system which systematically steals from the poorest who are also the most affected by the pension reform, so these different subjects were all linked.

31. My 2 letters of 23-2-23 ([PJ no 9](#)) and 7-7-23 ([PJ no. 10](#)) therefore present a proposal (1) to dismantle NATO and **(2) to create a new international organization** in its place *in charge of the modernisation of the armies, disarmament (nuclear, ...), peacekeeping and international security...* ', which would include the current UN entities responsible for peacekeeping, disarmament (nuclear, ...), and which would also have new responsibilities as we will see below; then a proposal (3) to develop a new retirement system that could be used by all UN member countries (...), and which would allow (a) to significantly reduce the cost of pension management, and (b) to bring many advantages (increased life expectancy, ...) and new functionalities important for all countries as we will see below also [as explained in [PJ no. 10](#) at no. 65, ' *a study published in 2000 by the ILO pointed out that '90% of the world's working-age population are not covered by pension schemes that guarantee them an adequate income.'*, so working on an efficient, less costly, and socially useful **pension system could help many countries around the world** , and **the proposal** I have made would allow us to do that, I think. **Our pay-as-you-go pension system is not so bad** , especially if we improve it significantly to reduce its operating costs and to add new features to generate additional income and achieve balance without reducing acquired rights (...) as I propose to do. ']. And, more generally, the letter of 7-7-23 also proposes **(4) that** , when rich countries (...) think about implementing a new law and a new administrative system (such as pension or LA law reform), they should also think, on the rare occasions when it is possible , about the possibility of

developing systems that can be used by all countries at the same time, as I did for the LA system and the pension management system, among others. As seen above, the letter of 7-7-23 also provides additional arguments to support the merits of the complaint to the ICC and returns to the proposal to improve LA systems and the platform of proposals presented to the UN in 2021.

2) The objectives of the UN and Gladstone AI Inc. reports on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and their connection to the work and proposals I have made since 1997.

32. The UN's Artificial Intelligence (AI) reports [[Governing AI for Humanity](#) , 12-2023] and Gladstone AI Inc. [written for the US Department of State, [Gladstone Action Plan](#) , 2-2024] have partly different objectives since the UN report highlights the importance of rapidly establishing international (global) governance of artificial intelligence (AI) to benefit all countries, communities and individuals from AI, and to better manage the risks associated with this technology ['*We believe that **global governance of AI** is essential to reap the significant opportunity and navigate the risk that this technology presents for states, communities and individuals today.*' page 20], and the Gladstone report aims to improve the safety and security of **advanced** artificial intelligence systems ['*Its aim is to increase the safety and security of advanced AI by countering **catastrophic national security risks from AI weaponization and loss of control**.*' page 12], but they also address several common topics such as (1) the recent significant progress that advanced AI systems have made, (2) the risks associated with the development of advanced AI systems, and (3) the importance of putting in place *structures*, regulations (...) to limit the risks associated with the development of these systems. The UN report describes functions that need to be performed within the framework of global AI governance, but does not propose, at this stage, a model for international AI governance, and the Gladstone Action Plan clearly proposes to create an International AI Agency (page 152) (a) which would make at the international level, among other things, the same type of observations and verifications on all actors in the supply chain (or who participate in the development and operation) of **advanced** AI systems, that it proposes to make at the US level, and (b) which would be responsible for setting up international standards (and international regulations...) in the areas of security, evaluation (...) of advanced AI systems similar to those existing (or to be set up) in the US. These two reports therefore address some important topics that I have addressed in the context of the proposals that I have made and am making here at the UN, but they do not take into account the proposals that I have made to improve Internet governance (1) **while** the possible synergies between the proposals that they make and those that I have made are obvious, and, for the UN report, (2) **while** the proposals that I have made [in particular the proposal to develop a new legal aid system that can be used by all countries and that would use AI to facilitate the work of AJ judges and lawyers ...] (a) are essential to ensure that all countries and all the inhabitants of the planet benefit from the benefits of AI, (b) present solutions to the problems that they pose and (c) are consistent with the objectives that they want to achieve (no. 44-51).

33. As the UN report and the Gladstone Action Plan think, there is an urgent need to establish international AI governance and even a (sort of) international AI agency, but I think **(1) that** , for multiple reasons that I will explain here, **this would be a** (or a new) **mistake . to dissociate the governance (technical ...) of AI of Internet governance** , and therefore **(2) that it is essential to create a new international organization dedicated to computer applications and networks** that will be responsible, among other things, for the '**technical**' governance of AI and **the governance of the Internet** ; and, of course, I also think that **the creation of a new international organization (IO)** for the modernization of armies, disarmament (...) that I will present here, **is crucial** to limit certain risks associated with advanced AI systems that the Gladstone report talks about, and should therefore be set up at the same time as the recommendations of this report and the creation of the new IO to govern AI and the Internet. I must also point out that the proposal of the Gladstone report presented in parallel (...) with the proposal to create an International Agency for AI (' 5.5 Allied multilateral initiatives to manage the AI supply chain ' or creation of an ' AI NATO ' p. 155-157), **which consists** , for the USA with the help of a small group of allied countries (the list of which is given on p. 157), which manufacture or develop or control all the elements (or components) which make it possible to operate advanced AI systems, **to control** the use of advanced AI systems on its territory or those of its allies, and **to**

allow other countries to obtain access to the infrastructures supporting AI of the USA or its allies under conditions, (a) is not a good solution, I think (even if we can understand that the experts of Gladstone Inc., who were responsible for writing a detailed report studying and presenting all the possible alternatives to the State Department, could present this solution), (b) is contrary to the UN Charter, and (c) is dangerous for the maintenance of international peace and security because this solution would above all contribute to dividing the world even more, in the same way that embargoes on microprocessors dedicated to AI, notably imposed on China, prevent the world from progressing and are dangerous for the maintenance of international peace and security.

34. I will now explain why the proposals that I have presented to you since 1997 and that I present to you here, **(a) address** some of the concerns presented in the AI reports, **(b) help** achieve some of the objectives put forward in those reports, and **(c) help** to resolve some of the important problems that those reports highlight. And in order not to repeat the arguments I had presented in my previous letters (from 2022 and before), I will (1) **briefly return** here only to the topics (from my 2 letters from 2023 and the AI reports) that I had not addressed in my previous letters such as (a) the proposal to develop a new pension management system, (b) the proposal to dismantle NATO and create, instead, a new IO for the modernization of armies, disarmament (...), (c) the modification of the proposal to create a new IO to govern the Internet adding to the responsibilities of this new organization the governance (technical or ...) of AI, and (d) the proposal to reflect on the possibility of making other reforms that are useful to all UN member countries, and (2) put these proposals in the context of the platform presented on 23-5-21 (and in 2016), the AI reports, the Global Resources Outlook 2024, and of the war in Ukraine.

B The pension system in France and how to improve it so that it is useful to all countries and the UN.

1) The government's objectives and why it was important to propose an alternative to the reform.

35. The main proposals of the pension reform proposed by the government were: (a) the postponement of the legal retirement age (from 62 to 64 years), (b) the increase in the working time to receive a pension (from 42 to 43 years), (c) the revaluation of small pensions for those who have a full career (85% of the minimum wage, or 1200 euros), and (d) the gradual end *of special schemes* (which had already begun for some); and the objectives were, among others: (a) *to preserve the redistributive system* , (b) *to consolidate our pay-as-you-go pension schemes which, without this, would be threatened because we continue to finance the system on credit* , and (c) *to guarantee the balance of the system in 2030 with an objective of justice* . Therefore, the reform **(1) did not bring no** real progress for the French (apart from the revaluation of small pensions), **(2) did not** significantly advance the organization and operation of the pension system [for example by providing additional benefits for the insured (the French) or by significantly reducing the management costs of the system, among other things] , and **(3) made** the poorest French people pay above all, whose life expectancy is not as high as that of rich people (...); so I presented **an alternative proposal** (a) that significantly improves the functioning and organization of our pension system, (b) that allows to withdraw new benefits (other than the payment of pensions) and to generate additional revenues from the system by making the Pension Insurance **an expert in life expectancy and an advisor to the government** in many areas (such as education, social, health ...), and by collecting more information on retirees and future retirees to estimate more precisely life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, to better analyze government policies in many areas (education, social, health,), and (c) that also allows to reduce management costs by taking advantage of new technologies (Internet, AI,) and by opening the possibility of designing a pension management system that can be used by all countries in the world .

2) The pension system in France is complicated, while very little information is taken into account.

36. In France, there are **42 pension funds** (basic schemes and supplementary schemes), and these pension funds do the same job since they collect contributions and pay pensions [even if they manage different groups of workers and use different rules governing the allocation of pensions (for example, civil servants depend on one pension fund, self-employed workers depend on another pension fund, etc.)] , so the system is quite complicated

, and it is limited in terms of the information it takes into account to calculate pension rights [for example, the system collects the name of the employer, the salaries (or income of all kinds) of workers and future retirees, the pension contributions paid ... (see my career statement, [PJ no. 11.3](#)), but it does not collect (1) the assets they have and the savings they have accumulated, whereas this could be a criterion for paying the pension to make the system fairer for example (everyone contributes to retirement, but the economic system is so unequal that some can become billionaires and others not, and billionaires do not need to receive a pension to live decently), (2) not the arduousness of work and working conditions at the individual level, ...]. I therefore proposed to take into account more information including the following information, among others : **(1) work done during unemployment** (work done on the unemployment project, work done to defend oneself in court, training, ...), and studies and training done outside of unemployment; **(2) health problems** (illnesses,) related to work or not, and **the arduousness of work** done at the individual level which can affect the well-being and life expectancy of future retirees; **(3) living conditions** (type of housing,) and **events** (accidents, layoffs, criminal record,) which can also affect the well-being and life expectancy of future retirees; **(4)** (for women in particular, and men who stop working to raise children) the children to whom the insured persons have given birth and whom they have raised; **(5) all pay slips** (in addition to pension contributions); **(6)** (for each insured person and pensioner) **the assets and savings accumulated and the income** they generate each year (...); and I proposed to launch a reflection to find out what other information could be collected to make the system even more efficient and also a reflection to determine the format of the information that should be collected, to create an efficient information system that is more useful to the community (...).

3) The proposal to make the Pension Insurance an expert in life expectancy and an advisor to the government, and to set up a pension management system that can be used by all countries.

37. I also proposed to create a single pension body for all types of professions and to create a pension system: **(1) which encourages** people to work longer (**voluntarily**) when they have a job and the health to do so [a significant number of people already do this without encouragement or with the encouragement of the current system , so existing mechanisms could be strengthened in certain circumstances to convince more people to work longer]; **(2) which allows** (a) to reduce expenditure (related to the payment of pensions) by taking into account the fact (i) that our society is **very unequal** (and unfair) and (ii) that people who have *benefited* (in the good sense of the term) from inequalities during their careers and lives could participate more in the search for balance in the system (by not receiving a pension or by receiving lower pensions), and **(b) to bring benefits to Society other than the sole payment of pensions to retirees** [such as **the significant overall increase in life expectancy** (and life expectancy **in good health**), **the significant reduction** in differences (- inequalities -) in life expectancies (...) between different socio-professional groups, the possibility of advising the government in its reforms in other areas such as justice, health, social affairs, etc.]; and **(3) which uses** an improved information system and advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence **(a) to take into account more information** on each future retiree and improve the functionalities and possibilities of the retirement system, **(b) to significantly reduce the operating cost** of our retirement system, and **(c) to reorganize** the different retirement organizations (merge the 42 pension funds ...). **The objectives of the new system** are no longer **just to paying** the highest possible pensions with the contributions paid by active workers and *the budgetary balance and the preservation of the redistributive system (...)* , **but also** (a) *to correct the injustices* that our imperfect systems create over the course of life , (b) *to increase life expectancy and healthy life expectancy overall and to reduce the differences in life expectancy between different socio-professional categories* , and, more generally (c) *to help advance the Society* , and (d) *to make Retirement Insurance (RA) (i) the national expert on life expectancy, (ii) the government advisor* [in several areas (social, employment, health, justice, education,)], and (iii) *a driver of progress for Society* [by generating income (revenue,) and indirect benefits that exceed the objective of a balanced budget]. And of course, such a system should not be developed for a single country, but for *all countries* that would like to use it to improve the living conditions of their populations, and to allow their populations to benefit from advanced AI systems (...) developed jointly, from a greater volume of standardized and high-quality data, and from more efficient analyses.

4) Development of the information system and a global computer application to establish a pension system that can be used by all countries.

38. It is important (capital) **to reduce the costs** that are linked to pension payments and **to generate revenues other** than those linked to the collection of pension contributions; and **(a) the development** of IT systems and AI systems necessary to improve the management of the pension system, to reduce management costs, to provide new functionalities and new benefits for pensioners and society, and to generate new revenues to balance the income and expenses of the system, and **(b) the maintenance** and operating costs of these advanced systems (and in particular AI systems), **are expensive**, so we have a clear interest in developing systems that can be used by all countries at the same time (especially if we seek to ensure that ' *AI governance ... brings benefits to humanity* ' p. 1 of the UN report), and the proposal that I have presented to the deputies and senators, to the union leaders and to the Prime Minister allows us to do this and will be useful to all countries. The development of this system will allow to standardize data formats between countries (to create a powerful information system) and to collect a large number of different high-quality data, which will allow the AI system to be more powerful and more useful for all countries as recommended by the UN report on p. 14 no. 51 [the system will contain data on all inhabitants of the planet (who are alive) and on all dead people who have been registered in the system, and **the volume of data managed will be considerable**]. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) could be the **functional managers** of this new global application; and, of course, the new international organization (IO) dedicated to computer applications and networks [which would have, among other things, the responsibility for Internet governance and the governance (*technical or ...*) of AI] that I propose to create (1st proposal in 2005, then 2016, 2021 and here) would be the **technical** manager of the development of this new application and its maintenance. And of course, these organizations would work in close collaboration with national administrations.

*** 38.1 Managing data from all countries at the same time through a global IT application also allows for managing a large volume of data and therefore setting up an organization that allows optimizing (minimizing) energy and water consumption which is significant for '*data centers*'; and advanced AI systems, using dedicated and more powerful microprocessors, also consume a lot of energy and water, so the UN report (p. 3) mentions the importance of taking this issue into account and protecting the environment (see also GRO 2024). ***

C The proposal to dismantle NATO and create a new IO for the modernization of armies (...), and the proposal to create a new IO to govern the Internet and AI are essential to maintain international peace and security, to achieve the SDGs and convergence and to solve our global problems.

1) **The importance of dismantling NATO and thinking about *our* security without forgetting (and even taking into account) the security needs of other countries.**

(a) The importance of diverting only the minimum of the world's human and economic resources to armaments.

39. The dismantling of NATO and the strengthening of the UN's capabilities in the field of maintaining international peace and security and in all related areas (disarmament, etc.) by creating, in place of NATO, *a new international organisation for the modernization of armies, the maintenance of peace and international security, disarmament* (nuclear, ..., the reduction of defense budgets, ...) ..., is something that we should have done **as soon as the Berlin Wall fell** (a bit like the reunification of Germany happened immediately); and the war in Ukraine, the war between Israel and Hamas, and the other conflicts currently underway in the world are clear proof of our error. More generally, **we should have (1) changed our approach** in the field of maintaining international peace and security, **(2) taken into account the consequences** (a) of the development of **advanced technologies** such as the atomic bomb, the Internet, artificial intelligence, (...), **(b) of human rights**, **(c) of global warming**, **(d) of the earth's limited** natural resources, and **(e) of the UN Charter**, on the functioning of society in order to put in place **solutions to maintain more effective** international peace and security, and **(3) stopped promoting the trade in war**. And it is essential to do this now and to understand (1) that **we** (each country) must **now** think about our (its) security **without forgetting**,

- and even **taking into account** - , **the security needs** of other countries; and (2) that rich countries (and some others) must do more (a) to protect the environment and combat global warming, (b) to optimize (minimize,) the use of the earth's natural resources [and ensure that they are used equitably by all countries, currently rich countries use 6 times more materials per capita and are responsible for 10 times more climate change impacts than poor countries , see GRO 2024 p. xiv, key messages '5. *High-income countries use six times more materials per capita and are responsible for ten times more climate change impacts per capita than low-income countries.* '], (c) to use **the minimum** of human and economic resources in the military field by controlling the production and sales of armaments as recommended by the UN Charter [art. 26 of the Charter : ' *In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security by diverting only the minimum of the world's human and economic resources to armaments , the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee provided for in Article 47, shall be responsible **for developing plans for submission to the Members of the Organization for the establishment of a system for regulating armaments.** ' , this has never been done seriously and effectively because it is complicated and **it takes much more than a staff committee to do it well**], (d) to achieve **the SDGs (...)** and **convergence**, and (e) to show the world their willingness to maintain peace and security and improve the living conditions of people everywhere.*

(b) A regional organization that draws all other countries into an arms race violates the UN Charter.

40. Join together in a regional military organization like NATO and increase budgets defenses of its members disproportionately, unilaterally sanctioning certain countries by circumventing the UN, and supporting a conflict like the conflict in Ukraine without making any effort to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, while making very little serious effort (a) to protect the environment and to combat global warming, (b) to optimize (minimize,) the use of the earth's natural resources, and (c) to achieve the SDGs and **convergence**, do not bring more security. **On the contrary**, it leads to an arms race that is harmful to the world and contrary to the UN Charter, **Article 52** , paragraph 1. *Nothing in this Charter shall preclude the existence of **regional agreements or organizations** intended to regulate matters which, affecting the maintenance of international peace and security, lend themselves to action of a regional character; provided that such agreements or organizations and their activity are compatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations . Paragraph 2. *Members of the United Nations which conclude such agreements or establish such bodies shall make **every effort to settle local disputes peacefully** through such agreements or bodies before submitting them to the Security Council.*'*

Chapter I Aims and principles,

Article 1 ' The purposes of the United Nations are : **1. To maintain international peace and security** and to take effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace and to suppress any act of aggression or other breach of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; **2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples** , and to take other measures which will consolidate world peace; **3. To achieve international co-operation** in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; **4. To be a center where the efforts of nations towards these common ends are harmonized** .

Article 2 The United Nations and its Members, in pursuing the purposes set forth in Article 1, shall act in accordance **with the following principles** : **1.** The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. **2. Members of the Organization** , in order to ensure to all the enjoyment of the rights and benefits of membership, **shall fulfill in good faith the obligations** assumed by them under the present Charter. **3. Members of the Organization shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means** in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. **4. Members of the Organization shall refrain** in their international relations **from the threat or use of force** against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. **5. The Members of the United Nations shall give the United Nations full assistance in any action taken by it** in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter **and shall refrain from rendering assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action** . **6. The United Nations shall ensure** that States not Members of the United Nations act in conformity with these principles to the extent necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. **7. Nothing** in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within

the domestic jurisdiction of any State or require Members to submit such matters to a procedure for settlement under the present Charter; however, this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII.'

NATO, which encourages its members to increase their defense budgets and allows the US to have an excessive defense budget, **does not respect the purposes and principles** of the UN Charter because NATO's collective measures lead to an arms race (and a diversion to arms of a part of the world's human and economic resources that is too large or much more than the minimum desired by the UN Charter, art. 26), creates security problems for other non-NATO countries, including Russia, and threatens international peace and security, and NATO's objective is to impose its views by force and threats and not by negotiation and diplomacy [Goal No. 1, 'to take effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace'; Principle No. 4, '**Members of the Organization shall refrain, ... , from the threat or use of force** against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations', and Article 26 'In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security **with the minimum diversion to armaments of the world's human and economic resources**, ... ']. Russia is therefore right on this point, the fact that NATO enlargement to Ukraine (and even NATO itself) is (are) a threat to world peace and to Russia. I will return to this subject [on the fact that rich countries (NATO, Europe, G7) regularly violate the UN Charter in the discussion on the war in Ukraine ...] below (No. 77).

(c) Maintaining balances, strengthening the UN, demonstrating transparency in the military field and Increasing cooperation between countries in all areas will bring peace and prosperity.

41. **(1) Maintain** balances while acting (a) for disarmament (nuclear and others), (b) for the reduction of defense budgets, and (c) for the modernization of the armies, **(2) demonstrate more transparency in the military field**, **(3) strengthening** the UN in the field of maintaining peace and security (...), and **(4) increasing** cooperation between countries in all fields to improve the living conditions of people (all over the world), to protect the environment, and to achieve convergence, **will bring peace** and prosperity, and **more security** than the enlargement of NATO and the excessive increase in the defense budgets of its member countries, or even than maintaining NATO. In a recent interview with CNN (dated 7-4-24, [Attachment No. 10.17](#)), Mr. Kishida (the Prime Minister of Japan) explains, among other things, “ *In our neighborhood, there are countries that are developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, and others that are **building up their defense capabilities in an opaque way*** ”; and he is right that developing nuclear weapons (and ballistic missiles to deliver them) and building defenses **in an opaque way** are serious security issues, but are rich countries being transparent in the military domain? No. And **what have we done**, or **what have the rich countries**, which dominate the world, **done**, **to encourage countries** to limit their defense budgets and to demonstrate greater **transparency** in the military domain ? Nothing, and, even worse, *we* (the rich countries, G7, NATO, Europe,) caused this problem by maintaining NATO after the fall of the Berlin Wall, by encouraging NATO member countries to increase their defense budgets, **by allowing the USA to maintain an excessive defense budget** (since **more than 10 times** that of Russia, and more than 2 times that of China, a country 4 times more populated than the USA), and by allowing *us* (the rich countries) to substitute *ourselves* for the UN and international institutions and to unilaterally sanction countries with which '*we*' do not (supposedly) agree [for example by threatening countries that help Russia, the rich countries take themselves for the UN, which undertakes preventive or coercive action, and make believe that countries that help Russia violate principle 5 ('**The Members of the Organization ... and refrain from providing assistance to a State against which the Organization undertakes preventive or coercive action**')], rich countries are not the UN or the Security Council, and they have no right to threaten other countries that help Russia through trade (principle 4). **Strengthening the UN** in the area of peacekeeping (...) would have provided the transparency needed to maintain international peace and security; making more effort (a) to limit the defense budgets of the US and other NATO members; and (b) to increase cooperation (i) to protect the environment and combat global warming, (ii) to optimize (minimize) the use of the earth's natural resources, and (iii) to achieve the SDGs (...) and **convergence**, would have (a) demonstrated *our* commitment to improving the living conditions of people around the world, (b) reduced other countries' security concerns and their need for military equipment [the

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2003 invasion of Iraq, without the authorization of the Security Council, and thus weakening the UN, left North Korea with no choice but to build an atomic bomb to ensure its security], and (c) contributed to maintaining international peace and security.

*** 41.1 Also, when we have advanced technologies (such as the Internet and AI) and knowledge that give us the possibility (a) to help all countries, - **at the same time** -, to improve their justice systems and to better enforce human rights, and (b) to improve the living conditions of billions of people in the world **at the same time**, we do not defend *democracy* and *so-called values* by making war **or unilaterally sanctioning countries**; we defend them by proposing to improve, - and improving -, the systems (justice, economic, health, social ...) and the living conditions of the inhabitants **of all countries** who wish to benefit from the knowledge and technologies that we have acquired. The embargoes on certain technologies [such as the embargoes on microprocessors optimized to *develop* (train) advanced AI systems] that are imposed on several countries including China [([PJ no 10.3](#), [PJ no 10.4](#)), [Gladstone report p. 69, 224](#)], are also dangerous for peace, and they prevent the world from progressing faster; **encouraging transparency on the use of technologies** and setting up an organization to control the proper use of advanced technologies would be **more useful to the world** than embargoes on these advanced technologies. ***

2) The importance of strengthening the UN in the area of maintaining international peace and security (...) by creating a new IO for the modernization of armies (...) and amending articles 26, 46, 47 of the UN Charter.

42. We must now create **a new international organization** in charge of the modernization of armies, disarmament (nuclear, ...), and the maintenance of peace and international security' (...) , which would include the current UN entities responsible for peacekeeping, disarmament (nuclear,...) ..., and which would have the responsibility, among other things: **(1) to inform itself** (and create databases) **(a) on the composition of the armies** of each UN member country (and others like Taiwan), **(b) on the types and stocks of weapons** of each country, **(c) on the activity of the arms industry** in each country that has one ... [and even perhaps **to control** the production chains of certain weapons in a manner similar to that which the Gladstone report proposes to use to control the AI supply chain]; **(2) to conduct** - independent - studies on the threats faced by different countries, **(3) to help to establish regulations** on the use of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies **and to control the use of AI in the military field**, **(4) to coordinate** the efforts made by (all) countries in the field of armaments, and **to control** the production and sales of all armaments (including new armaments) **in order**, among other things, **to comply with Article 26 of the UN Charter** (no. 39), **(5) to encourage all** countries to reduce their defense budgets (while allowing the modernization of their armies), and **(6) to act** in favor of disarmament (nuclear, conventional weapons,) and the maintenance of international peace and security (...). **We must (a) optimize (minimize) the use of natural, economic and human resources**, which are allocated to the production of armaments, and **(b) optimize (minimize)** our military expenditures to be able to spend more on improving people's living conditions and to protect our environment, so we must **control at the global level** the use of human, economic and natural resources **in the military field** and **produce the minimum of armaments necessary** for maintaining peace and international security while modernizing armaments (and **therefore not letting the market control the production of armaments**, no 54-57), and **(c) stop promoting the trade of war**; and the new IO for the modernization of armies ... and for computer applications will help us to do this.

43. We must also **amend** Articles 26, 46 and 47 of [the UN Charter](#) (referring to the Military Staff Committee) because this new IO will be responsible, **among other things**, for the functions of the *Military Staff Committee*, and will have greater means to carry out the mission assigned to it and will be assigned to it in Article 26, among others. Of course, this new international organization will work closely with the UN Security Council (as the ICC does) and with the permanent representatives to this IO of its member states (all UN member countries, plus non-member countries or territories). **Creating this new IO will cost money**, of course, but the budget currently allocated to NATO can be used as soon as NATO is dismantled (370.8 million euros in 2023 of civil budget, and 1.96 billion euros of military budget in 2023, according to the

NATO website), and this expenditure will certainly not be as important as the hundreds of billions that have been spent to support Ukraine (and *its desire* to join NATO ...), and it will make it possible to recover money by reducing the defense budgets of its member countries and **avoiding wars**. As Mr. Kishida explains, **transparency is important** in the field of security, but it is important to understand that transparency is not only important for rich countries, it is also important for all other countries, including the poorest ones that do not have advanced intelligence services (no CIA or NSA or FSB, no satellites ...) that collect all kinds of information, and therefore it is important to have an international institution that does this work (on transparency) for them and informs them of the risks associated with technological advances made around the world, including in the USA (which is the most advanced country in the field of AI, among other things, according to its experts). It is also important that discussions on nuclear disarmament are not limited to discussions between the USA and Russia (and China), they concern all countries, even those that do not have nuclear weapons.

3) The importance of creating a new IO dedicated to computer and network applications in charge, among other things, of Internet governance and governance (*technical or ...*) of AI to help maintain international peace and security and to help solve our other global problems.

(a) Risks associated with advanced AI systems, solutions for managing them, and possible functions of the IO in charge of AI governance.

44. The Gladstone Report explains, among other things, that **the risks associated** with the development of advanced AI systems **are very serious** since they can lead to the extinction of the human race [' *The recent explosion of progress in advanced artificial intelligence (AI) ..., is also **creating entirely new categories of weapons of mass destruction-like (WMD-like) and WMD-enabling catastrophic risks*** ' page 11 ; an article written by several experts in this field and published before the Seoul summit on AI on 21 and 22 May 2024 also confirms this observation (see [Attachment no. 10.10](#))] and that **the best** AI labs and the best AI system security experts **are in the USA...** [' *First, the United States and its allies control key nodes in the global AI supply chain. And second, the world's top AI labs are all currently based in the United States or in allied jurisdictions, as are the world's top AI safety experts.* ... ' page 21], so if some experts in the USA (and the USA) are worried about **their** security because of the advanced (AI...) systems that **they themselves develop** [' *The prospect of inadequate security at frontier AI labs raises the risk that the world's most advanced AI systems could be stolen from their US developers, and then weaponized against US interests.* ' page 11], other countries also have good reasons to be concerned about what the USA could do (and what it is already doing and developing) with these advanced (AI...) systems. Moreover, the risks associated with AI are not limited to catastrophic risks as explained in the UN report (page 8-11, see summary Box 3 page 9), so it is essential to have **both** (1) **an international institution (or organization) to govern AI** that is capable of managing all the risks mentioned in the 2 reports (in collaboration with other institutions for some) and that has, among other things, the responsibility of preventing the worst risks (related to advanced AI systems) from occurring [see the functions proposed in the Gladstone report (p. 152-154), (a) monitoring the evolution and performance of AI systems, (b) putting in place the regulations and means of control necessary to ensure the safety and security of advanced AI systems, and (c) monitoring the work done (and compliance with the rules in force) by the actors of the entire sector (AI) who develop and contribute to the operation of advanced AI systems ...]; and (2) the international organization for the modernization of armies (...), which I propose to create above, (a) which lists and analyzes **the concrete applications of AI in the military field**, (b) which prepares **regulations** related to the use of AI in the military field that are in the interest of the whole world (and not only in the interest of the USA and its allies) and to make the world a safer place, and (c) which monitors the work done by the arms industry in the field of AI (and all other fields) and ensures that the regulations in force in this field are respected.

(b) The functions and structure of the new IO to govern AI and the Internet.

45. Since the Gladstone Report and the UN Report agree on the desirability of creating an international agency to govern AI and common sense confirms their view, the question that needs to be answered now is what should be the functions and structure of this new international organization (or agency)

to govern AI. [The UN Report](#) does not answer this question exactly, **but it describes (a) several guiding principles** [page 13 to 15, (1) *AI should be governed inclusively, by all and for all*, (2) *AI must be governed in the public interest*, (3) *AI governance should be built in step with data governance and the promotion of data commons*, (4) *AI governance must be universal, networked and rooted in adaptive multi-stakeholder collaboration*, (5) *AI should be anchored in the UN Charter, International human rights law, and other agreed international commitments such as the sustainable development goals* .] and **(b) several institutional functions** [page 15 to 19, (1) *Assess regularly the future directions and implications of AI*, (2) *Reinforce interoperability of governance efforts emerging around the world and their grounding in international norms through a Global AI Governance Framework endorsed in a universal setting (UN)*, (3) *Develop and harmonize standards, safety, and risk management frameworks*, (4) *Facilitate development, deployment, and use of AI for economic and societal benefit through international multistakeholder cooperation* , (5) *Promote international collaboration on talent development, access to compute infrastructure, building of diverse high-quality datasets, responsible sharing of open-source models, and AI-enabled public goods for the SDGs*, (6) *Monitor risks, report incidents, coordinate emergency response*, and (7) *Compliance and accountability based on norms*], some of which are identical or similar to the functions assigned to the International AI Agency described in the Gladstone report [in particular functions (1), (3), (6) and (7), I think] and that seem quite appropriate. Also, among the risks described in the Gladstone report, it is mentioned that advanced AI systems could identify weaknesses in connected computer systems and launch unstoppable large-scale cyberattacks [' ... future advanced AI systems ... could enable AI-powered mass cyberattacks that autonomously discover crippling zero-day exploits ' p. 24], which means that anyone, or any country, in the world could be the target of this kind of attack (!), so it is clear, I think, that the organization, which governs the Internet, or which should be created to govern the Internet , should have a great deal of expertise in the field of AI and the Internet and sufficient means to prepare for this type of catastrophic situation, among others. These various elements and other arguments that I have already presented in my previous letters make it possible to justify the merits of the proposal to create a new IO to govern the Internet and AI.

(c) The creation of a new IO dedicated to computer and network applications and responsible, among other things, for Internet and AI governance is a good solution that would make it possible to effectively ensure the various functions described (and others) and to allow all countries and all inhabitants of the planet to benefit from AI and the Internet.

46. (1) The importance of being able to manage the risks of unstoppable mass cyberattacks, (2) the importance of tracking and controlling the AI supply chain, (3) the other functions that the Gladstone Report attributes to the International Agency for AI (IAIA) that it proposes to create (see page 152-155), and (4) the guiding principles and institutional functions described in the UN report, justify the attribution of Internet governance and governance (technical or ...) AI to the new international organization dedicated to computer applications that I had proposed to create **in 2005** , and then, more recently, in 2016 and 2021. In the letter of 29-11-05 ([PJ no 48.3](#)), I explained **(1) that it was important** for the international community to recognize *the importance of the role that computer applications have already played in the recent progress the world has made, and can play in solving our global problems by creating an international organization dedicated to this specialty* (computer science or computer applications and networks) [' *I believe it is critical that the International Community understand, recognize and stress the role computer applications can play in the resolution of our global problems by dedicating an International Organization to this specialty* . It is not an exaggeration to say that computer applications have significantly improve corporations, businesses and even administrations operations and efficiency, and Internet based global computer applications can help us create a better world ' , [PJ no 48.3, p. 8](#)], **(2) that the Internet** was a global computer and network application [' *The 'Internet' (DNS,) is (first) 'one' computer application that is administered and maintained by several different organizations having different interests or objectives, and this is the main 'Internet' problem* ' [PJ no 48.3, p. 7](#)] , and **(3) that the governance** of this global computer application (which is the Internet) should be entrusted to **the new international organization dedicated to computer applications** (which would also be in charge of developing and maintaining other global computer applications). The idea was, in addition to simplifying and improving the governance of the Internet, **to create international expertise in the field of computer applications**, which is a complicated and vast field, as much as are the fields of (a) telecommunications and networks which the ITU deals with, (b) health which the WHO deals with, (c) economics and finance which the IMF deals with (...).

*** 46.1 Today it is clear (1) that if we had created this international organization dedicated to *computer applications* and in charge of Internet governance in 2005, we would already have **international expertise in the field of Artificial Intelligence** because artificial intelligence systems are complex computer applications (and which require computing capacities and therefore very high-performance microprocessors for advanced AI systems which present particular dangers), and (2) that it would be entirely logical to assign or entrust the governance (*technical, or central ...*) of AI to this international organization dedicated to computer applications and in charge of Internet governance. ***

(d) The benefits and synergies generated by the creation of a single IO to govern the Internet and AI (technical).

47. In the letter of 23-8-16 ([PJ no. 43](#)) in the American Congress, I describe quite precisely the functions of the new IO in charge of Internet governance (at no. 21-24, ' *A new Internet IO, - that would perform the Internet related functions of ICANN, IANA, IAB, IETF, ISOC, registries, registrars (...)* - ' ...), and I return to this subject to provide details in the letter of 23-5-21 at no. 67-72 ([PJ no. 3](#) , EN [PJ no. 3.2](#)), I propose in particular (1) to attribute all the functions related to the Internet of *ICANN, IANA, IAB, IETF, ISOC, registries, registrars (...)* to this new IO, (2) to set up a new pricing system for domain names (web sites) which take into account several parameters including the use of Internet resources, the revenues and profits generated thanks to the Internet (at websites), ... ([PJ no. 43](#) , no 21-22), (3) to create a **joint department with Interpol** to combat cybercrime (...) (no 22-22.1), (4) to assign responsibility for the development of global Internet applications that could help us solve specific problems, and (5) to assign responsibility for our global information system (or Internet) to this organization (no 68-72, [PJ no 3](#) , EN [PJ no 3.2](#)). So, if we study these functions and the functions that the UN and Gladstone reports on AI propose to assign to the new international agency for AI (and the guiding principles of the UN report), we can easily highlight the many synergies (and advantages) that appear in creating a new IO in charge of Internet governance and AI governance (*technical or ...*). **For example**, to better control the risks associated with the development of advanced AI systems, [the Gladstone Action Plan](#) proposes responsible safeguards for the development and adoption of AI that would be applied to the 4 groups of entities that are involved in the development of advanced AI systems: (1) producers of AI-optimized microprocessors [including NVIDIA, Google, AMD, Intel, AWS, and Cerebras, p. 112,113-114], (2) companies offering the use of data centers that use AI-optimized microprocessors [including Google, Microsoft, AWS, p. 115-117], (3) companies that own AI-optimized microprocessors [including Google, Microsoft, AWS, and Coreweave, p. 117-119], and (4) companies that develop advanced AI systems [including OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind ..., p. 120-129]; and all companies affected by these special measures related to advanced AI systems (1) will also be companies in the supervision domain of the new IO dedicated to IT applications which would be responsible for (a) Internet governance and (b) the establishment of a new system of pricing Internet domain names taking into account, among other things, the use of Internet resources, and (2) would therefore also be required to make detailed reports to this IO on other parts of their activities (see [letter 23-5-21 no. 67-72](#)).

48. **Another possible form of synergy** is linked to the importance of establishing legislation and an entity capable of sanctioning non-compliance with the protection measures put in place, which could go as far as civil and criminal sanctions. Indeed, in the proposal to create an IO to govern the Internet that I presented in 2016 and 2021, I mentioned that a department could be created jointly with Interpol to be able to investigate and prosecute more effectively *certain* (types of) perpetrators of cyberattacks and human rights violations on the Internet that would fall within the scope of the functions of this IO, so we can imagine that the cooperation between this IO and Interpol to punish certain behaviors harmful to the proper functioning of the Internet could be extended to also punish behaviors in violation of the protection measures related to advanced AI systems. Also, **another form of synergies** is related to (1) the fact that a significant number of the controls, which must be made in the framework of responsible protection measures in the development and adoption of AI, would be made through global IT applications dedicated to this work, and (2) the fact that the new organization to govern the Internet (...) should also have **advanced skills** (expertise) in, - and

resources for -, the development of such applications and for their maintenance. The financing of the operation of the new IO would be (or could be) ensured partly with the revenues generated by the new domain name pricing system (or annual website fees), and partly by the companies that will generate revenues with AI. **Finally** , advanced AI systems and the Internet are (complex) computer applications (1) that can help each other and **multiply each other's capabilities** , (2) that can play a vital role in maintaining international peace and security and in solving other global problems that we must solve (poverty, inequality, environmental protection, global warming, respect for human rights, etc.), and (3) that could support the work done by the new international organization in charge of modernizing armies, disarmament, etc., and, of course, also support the work done by all other international organizations (in particular for the establishment of a high-performance information system and reliable, high-quality databases).

(e) The essential role of data for many AI systems and the interest in assigning responsibility for the development of our international information system to the new IO in charge of Internet and AI governance.

49. As explained in the UN report ([Governing AI for Humanity](#)), *data is essential for many AI systems* , and *the development of common public data should be encouraged ...* (p. 14), and Institutional Function No. 5 aims, among other things, to promote *the creation of diverse and high-quality datasets* (p. 17), and the IO in charge of Internet governance that I have proposed to create would be responsible, among other things, for (1) the development of a high-performance international information system , and (2) the development of global Internet applications to solve specific global problems [such as: (1) the development of a new legal aid (LA) system and the Internet applications needed to implement it worldwide, (2) the proposal to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data worldwide, (3) the development of a new pension system that can be used by all countries that wish to use it, and (4) the development of a new system for pricing domain names (of websites)] that would allow to classify, codify and standardize important data in different domains and also to produce high quality data as the UN report wants, so one of the functions of the IO that I proposed to create to govern the Internet is identical to an important function that the UN report wants to assign to the new IO to govern AI (!). [The UN report](#) also suggests on page 15 at no . 57 that AI governance functions be given to *individual institutions* or a *network of institutions*, perhaps because the development and evaluation of AI systems does not only require technical skills, competences and knowledge in computer science, it also requires skills and knowledge, - or *functional expertise* -, in the particular fields in which AI is used (see article on this subject and on the development of a legal aid system at Yale, [PJ no. 10.16](#)), as is the case for the development of computer systems without AI [we can therefore imagine that **the OHCHR** , which would have functional responsibility for the computer and Internet applications necessary to set up the new legal aid system that I propose to develop and which could be used by all countries that wish to do so, **could also have a particular competence** for - and the responsibility for -, **evaluating AI systems in the legal** and human rights field ..., and of course also the responsibility for analyzing the consequences of, - and the risks associated with -, AI in the field of human rights], but it is important to give **the governance (of the technical aspects or ...) of AI** , and in particular the management of the risks associated with the development of advanced AI systems, to an organization that is specialized in the technical fields of AI, that is to say IT and IT applications and therefore to the organization that I have been proposing to create for almost 20 years which will also be in charge of **Internet governance** .

(f) The importance of admitting mistakes that have been made in helping to resolve the conflict in Ukraine.

50. The UN advisory group on AI is not responsible for resolving the conflict in Ukraine, but I am here proposing solutions to try to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, and I explain, among other things, that we must take into account the mistakes we have made (since the fall of the Berlin Wall, including using the wrong system of governance for the Internet and not developing common systems like the ones I have proposed to develop) to help resolve the conflict in Ukraine, which is why I would like to comment on 2 questions that are posed on page 21 of [the UN report](#) . Furthermore, the UN experts (AI Advisory Body) should not ignore the mistakes made in the field of **Internet governance** because the two subjects are too closely linked as we

have just seen, and they would, I believe, make a new mistake by not taking into account the proposals that I made in 1997, 2005, 2016, 2021 on the subject of Internet governance (...).

50.1 On page 21, the [UN report](#) poses, among others, 2 questions; the first, ' *Would common standards for data labeling and testing encourage AI startups to test and deploy across more countries and regions ?* ', could be asked differently, ' *why didn't we start standardizing (classifying, codifying, naming ...) our data internationally **in 1997** to be able to jointly develop computer systems using the Internet and Artificial Intelligence, and thus (1) pool (and minimize) our IT and network expenses, (2) allow all countries to benefit from the technological progress and knowledge that rich countries have made and acquired, and (3) 'we' (the rich countries) fulfill our obligations in terms of development aid (ODA) while advancing our own administrative systems (?)* when I proposed to do it in the proposal to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data in the world supported by many national and international experts [1997 proposal ([PJ no 49.1](#) , [PJ no 49.2](#) , [PJ no 49.3](#))]. Artificial intelligence already existed in 1997, even if it was not as intelligent as it has become in the last 4 years, so it could already be used at that time and above all we could have saved money and started the process of classification, codification and standardization of data which takes a lot of time, especially at a global level, for different reasons that you can imagine. And we must not - only - do this work of classification, codification and standardization of (public) data to encourage ' *AI startups* ' to test and deploy their AI systems in several countries and regions, we must do it - also **and above all** - to develop systems that can be used jointly by several countries and regions, and, for me and for many reasons (which I have already presented), by all the countries of the world that would like to use them. On important topics like human rights (or justice), pension management systems, statistics, maintaining peace and security (...), we have a clear interest in using AI to improve the systems of all countries, so we should not wait for **startups** to **be** willing to take an interest in our problems, it is *we* (the UN, all its member countries, regional organizations...) who must take the initiative on this subject as the Chinese have done in the field of justice [[Task force on justice ch. 5](#) , [letter of 23-5-21 no 55-4](#)] , they started using AI to help judges write their decisions (...)].

50.2 The second question asked on page 21 is ' *How can international collaboration harness AI talent, **data** and compute for scientific research and for the SDGs?* '. **The development of global Internet applications** like the ones I propose to develop to help all countries in the world at the same time [new AI system, new pension management system, new domain name (website) pricing system ...], and **the creation of a new IO** dedicated to computer and network applications in charge of, among other things, Internet governance and AI, **are 2 of the main ways to exploit AI talent, data and compute for scientific research and for the SDGs** (and for the maintenance of international peace and security as seen above). The UN and its member countries [including those (the 89 countries) that had advocated (in 2012) for the UN to take charge of Internet governance] have a share of responsibility for the fact that we are not using the Internet better to achieve the SDGs and that we are not ready to use AI better and to reduce the risks associated with advanced AI. The Internet is an incredible technology that could (and should have) helped us improve the living conditions of billions of people around the world, in particular by making all countries benefit from the exceptional progress that AI has made in recent years, but, to date, too little has been done and is being done to make this happen. As I explained in 2021, the UN Data Strategy is good, but if it is not associated (at the same time) with a global cooperation effort **to develop Internet systems** that can help all countries at the same time (and related information systems) in different areas (like the new legal aid system and the new pension management system that I propose to develop), *it is a bit like shooting ourselves in the foot*.

4) Conclusion on this section on the strengthening of the UN in the field of maintaining peace and international security and computer applications (AI, Internet, etc.).

51. As we have just seen, the maintenance of international peace and security is no longer only linked to the military domain and to issues of disarmament (nuclear, etc.); we must also take into account, among other things , (1) the risks associated with advanced AI systems, (2) the fact that the Internet makes it possible to multiply the capacities of advanced AI systems and allows these advanced systems to be able to

strike (almost) any target anywhere in the world, (3) the fact that the Internet makes it possible to help improve the living conditions of billions of people at the same time, and (4) the limited natural, human, economic (...) resources of our planet (as the [GRO 2024](#) and the [UN Charter](#) explain). This is why, among other things, we must not only strengthen the UN (1) in the area of maintaining peace and (traditional) security by creating a new IO dedicated to the modernization of armies (...), but also (2) in the area of AI and the Internet by creating a new IO dedicated to computer and network applications and responsible, among other things, for the governance (*technical or ...*) of AI and Internet governance [and, also and among other things, (3) in the area of natural resource management by creating a new IO dedicated to this specialty, as the UNEP (IRP) experts explain, no. 55 below]. And as the UN Charter reminds us in several of its articles, the maintenance of peace and international security is **inseparable from** (1) nuclear disarmament, (2) conventional weapons disarmament (and the reduction of defense budgets ...), (3) the end of unilateral sanctions circumventing the UN that rich countries regularly use, (4) efforts made by rich countries (and others too of course) to achieve convergence, to protect the environment (...) and therefore (5) **increased cooperation in many areas** (and therefore increased cooperation to develop global computer applications like those I propose to develop), and, now and in addition, (6) efforts to control the application of responsible protection measures in the development and adoption of AI.

D The importance of (a) increased cooperation and (b) the search for an alternative to market capitalism to maintain international peace and security (...) and my platform of proposals (from 2016, 2021 and 2024).

1) The importance of carrying out the cooperation projects I present and of making better use of the Internet and AI.

52. Specific actions to strengthen the UN in the areas of peacekeeping and international security, the Internet, AI (and more generally computer applications) must be launched urgently , this is indisputable , but these actions would lose a significant part of their interest if, at the same time, we did not make **more efforts** to cooperate **in many other areas** (1) to improve (a) the efficiency of our systems (political, economic, justice, health, social, ...) and (b) the living conditions of people around the world, and (2) **to achieve the SDGs and convergence while protecting** the environment and using the earth's natural resources **sparingly (and intelligently)** (as [GRO 2024](#) explains). If AI systems are so advanced that we must start preparing to prevent them from destroying humanity, this means that (a) they are already capable of playing a crucial role in improving the living conditions of the more than 8 billion people in the world, and (b) we must act urgently to make **all** countries, and all administrations in all countries , benefit from these AI systems and the Internet [companies, for their part, are responsible for using advanced technologies that could be useful to them, so (in poor countries) we must set an example for them by equipping administrations with these advanced systems, and companies in rich countries, which have already taken the lead in this area of AI, will also be examples]. Over the past 25 years, we have **not done our best** to make all countries benefit from the Internet and (less intelligent) artificial intelligence [I know this better than anyone because I have written *to you* many times **since 1997 and because the 1997** project proposal to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data in the world ([PJ no 49.1](#), [PJ no 49.2](#), [PJ no 49.3](#)) proposed to use the Internet and AI to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data and to benefit all countries]; in particular, the issue of Internet governance has never been properly and precisely addressed publicly as the letter of 23-5-21 explains in detail again at no. 66-72 ([PJ no. 3](#), EN [PJ no. 3.2](#)), and of course the creation of a new IO dedicated to computer applications that I proposed in 2005 has not been discussed either, and, now that AI has made significant progress, we are caught off guard, and we are not prepared to benefit the world (we have not **improved** our information systems, not **generated** the high-quality and standardized data that are necessary to benefit all countries from the benefits of AI, and **not launched** the cooperative efforts, and **not created** the institutions, to do this). We must therefore urgently correct the mistakes made [the experts of the AI Advisory body and *you* are already working on the subject, as we have just seen here], and the proposals that I am presenting to you allow us to do this too.

2) The proposals of the 2016 and 2021 platform, and the new proposals of 2023 and 2024 cover the 3 pillars of the UN which are peace and security, development, and human rights.

(a) The platform presented in 2021, and the importance of seeking the alternative to market capitalism.

53. In the letter of 23-5-21 ([PJ no 3](#) , EN [PJ no 3.2](#)), I had proposed to present to you (as part of the CITO functions): **(1) detailed specifications of the new legal aid system** and the 2 global applications needed to implement it worldwide (with cost estimates ...); **(2) a detailed proposal** (organization, cost, ...) of the project to create a new international organization dedicated to Internet governance (and responsible, among other things, for the proper functioning of the Internet, the development and maintenance of global Internet applications allowing us to solve specific problems common to all countries ...) **including detailed specifications of the new domain name/cites pricing system** that takes into account the use of Internet resources (the profits generated ...), and of the global IT application needed to calculate this rate and to collect important information on the owners of Internet sites; **(3) a (proposed) list of global Internet applications** to be developed in different areas of importance to the UN and its member countries [and which would be useful to solve specific problems, help countries achieve their 2030 goals (...), and accelerate the realization of the UN *data strategy*]; **and a strategy to improve our international information systems in the economic and financial fields**, which are important for considering **the development of the alternative to market capitalism**. But no one has responded to, or commented on, these proposals, and the war in Ukraine has been used to prevent any form of cooperation at the international level. **Yet these proposals are crucial**, including **the search for an alternative to market capitalism** that must be launched urgently because we absolutely must take into account, among other things, human rights, the UN Charter, global warming, the planet's limited resources (see [GRO 2024](#)) and the degradation of our environment linked to the industrial revolution, artificial intelligence, and the globalization of the economy (...) to develop **a more efficient economic system** that is better adapted to the progress of society, and which *remunerates everyone more according to their relative contribution to the progress of society*, - and which respects human rights, and helps us **to better protect** the environment, to better fight against global warming and to better manage the planet's natural resources - than market capitalism **does**.

(b) Recommendations from the Global Resources Outlook (GRO 2024).

54. The International Resources Panel (IRP experts) explains, among other things, in [the GRO 2024](#) and the [GRO summary](#) for policy makers that ' **The scale of impacts linked to the way material resources are extracted and processed for our global economy are astounding** — over 55 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions driving us to the brink of climate catastrophe, **up to 40 per cent of particulate matter health related impacts** costing over 200 million disability-adjusted life years every year; and **over 90 per cent of total land-use related biodiversity loss that is the lynchpin of vibrant ecosystems and life on Earth** . **If not addressed** , the impacts of our resource use will derail all hope of meeting Multilateral Environmental Agreements like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biological Diversity. ' ..., ' **A monumental push towards sustainable resource management and improvements in resource productivity is imperative**. This must go hand-in-hand with responsible consumption, facilitated by strategic infrastructure investments, to guide the global economy towards sustainable and equitable utilization. '...' The science is clear. The key question is no longer whether a transformation towards global sustainable resource consumption and production is necessary, but how to make it happen now ' ; and of course they propose solutions to resolve the problems they highlight, including, among others, the importance of assessing **the real cost of** the planet's **natural resources** . ' **Urgent action is needed now to institutionalize resource governance** , including embedding resources in the delivery of multilateral environmental agreements on climate change, biodiversity loss, land degradation and others. **Defining resource use paths aligned with the goals of these agreements and the creation of an international resource agency are some of the ways that resources could be prioritized at all levels of governance**. **Equally important is the reflection of the true costs of resources in the structure of the economy and the redirecting of finance towards sustainable resource use including through setting economic incentives correctly (including for example incentives addressing the rebound effect and subsidies reform including eliminating or repurposing environmental harmful subsidies)** . 'In 2008, in [the letter addressed to Mr. Bloomberg](#), I proposed to work on the **search of the**

alternative to market capitalism , and I explained, among other things, that we had to re-evaluate *the cost of doing business* ['*cost of doing business*' , see page 7 of the letter : '*To do that, I believe we must (1) re-evaluate the cost of doing business in a modern and honest society (that has a universal health care system, a fair legal aid system for every poor, a fair justice system, that protects its environment , that pays its civil servants in relation to their important contribution to society's progress*) ; ... (b) by looking for and analyzing all the 'unaccounted for' (in our existing taxes system,) costs large corporations (and more generally businesses) impose on the community'] , so I fully agree with the IRP experts who propose **to launch a reflection on the real cost (or true cost) of natural resources** and to include, among other things, the fact that they are not unlimited (on the planet) and that their extraction and use have an impact on the environment (climate ...) which is considerable as the experts explain. More generally, the establishment of a new economic system will make it possible to take into account the profound changes that the world has experienced since market capitalism was created (human rights, the UN Charter,).

55. As seen in no. 39-40, the UN Charter clearly encourages countries to control and limit their spending on armaments, so we cannot **let the market** (supply and demand) and the governments of countries (unilaterally or only) **control this area of armaments** , the international community (the UN) must be responsible for this control, I am not saying that we must return to an economic system that plans production (every 5 years), a bit like the one in force in the USSR or China in the past, but it is clear that we must be able to monitor and control more effectively the production and demand **of certain products** (or resources), and not only in the area of armaments, but also, at least, in the area of natural resources if we believe the recommendations of the experts (of the IRP), which seem to be quite appropriate. **The issue of monitoring and controlling arms production** is undoubtedly **a sensitive issue** for the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council and for all other countries that produce arms in large quantities, but this issue **is crucial** if we want to maintain international peace and security and respect the UN Charter, so the 5 permanent members of the UNSC must set an example and encourage all countries to put in place the necessary institutions, regulations and reforms (including the search for *an alternative to market capitalism*). I have presented many other arguments that support this proposition (of the search for *an alternative to market capitalism*) in my previous letters, but I think that the new arguments presented here and in the GRO 2024 can be useful as well. A final point on the IRP report is the fact that we will need to be able to monitor (regularly and automatically) the production and consumption of the natural resources that we seek to use sparingly, and therefore we need to improve our information system in this area of natural resource management and implement automated (computer) control systems, and the new IO dedicated to computer applications could help to do this.

(c) The new proposals and clarifications provided here.

56. So today **I am renewing the proposals** I have already made **by specifying** that the new international organization dedicated to computer applications and in charge, among other things, of **Internet governance**, would also have (or **should also have**) responsibility for **the governance (technical or central or ...)** of AI as seen above (and have in addition most of the functions described in the UN and Gladstone Inc. reports on AI, no. 45); and **I am adding new proposals** including: **(4) the proposal to develop a new pension management system** (specifications ...) that could be used by all countries that wish to use it, and for which functional responsibility could be given to the World Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) and the (technical) responsibility for development and maintenance would be given to the new IO in charge of Internet and AI governance (and computer applications); **(5) the proposal to dismantle NATO and create, instead, a new IO in charge of the modernization of armies , disarmament (nuclear, ...), and the maintenance of international peace and security** ; this new IO would also have (or could and should also have) the responsibility for *the governance* of AI in the military domain (i.e. among other things the preparation of regulations for AI in the military domain, the evaluation of AI systems in the military domain,); and, more generally, **(6) the proposal that rich countries** , which are considering the implementation of a new law and a new administrative system (...), **also consider, the rare times when it is**

possible, the possibility of developing systems that can be used by all countries at the same time (as I did for the legal aid system and for the pension system). And I am offering my services (or re-applying) to the UN to prepare the launch of - and to carry out - these projects that are important for all countries and all people on the planet. I think it would also be wise to follow the recommendation of the GRO 2024 that proposes to create a new IO dedicated to the management of the planet's natural resources (which will help us, among other things, calculate the real cost of natural resources).

(d) The interest and usefulness of the work and proposals I have made since 1997 have been confirmed by recent reports and recommendations in the field of AI and by the difficult situation in which the world finds itself.

57. AI will be used in a wide range of areas and the implications and consequences of the use of AI are complex as explained in the UN report, so I do not seek here to cover all the topics that are covered in the 2 reports, but I would like to emphasize that the proposals I have presented to you since 1997 (1) anticipated *the technical and intellectual revolution* that is brewing and that is due to recent advances in AI (and in related areas of the entire AI supply chain), (2) sought to facilitate the use of (a) AI and (b) the exceptional possibilities that advanced AI systems will give us, in all countries and for all people in the world; and (3) showed [in some specific areas, human rights or justice, statistical data, the social domain (pension systems), the Internet and its governance,] how AI and the Internet can be used for the good of all (and, among other things, to achieve the SDGs and convergence and help maintain international peace and security). The conclusions of the recent AI Summit in Seoul underline the importance of promoting the use of AI in the public domain (' *it also highlighted the importance of promoting AI-driven ecosystems, **public sectors applications**, and sustainable practice while ensuring equitable AI benefits, **enhancing digital literacy**, and **bridging digital divides*** .', [PJ no 10.13](#)), and I had stressed the importance of promoting the development of global Internet applications using, among other things, AI, while acting to reduce the digital divide. **since 1997** when I presented my 1st proposal to the INCO-Copernicus program, and since then I have presented **3 new** similar proposals to develop global Internet applications using AI in 3 different public domains (justice, social and Internet) that would generate high-quality community-critical data; and as seen above, the UN report emphasizes that *the development of common public data should be encouraged* (...), and, of course, I have also done this every time I presented a new proposal to develop a global Internet application to solve a specific global problem; so (1) my proposals are in line with recent reports and recommendations made in the field of AI, (2) their implementation would demonstrate to people around the world that we are actively acting (a) to improve their living conditions everywhere, (b) to maintain international peace and security, and (c) to make everyone benefit from the advanced technologies that have been developed recently, and (3) the experience and knowledge that I have gained from doing this work would be useful to the UN.

E Conclusion on the subject of my new proposals and comments on the reports on AI and on the Global Resources Outlook 2024.

58. The new proposals presented here and in the two letters of 23-2-23 and 7-7-23 to French deputies and senators, union leaders (...), complement the proposals that I presented to you in my previous letters; and the set of proposals presented or summarized here (a) would address (*i*) the issue of the risks associated with the development of advanced AI systems that are described in [the Gladstone Report](#) , and (*ii*) several of the issues raised in [the UN report](#) , (b) now cover the 3 pillars of the UN: international peace and security, development, and human rights, (c) aim to help all countries (and the UN) (*i*) maintain international peace and security, (*ii*) achieve their development goals and convergence, (*iii*) advance our justice systems, and, more generally, (*iv*) make better use of advanced technologies such as the Internet and AI, and significantly improve our information systems in many areas, including in the military domain, and (d) take into account certain key elements of the [Global Resources Outlook 2024](#). The proposals and recent reports discussed here also highlight the usefulness of the work that I have done since 1997 for the UN, so, above, I have also renewed my candidacy for a position at the UN. To help resolve the ongoing conflicts, and in particular the

conflict in Ukraine, **it is important, among other things** , (1) to analyze (a) the mistakes that we have made since the fall of the Berlin Wall that have led to the serious problems that we face today, and (b) the causes of these various conflicts, (2) to identify the responsibilities of each party in these mistakes and the conflicts, and (3) to propose solutions that address the causes of the conflicts and correct the mistakes that have been made; and in this section I have presented solutions that would correct some of the mistakes that we have made since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and I will now analyze, among other things, the causes of the conflict in Ukraine in order to be able to propose to you a peace plan.

59. But before that, I would like to make a brief digression on the recent dissolution of the National Assembly and the new legislative elections of 1 and 7 July which led to a significant increase in the number of deputies of the National Rally, the far-right party (and to a lesser extent of the far-left party), (1) because the politicians who have led France **for about 40 years** have a significant share of responsibility (with the European Commission too...) in the recent electoral successes of the far-right which are mainly due to (a) **the unprecedented migration crisis** that the world is experiencing, (b) the desire of French politicians (...) to take advantage of the difficult situations in which poor (African) countries find themselves and of the cheap labour coming from these countries, and (c) the fact that, **since 1997, French politicians ignored the many efforts I made to provide solutions to the development problems** we are experiencing, to better use the Internet and other advanced technologies such as AI and to reduce the digital divide [and (d) the lack of integrity of French politicians highlighted by the many corruption scandals that have made headlines (including the one I was a victim of) and by the maintenance of the dishonest legal aid system and law for over 30 years (of which I was also a victim)], and (2) because, if you act together to carry out the projects presented here, and to denounce the unconstitutionality of the French legal aid law and the crime against humanity linked to it, you will help France and its politicians to solve the problems that they have failed to solve for over 40 years.

IV. The war in Ukraine and the proposal of a peace plan.

A The causes of the war in Ukraine.

60. In order to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and establish a lasting peace, it is necessary to identify the real causes of the conflict, and not to limit ourselves to the causes that are mentioned in the press and media by politicians and other commentators on the conflict, such as the fact **that (1) by financing the war in Ukraine, and preventing Russia from winning the war, the rich countries (NATO, G7, Europe,) and Ukraine are defending (a) the Values of the rich countries, (b) Democracy, and (c) the UN Charter; and (2) that Russia is a dictatorship** that does not have *our values* (...) and that violates the UN Charter by attacking Ukraine without legitimate reason and then attacking the EU member states. So I will (1) study the reasons why the argument that Ukraine and the rich countries are defending Values, Democracy and the UN Charter by waging and financing the war is not serious, and (2) describe the real causes of the conflict or at least causes that better explain the behavior of the parties to the conflict in Ukraine.

1) *We (rich countries, NATO, Europe, G7...) are not defending Values by helping Ukraine.*

61. ' *Our* ' *Values* , which are defined as follows in the NATO Handbook: ' *The Alliance strives for a just and sustainable peaceful order in Europe, based on shared values what are democracy, human rights and the rule of law* ', therefore include respect for human rights and the rule of law , which *we respect only when it suits us* , as evidenced by **(1) the behavior of France** , its politicians (its press and media ...) and Europe (and NATO) who turn a blind eye to the fact that France has maintained **for more than 30 years a system of legal aid (LA) and justice** that systematically violates the rights of the poor who come before the courts and that covers up as much as possible the corruption of politicians (...) [*The rule of law* includes respect for the hierarchy of norms , **the equality of citizens before the law** , and the establishment of the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers ; and **the equality of citizens before the law** *we don't have it in France* (and in most, if not all, other European and NATO countries) *because of our dishonest and unconstitutional LA system that systematically violates the rights to a fair trial and to an effective remedy before the courts of the poor* , among other human rights (!)], **(2) the fact** that a large number of countries (rich and NATO members) also maintain LA systems based in one way or another on the (forced) **charity of lawyers** (...) who help to systematically steal from the poor (no. 9-12), **(3) the fact** that many countries in Europe or NATO maintain a king or queen as head of state and thereby **violate Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights** of 10-12-48 [' *All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights* . They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. ' , and kings and queens inherit their titles and functions *at birth*] ; **(4) the fact that we** (rich countries, G7, Europe, NATO) **let us maintain an economic system , market capitalism** , (a) which allows the 10 richest people in the world, including **9 Americans and one Frenchman** , to accumulate as much property as **40% of the planet's population** , or more than **3.2 billion people** (! see UN speech by President Lula, [PJ no. 10.5](#)) and (b) which allows ' *high-income countries to use six times more materials per year per capita and to be responsible for ten times more climate change impacts per capita than low-income countries.* ' (no. 39 and [GRO 2024](#)) because an economic system, which leads to this kind of disproportionate inequality, violates human rights, *the right not to be a victim of degrading treatment* [ECHR case law explains this: ' *Article 3 provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment* ' . Taken in this context, the expression ' *inhuman or degrading treatment* ' shows that this provision is generally intended to prevent particularly serious attacks on human dignity . Consequently, *a measure which lowers a person in his rank, position or reputation, can only be considered 'degrading treatment' within the meaning of Article 3 if it reaches a certain degree of gravity.* ' as is the case with inequalities created by the economic system] and (5) other problems which I cannot address here.

2) *We also do not defend Democracy by helping Ukraine and sanctioning Russia, and Democracy does not need to be defended, it needs to be improved (to defend itself in an information society).*

62. And **as for Democracy** , it does not need, - or should not need - to be defended in the twenty-first century and in an information society in which everything is known (or almost everything, because democracy is not perfect ...); **Democracy should defend itself in an information and globalized society like**

ours ; and it would do so if *we* , the rich countries (NATO, G7, Europe,), made more efforts to improve it **instead of unilaterally sanctioning other countries**, which supposedly do not respect our *principles* (*values*) or human rights and other international regulations (...), in order to minimize and conceal the serious defects of our political, justice, economic systems (...), and while we ourselves do not respect these international regulations and human rights (*our values as we have just seen*). **Our democracies are imperfect and corrupt** because we do not make enough efforts to improve them and because we do not cooperate enough with all other countries to improve our justice and economic systems (..., no 52-59).

a) American democracy is imperfect even though the country is the richest in the world.

63. In the **USA** , for example, there is not even a public LA system in areas other than criminal defence, and a very imperfect LA system in this area of criminal defence (by the admission of the Minister of Justice in 2015, Attorney General Holder, [PJ no 48.4, no 18](#)); and the country has maintained the same organisation and operation of its justice system for more than about 150 years [(1) the number of judges on the US Supreme Court changed 6 times to 9 in the 1860s or so and has not changed since, while the population has increased about 10-fold and the number of proceedings in the lower courts has increased by a factor surely even greater than 10; and (2) the judges of the US Supreme Court and federal courts are chosen by politicians in the US Congress (the senators), have almost total immunity, and are appointed for life, which means that the quality of judicial decisions is poor and that justice is **highly politicized** (as the recent decision of the Supreme Court on Mr. Trump's immunity confirms, [PJ no. 10.27](#)), and that *the principle of separation of powers is affected*]; and this has serious consequences on the functioning of Democracy. For example, in the last elections (2020 or 2022), the Democrats asked voters to vote for them *to defend Democracy* , which means that they know or think that their Democracy is not working well at all [even if it is a bit easy to blame the Republicans for this problem because they necessarily also have a share of responsibility in this problem; The Supreme Court decision, which allowed abortion to be banned again, I believe, had triggered criticism from Democrats]. And after the vote in the IOWA presidential primary, CNN wrote a story saying that, ' **despite his 91 criminal charges in his various pending lawsuits, Mr. Trump easily won IOWA's first primary with more than 50 percent of the vote.** ' (translation of the meaning; see the Washington Post article on the 91 charges against Mr. Trump, [Attachment No. 10.6](#)).

64. There are 3 ways to interpret this remark, I think: **(1) Mr. Trump has not committed a single one** of the 91 crimes or offenses that the courts accuse him of having committed, and these accusations are *all outlandish* (or unfounded), and obviously politically motivated to handicap Mr. Trump in his candidacy for the presidency (this is Mr. Trump's point of view, I believe); in this case, it means that the American justice system is very bad and very politicized, and that **Democracy** American (the American political system, which maintains this system of justice and election,) **is very imperfect** (ait) [recently Mr. Trump was convicted in New York **on 34** of these 91 **criminal charges** , I believe, he will be sentenced on 11-7-24, and he faces up to 20 years in prison according to the press and media]; **(2) Mr. Trump has committed the majority** (or most) of the crimes and offenses that he is accused of having committed by the justice system; in this case, it means that the Americans could elect a politician-criminal, who deserves to go to prison, or at least who has committed many crimes and misdemeanors that should prevent him from running, because Mr. Trump is well placed to win in the polls, and because his legal cases will not be judged before the November 2024 election (except for the New York case), and it also means that American Democracy (the political system,) is a very imperfect political system because it allows a politician, who has committed many crimes and misdemeanors, to be elected President and obtain immunity for the crimes and misdemeanors he has committed (!); and **(3) Mr. Trump has committed only a few** crimes and misdemeanors (out of the 91 indictments in his cases), and the rest of the accusations brought against him are far-fetched; in this case, it also means that Americans could elect a president who has committed crimes and/or misdemeanors, and that American Democracy is (very) imperfect. Another way to analyze this is to say that 80 million Americans are willing to vote for a president who has committed crimes and misdemeanors or that 80 million Americans

are willing to vote for a president who has used or taken advantage of a politicized and corrupt justice system to try to win the presidential election, which is also not evidence of a healthy or honest democracy.

***64.1 Mr. Trump is undoubtedly **entitled to the presumption of innocence** for the charges that have not yet been tried, and **the right to appeal** the conviction he received in New York, but can an honest political system impose *the presumption of innocence* ... in a situation like this **to more than 200 million voters** , and indirectly **to more than 8 billion people in the world**, who are also impacted by the decisions taken by the President of the USA? This is a relevant question that is not only important for the USA, I think, yet the fact that Mr. Trump has been convicted in New York and risks new convictions, does not seem to bother American politicians and Americans (and the G7 ...). This is a serious problem, I think, especially when American politicians unilaterally sanction Russia, give weapons, intelligence, ..., to Ukraine to kill hundreds of thousands of Russians (and Ukrainians) in the name of so-called values (...) and all this without making any effort to resolve the conflict through diplomacy (and in violation of the UN Charter). The budget of the Department of Justice in the US is in 2023 about **47 billion dollars** according to the Internet, so the US spends **\$47 billion to encourage, and even force , Americans to respect the laws** (and not to commit crimes and misdemeanors); and Mr. Trump and American politicians are implicitly **promoting crime in a way** by allowing Mr. Trump to run for President of the USA [*' commit crimes, that's how you become and become again President of the USA '*], this is a serious problem [if American politicians had improved their political system (their democracy) instead of unilaterally sanctioning (bypassing the UN) other countries that supposedly are not democracies, violate human rights (...), this situation would never have happened].

64.2 **In France** , we have had several similar situations; for example, **in 2017** when the candidate of the main right-wing political party and the favorite (in the polls) of the presidential election (Mr. Fillon) was accused by the courts, before the presidential election, of having committed crimes (fictitious jobs,), and refused to give up his place to another candidate from his political party; he lost the election, and Mr. Macron was elected thanks to his refusal to give up his place; then, afterwards, he was tried and convicted for the crimes he was accused of having committed (and finally convicted recently, **in 2024** , more than 7 years after the election and the first accusations). The voters made their choice, but **their choice was manipulated** in a way because the election was no longer just about policy proposals and ideas to solve the country's problems (...), it was also about whether to elect a candidate who is potentially a delinquent, and a significant portion of the voters thought no (that's why Mr. Macron was elected). Another example is the case of Mr. Chirac who was elected despite accusations against him; and 2 terms as president and 12 years later, when presidential immunity ended, he was convicted for his frauds to, among other things, ineligibility ; that is to say, we had a President for 12 years who should never have had the right to run for president (!). On this subject, and as I mentioned in the [letter of 23-5-21 \(no. 21-24\)](#) , Mr. Sarkozy, who succeeded Mr. Chirac in 2007 as president, was accused and convicted, after his term, for fraud committed during the following election in 2012, and he is also accused of having committed fraud on the financing of his 2007 campaign, I believe, so we are very poorly placed in France (and in the USA) to give **lessons in democracy and integrity** to foreign leaders, including Mr. Putin. And you also understand why French politicians have an obvious interest in keeping a justice system that deprives more than 14 million poor people of the right to justice (!).

[64.3 I am amazed by the technological progress that comes from the USA, of course (Internet, artificial intelligence, rockets that come back to earth and then go back to space, cars that drive themselves, ...), but I also lived for almost 10 years in downtown Los Angeles (including more than 6 years in the Skid Row neighborhood where many homeless people are gathered) , so I know the problem *of homelessness in the USA* , and in particular in California, quite well, and I know that, **although billions of dollars** are spent and many individual efforts are made to try to help these homeless people, **very little is done** (or there is no real *national organization* , no coordinated effort in the different areas concerned) to be sure that the problem will be solved and that the homeless can live in the best possible living conditions (...), and this is not the sign of a perfect democracy either. The advanced technologies that have been developed, and the advanced knowledge that we have acquired in certain areas

could and should be used to solve the homeless problem, but this is not the case, and it is a political, and religious, and organizational problem (...).***

b) Democracy in France is also very imperfect.

65. And, of course, **Democracy in France is no better than in the USA** because, as we have seen at no 13, Mr. Macron knowingly lied to the French people before the last presidential elections in 2022, and even (almost certainly) committed at least crimes when he concealed the fact that charges *of crimes against humanity of persecution* linked to the unconstitutional LA law and OMLs were brought against him and other political figures (...) in order to be re-elected, and because he continues to conceal the charges *of crimes against humanity* and the unconstitutionality of the LA law in order to have a large number of Ukrainians and Russians killed and to support a war that is harming the entire world. And **the behavior** of the deputies and senators and the press and media in France, who turn a blind eye to the accusations *of crimes against humanity* linked to the dishonest LA law, to the unconstitutionality of the LA law, to my proposals (including the one to improve the LA system), and to Mr. Macron's silence on these subjects, to continue to steal from the poor, to manipulate public opinion and to lie to the French, **also highlights** an imperfect and **corrupt democracy** [as explained in some of my previous letters, the situation described, an unconstitutional law that is maintained and not judged by the Constitutional Council so as not to have to admit that it is unconstitutional, has already happened by the admission of the former President of the Constitutional Council, Mr Mazeaud, see his remark ' *Moreover, no one is unaware that, sometimes, it is precisely because they are not in conformity with the constitution that certain laws are not referred to the Council.* In particular, this is the case when *the unconstitutionality is based on a consensus and none of those who, given the state of the texts, can refer the matter to the Council would risk taking the risk of censure.* *The love of pure law sometimes weighs little in the face of political realities,* especially when social peace is at stake. *Who would want to judge the insult done to the constitution, when everyone accepts it?* in his speech entitled 'the error in constitutional law' at the Colloquium of the Institut de France: 'the error', on October 25 and 26, 2006, Mr. Pierre Mazeaud]. Recently, MPs voted on a law to compensate homosexuals who were convicted and punished by the courts more **than 40 years ago** for the simple fact of being homosexual (because of laws punishing homosexuality), and the Minister of Justice apologized for the suffering and damage caused ([PJ no. 10.26](#)), while, at the same time, MPs, the Minister of Justice and the President completely ignore the fact that the current LA law systematically violates the rights **of more than 14 million French people** , including homosexuals surely (!). We should not wait 40 years to correct injustices, and here it is **more than 30 years** that the dishonest LA law exists and nothing has been done to correct the injustices linked to LA law despite parliamentary reports pointing out the problem since 2001.

c) Democracy in Russia is not perfect, but there are institutions similar to ours (presidency, parliament, justice, regions, city halls, etc.) and before the war people had the right to leave the country whenever they wanted, it seems.

66. Mr. Putin was recently re-elected, but when the Russian Constitution forbade him to run for president, he left his place as president; not many dictators would do that; and he also has to pass his laws with the help of parliament, so it cannot really be said that he rules Russia alone or that Russia is a dictatorship. And the media smear campaigns combined with the unilateral sanctions of rich countries, which are so powerful (because of the Internet, television, social networks ... and our information society), and which are also aimed at manipulating public opinion in Russia, necessarily affect the behavior of Russian political leaders and lead to severe repressions against some political opponents, who, in addition, allow themselves to demand unilateral economic sanctions from rich countries against their own country and their fellow politicians and officials (!). **We must stop (1) this madness** of unilateral sanctions, which bypass the UN and international institutions, and whose goal is the manipulation of public opinion, the impoverishment of the populations and the targeted countries, and the division of the world to prevent any global cooperation to solve our common problems, **and stop (2) encouraging** politicians of other countries to request unilateral sanctions against their own countries (or their colleagues ...), requests which make them **traitors in their country (!)** . As human beings have the right to *privacy* [even if this right is not often (or not always) respected ...], countries should have the right *to the equivalent of privacy* for countries (to **non-interference** from other countries in the form of unilateral sanctions that bypass international institutions or insulting media comments ... on decisions taken ...). Rich countries have a significant responsibility for the (democratic) problems that Russia is

experiencing for many reasons, including the imperfections of *our* democracies (a) which have not yet mastered the information society well (and the fact that the possibilities for harassment are *multiplied*), and (b) which allow themselves to manipulate public opinion in other countries. Moreover, Russia does not have as long an experience of democracy as we do, so it has an excuse for its imperfections that we do not have.

3) Manipulation of public opinion has become an indispensable tool for winning elections, which diminishes the integrity of Democracy (of our political systems).

67. Politicians (from rich countries) express themselves on all subjects and use all possible techniques to manipulate public opinion. The number of television channels reserved for information has increased significantly in France (and elsewhere), and to the written press, television and radio have been added social networks which allow everyone, and politicians in particular, to express themselves on everything and as soon as information appears, so the press and the media play an increasingly important role in the functioning and *corruption* of Democracy. And the means and techniques used **to manipulate public opinion** and Democracy, and **to conceal the problems of our societies** and even the criminal and delinquent behavior of our politicians, are increasingly numerous and sophisticated; for example (1) unilateral economic sanctions (...) against countries and (2) wars, such as the war in Ukraine, among others, have become frequent techniques to manipulate public opinion. Around 2007, Mr. Obama published a book in which he explained that **13 innocent people** were on death row in the state of Illinois alone [(!) and being sentenced to death when you are innocent is not the only injustice you can suffer before the courts (in the US and elsewhere), although it is undoubtedly **one of the most serious** injustices you can suffer], and around the same time, the US sanctioned the judges in Burma who had sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi to prison (unjustly or for political reasons according to the US); This is absurd and proof that unilateral sanctions serve no purpose other than **to manipulate public opinion** (1) to (in this case) minimize the fact that the American justice system (which sends 13 innocent people to death row in the state of Illinois alone) is very imperfect, and (2) to pretend **and make believe** (to Americans and the rest of the world) that the USA is acting to improve the functioning of justice systems in the world and to advance Democracy and other countries (dictatorships that supposedly do not have *our values*) when they sanction judges from these other countries who have made a dishonest decision (even if it is true), **when it is false**.

68. We do not improve the justice systems in Burma or Russia or elsewhere by sanctioning these countries when the justice systems of these countries unfairly punish (*it seems*) a political opponent or a public figure. Delivering justice is a **complex intellectual process** that **takes time** and **is very costly** for all countries, and even more costly for countries that are not as rich as the USA (*the richest country in the world*), so **to improve justice** in the world and in the USA too, we are looking for solutions to better organize ourselves and better use advanced technologies **(1) to help judges** (...) to render fairer, more honest, better motivated legal decisions (...), **(2) to reduce** the enormous cost of justice , **(3) to ensure the principle of equality before the law** (*i.e., among other things, improving the LA systems*), **(4) to set up efficient and impartial control systems** (*not completely overwhelmed and politically motivated like the ECHR, the Supreme Courts in the USA...*). In France (and now in Europe), it is the same, France (and Europe) sanctions Russia for human rights violations (...), while it (and other European countries) maintains (maintains) a system (s) of legal aid that systematically steals from the poor. Recently, the American Congress even passed a law **to sanction** the employees of **the ICC** (*the UN*) who accused Mr. Netanyahu of war crimes (!, [PJ no. 10.18](#)), which constitutes a violation of (a) Article 2, paragraph 5 of the UN Charter (' *5. The Members of the Organization shall give the Organization full assistance in any action it takes... and shall refrain from rendering assistance to any State against which the Organization takes preventive or enforcement action* '), and (b) the rule of law (including the separation of powers) , among others .

69. In my letters [of 20-11-20 ([PJ no. 4, no. 56-65](#), EN [PJ no. 4.2](#)), of 23-5-21 ([PJ no. 3, no. 30-41](#), EN [PJ no. 3.2](#)), and of 23-3-22 ([PJ no. 8, no. 12-15](#))], I explained, among other things, that **France and its politicians**, who commit *the crime against humanity of persecution* linked to the unconstitutional LA law when they maintain the dishonest LA system to rob the poor appearing before the courts (and by transitivity Europe), **have no**

legitimacy to unilaterally sanction Russia (without going through the UN Security Council and other competent institutions, and in violation of the UN Charter) for violation of human rights or other violation of an international regulation and now for to wage war on Ukraine [and that they are committing *the offence of receiving stolen goods for the crimes* they denounce (!, [PJ no. 3, no. 41](#), [PJ no. 8, no. 12-15](#))], but everyone has ignored these remarks, even Russia unfortunately because it is now also clear that **maintaining unilateral sanctions** against Russia and **sending arms and ammunition** to Ukraine **are also ways for France (...) (1) to manipulate (a) French public opinion** to increase its defence budget and to finance its arms industry [France has become the 2nd largest arms exporter after the USA, [PJ no. 10.22](#); Germany has planned to spend 100 billion euros to modernise its army after the start of the war...; see also the article on record military spending in the world, [PJ no. 10.20](#); and the article on Japan also increasing its defense budget, [PJ no 10.17](#)], **(b) Ukrainian public opinion**, and in particular those fighting on the front lines, to make them believe that they are fighting for a just cause and for the good of humanity, when this is false (as seen here), and (c) world public opinion, **(2) to cover up its** (and that of rich countries) **dishonest behavior** towards the poor [maintaining dishonest LA law, using 6 times more materials per capita and being responsible for 10 times more climate change impacts than poor countries (no 40 above)...], **(3) to cover up France's responsibility (...) in the war in Ukraine**, and **(4) to divide the world** and prevent any global cooperation to solve our current serious problems, including the improvement of our institutions, **and constitute a crime**, the crime of *receiving stolen goods from crimes* committed in Ukraine supposedly by Russia, which they denounce and which they use to justify their sanctions and their arms deliveries (...).

70. In summary on this topic of manipulation of public opinions and integrity of Democracy, rich countries should not be so proud of their **imperfect Democracy** and so critical of other countries that supposedly do not have *our Values and not a perfect Democracy* (like ours supposedly) or that have a different political system; and, in no case, they should bypass the UN and other international bodies to unilaterally sanction countries because of alleged violations of human rights, the rule of law or international regulations. **Instead of giving moral lessons** to Russia and other countries by sanctioning them, the USA, France, Europe, the G7, NATO should make more efforts to improve their imperfect Democracies, and would also do better (a) to help these (and all) countries to improve **their** justice systems, and more generally their administrative systems (social, health, education, ...), and, at the same time, (b) to improve their own systems (justice, economic, social, health, ...), as we saw in part III.

4) The rich countries (G7, NATO, Europe), which maintain imperfect Democracies, are - at the international level - dictatorships which impose their points of view by force (economic, military, media, etc.).

71. Moreover, **at the international level**, rich countries are no longer - or no longer behave like - democracies, they behave like **dictatorships** that impose their views **by force** (unilateral economic sanctions, military actions, arms deliveries, embargo on advanced technologies,), as can still be seen in the context of the war in Ukraine. Rich countries (G7, NATO, Europe,) do not allow any country to help Russia militarily or even economically, promising economic sanctions or imposing unilateral economic sanctions and embargoes (bypassing the UN) on all countries that would provide assistance to the war effort in the form of sales of goods and services [recently the G7 **threatened** Iran with sanctions if the country supplied missiles to Russia, see [Exhibit No. 10.23](#), which constitutes a violation of the UN Charter, Art. 2, No. 77]. When they say at the UN ' *you are either with us or against us* ', that is the opposite of democracy [Mr. Lavrov had stressed this remark in one of his speeches, a few years ago, I think, but I myself was surprised to hear this phrase from the US at the UN, that is why I had noted this remark in Mr. Lavrov's speech]. The war in Iraq without the agreement of the UN Security Council was also proof of the dictatorial behavior of the countries of the US-led coalition that launched this war [I understand that the context was particular for the US, but the US (...) does not understand that the context of the Russian military operation in Ukraine is also very particular for the Russians and as we see here]. In the context of the war in Ukraine, unilateral economic sanctions against Russia are accompanied by arms supplies, and economic and military aid of all kinds to Ukraine, and are not associated with any efforts to resolve the conflict through diplomacy, while the conflict (and Russia) raises (raises) **security issues important for the whole world**, and not only important for Russia, which should be discussed for the good of all and not only to try to

resolve the ongoing conflict; this point should be obvious to all countries because if Russia, which has 6000 nuclear bombs and set up a manned station in space before all other countries, has a security problem, we can easily say that all countries in the world (except the USA) have a serious security problem. And **NATO is the armed wing of the international dictatorship** (led by the rich countries) which seeks to impose its positions through its economic and military power and to divide the world, (1) instead of trying to convince other countries **with the strength of its arguments and the perfection of its systems** (political, justice, economic, social,), and (2) instead of strengthening the UN, encouraging all countries to cooperate and reduce their defense budgets, and to use advanced technologies more effectively (a) to solve **our common and global problems** (poverty, inequalities, global warming, environmental degradation, pollution of oceans and rivers, plundering of natural resources, ...) and (b) to achieve the SDGs (...) and **convergence** .

5) NATO expansion is not only a security problem for Russia, and the very existence of NATO and the huge US defense budget are two causes of conflict and serious security problems for the world.

74. Before the war, Russia made it clear that NATO enlargement to Ukraine was a serious security problem for Russia, and it also made it clear that the US and its allies had committed not to enlarge NATO after the fall of the Berlin Wall (and had failed to keep that commitment). The idea was to leave so-called ' *neutral* ' (non-NATO) countries between NATO and Russia to reduce the risk of direct conflict between Russia and NATO, but that is only part of the problem , it seems, or at least to me . In reality and as we have seen in no. 39-43, the problem of NATO enlargement is not the only security problem for Russia and the world because this problem is associated with, and aggravated by, the fact **(1) that the USA has an excessive** defense budget [of **800 billion dollars** , more than 10 times the defense budget of Russia and almost (or now even more than) 3 times the defense budget of China], and **(2) that NATO** encourages its members to increase their defense budgets, which leads to **an arms race** that creates **great insecurity** for all the other countries (necessarily less rich) who cannot spend as much on their armaments (for the most part) [and which is contrary to the UN Charter which encourages countries to spend the minimum on armaments in order to spend more on improving people's living conditions (art. 26 , no. 39-40)]. And, in addition to using this difference in defense budgets and the military and political power that results from it, rich countries also use their economic and media power, unilateral sanctions, and their growing political influence within international organizations (such as the Council of Europe which has become *a subsidiary* of the European Union) (1) to impose their domination (economic, political,) on other countries [to use and benefit more from the earth's natural resources and to pollute more than other countries, [GRO 2024](#) , no. 40 and [PJ no. 10.11](#)], (2) to impoverish other countries or deprive them of *free trade* and the right to fair competition on international markets, and (3) to prevent the world from progressing (as seen above in nos. 39-59). Finally, and as we also saw in no. 32-59, the USA (and its allies) have made significant technical progress in the field of AI which opens the way to the development of new weapons of mass destruction and many other lethal weapons and which necessarily create an additional imbalance potentially (very) serious for the world (including Russia) which had not been addressed before the start of the conflict (...).

75. The rich countries have gradually adopted (new) bad habits [which they already had in the past in different forms, such as the use of **slavery** to generate wealth; **the refusal (a) to seek the alternative to market capitalism** , and, for example and among others, **(b) to calculate the real cost of natural resources** (no. 54-56), is a **modern form of slavery** that benefits the rich countries and first and foremost the USA, the richest in the world] which allow them to accumulate as much wealth as possible (unjustly), to dominate the world as much as possible and to profit as much as possible from the planet's natural resources, and which prevent their societies **and the world** from progressing **sustainably** and reaching **convergence**. If the US (and its approximately 340 million Americans) need to have a defense budget (in addition) of **800 billion dollars** to **feel safe** , one can imagine that China and India (which have a population of 1.4 billion, **approximately 4 times that of the US**) might need a defense budget of **3,200 billion dollars** , to feel safe; and so one must ask the following questions: would it be good for the world if China and India spent this staggering sum of 3,200 billion dollars on their defense budgets (?), it is likely, if not certain, **that they would not**. Will such defense spending not lead to cuts in investment to improve people's living conditions (...) (?), it is likely, if not

certain, that yes, it will lead to cuts in investment to improve people's living conditions (a recent article, explaining that development aid has significantly decreased recently because of the war in Ukraine, provides proof of this, [PJ no. 10.15](#)). **The sums** that will be allocated to the defense budget **cannot be** used to improve the functioning of the justice, health, and education systems, or for environmental protection (...), while this is essential to maintain international peace and security, to protect our planet, and to improve the medium and long-term living conditions of all the inhabitants of the planet [in China, India and throughout the world (!) as is the case in the USA when we see all the homeless people in Los Angeles (...)].

76. Also, **will the world be safer** , and will other countries feel safer, including the USA and Russia (?!), **if these 2 countries (China and India) choose to have such a defense budget?** It is likely (if not certain) that it will not, so the US's outsized defense budget represents **a real danger** to the whole world, including Russia, as well as the expansion of NATO and the desire to increase the defense budgets of NATO countries [according to the press, China will increase its number of nuclear weapons **to 1000 by 2030** , and it is difficult to blame them when we see the little deterrence that the 5000 or 6000 nuclear bombs that Russia has, and when we see the more than 5000 nuclear bombs of the US, for a population of 330 million people, and its defense budget is constantly increasing, yet it is obvious (and it should be obvious to everyone) that if this happens , it will be a failure for the world, and the US and NATO will be primarily responsible]. **It is essential that we change our approach in the field of maintaining international peace and security** (no. 39-57), and that we strengthen the UN in this field to be more effective (no. 42-43) and to respect **the UN Charter** which requires us **to divert only the minimum of the world's human and economic resources to armaments** (article 26). The USA and NATO ignore the UN Charter, yet the USA (the United Kingdom, France,) had an important role in the creation of the UN and its Charter, and the UN is in New York (...).

6) *We are also not defending the UN Charter by supporting the war in Ukraine, and we are not doing enough to improve and strengthen our imperfect international (UN) institutions in a more complex world.*

77. As the invasion of Iraq in 2003 without a vote of the Security Council was a violation of the UN Charter art. 2 para. 4 [' *The Members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.* '], Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be considered a violation of the UN Charter even if the existing war in Donbass creates a particular situation or context, but we [the rich countries (G7, NATO, Europe,)] do not defend (and even violate) the UN Charter when (a) **we unilaterally sanction** Russia (**bypassing the UN Security Council**) and give weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, (b) we steal Russia's property and assets, and (c) **we threaten** (with sanctions ...) countries that would like to help Russia militarily and economically in its war effort in Ukraine (art. 2 al. 4), and when (d) **we make no effort** to study Russia's point of view, to resolve the conflict through diplomacy and to address the security issues that the conflict brings to the fore [art. 33 ' *The parties to any dispute the prolongation of which is likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security shall seek a solution, first of all, by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, ..., or by other peaceful means of their own choosing.* '], even if the objective is supposedly to punish a violation of the UN Charter, or supposedly to defend democracy, the rule of law, and to uphold human rights. The UN Charter is not just an article (art. 2 al. 4) that we use when it suits us to denounce the supposedly illegal behavior of Russia, and that we ignore when it suits us to invade Iraq (...). Also, and as seen in no. 39-43 , we violate the UN Charter when we use an international organization (regional, or military like NATO) to encourage its member countries to increase their defense budgets, and therefore to devote less of their economic resources (...) to improving the living conditions of their inhabitants (violation of article 26, no. 39), and to weaken the role of the UN or control (or influence the decisions) of other international organizations, including the UN (violation of article 52, paragraphs 1 and 2, and NATO's activities are contrary to this article as seen in no. 40). The UN, its peacekeeping department (and other related departments...) and the Security Council are responsible for maintaining international peace and security; and if we [the rich countries (G7, NATO, Europe,)] believe that the UN and its relevant departments are not sufficient to maintain international peace and security (which is obvious), then

we work with all countries, including Russia, to strengthen the UN and to create the institutions that will help us better maintain international peace and security (no. 30-59).

7) By supporting the war in Ukraine, rich countries are defending imperfect and corrupt systems (political, justice, economic systems, etc.) and are seeking to divide the world to prevent increased global cooperation.

78. Before concluding this section, it is important to emphasize that, if we are not defending Values, Democracy, or the UN Charter by supporting the war in Ukraine, as we have just seen above, it is because *we* [the rich countries (G7, NATO, Europe,)] are defending *imperfect and corrupt systems* (political, justice, economic systems,) which bring many (undue) advantages to a small number of people and make a large number of people suffer. Everyone (or almost) can see and **knows (1) that 10 people own as much property and wealth as the 40% of the world's population who are the poorest**, and therefore our systems (political, economic, justice, etc.) are very imperfect [Mr. Lula explained this to the UN in 2023 ([PJ no. 10.5](#)) and no one said he lied in his speech, on the contrary, NGOs specializing in this subject (such as Oxfam) confirm the validity of this remark], and **(2) that rich countries use six times more materials per capita and are responsible for ten times more climate change impacts per capita than low-income countries** (no. 39, [PJ no. 10.11](#)); and it is also obvious to everyone that (1) the economic system, market capitalism, associated with the justice and LA systems that systematically steal from the poor, (2) the imperfect and corrupt political systems of rich countries (which allow the maintenance of dishonest economic, justice, ... systems), and (3) the refusal to seek *the alternative to market capitalism* that pays each person according to their relative contribution to the progress of society, and to evaluate certain costs related to trade (such as the real cost of natural resources), **are the main** causes of the disproportionate inequalities (which these statistics on the 10 richest people in the world and on the use of natural resources highlight), **yet nothing significant is done and has been done in the last 25 years to change anything** about these statistics which have even worsened in recent years [since 2020 **the wealth of the 5 richest people** in the world **has increased by 114%** according to Oxfam, ([PJ no 10.8](#)) ' *The report uses new data to demonstrate that the richest people are not only the biggest beneficiaries of the global economy but exercise significant control over it too. The world's five richest men have more than doubled their wealth since 2020 , while five billion people were made poorer; 15 Jan 2024 ' , and Mr. Musk is even trying to get an extra \$56 billion salary* , it seems, while he surely knows better than anyone that *his salary is not in relation to his relative contribution to the progress of society*, and, among other things, that **many costs** (including the real cost of raw materials used to build Teslas and Space X rockets which is underestimated because it does not take into account the environmental impact of the use of natural resources, as the IRP experts point out, no. 54) **are not evaluated correctly** and are implicitly attributed (a) to society or simply (b) to future generations. And now everyone can see that it is the rich countries that dominate the world, that are responsible for this situation, and that in addition impose unilateral sanctions and their point of view on the conflict in Ukraine on all countries that seek to help Russia, without making the slightest effort to resolve the conflict through negotiations (!).

79. Also, everyone knows that there are **more than 100 million displaced people** in the world (a record), and everyone can see that thousands, if not more, die every year trying to reach Europe (almost ten thousand migrants died in 2023 in the Mediterranean, [PJ no 10.19](#)) or the USA, **yet** nothing significant is done by the rich countries (NATO,) to prevent this, in particular **by improving** the living conditions of people in poor countries, **by developing** economic and justice systems that can put an end to inequalities and this tragic situation linked to the record number of displaced people, and **by stopping to promote the business of war** , among other things. **The world is moving in the wrong direction** because of *the aggressiveness* and intellectual dishonesty of the rich countries and the passivity (or even inaction) of others; and Russia's initiation of the war in Ukraine, which highlights obvious security problems for Russia and the world, and broader problems such as the lack of effort to protect the planet and to use its natural resources sparingly, and which should have led to a surge and a change of direction, is instead being used to create more divisions and to lead to (a) increased military spending *and* (b) increased impoverishment and degradation of the planet.

8) In conclusion of this section on the causes of the war in Ukraine, the world is going in the wrong direction because of the rich countries, and they are trying to blame a small group of countries including Russia, China, Iran (...) for it.

80. **The world is moving in the wrong direction**, and the behavior of rich countries related to the conflict in Ukraine [unilateral sanctions and threats against all countries (including the largest countries by population such as China and India) that dare to help Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine (...), theft of Russian property and assets ...] leaves no doubt that it is the rich countries that dominate the world, and are therefore **primarily responsible** for the wrong direction in which the world is currently moving, even if, of course, the rich countries (G7, Europe, NATO,) are experts in manipulating public opinion and quite easily manage to blame (or make people believe that) a small group of countries including Russia, China, Iran (...) are primarily responsible for this situation by unilaterally sanctioning these countries, criticizing their political systems, giving completely disproportionate media coverage to political opponents in these countries, and supporting a war against Russia while pretending that it is Ukraine, which runs everything and chooses to continue the war [Ukraine would probably not survive 3 months without military aid (...), economic, and humanitarian aid, and unilateral sanctions against Russia, and against other countries that try to help it ...; and it would have great difficulty financing the reconstruction of the country after the war]. **To resolve the conflict in Ukraine , rich countries must admit: (1) that** their democracies are not perfect; **(2) that they** maintain systems (political, economic, justice,) that create inequalities and give them undue advantages (including the possibility of enriching themselves even more, of profiting more from the planet's natural resources ... than poor countries ...) and that make a large number of people in the world suffer; **(3) that they** do not have the necessary legitimacy to unilaterally sanction other countries by bypassing the UN; **(4) that** NATO, the increase in defense budgets of its members and the excessive defense budget of the USA (...), are dangerous for the world and that NATO should be dismantled; and **(5) that they** have a share of responsibility in the war in Ukraine. And **Ukraine must also admit its share of responsibility in the conflict** . Finally, to **resolve the conflict in Ukraine, all countries**, and in particular the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council who must set an example, must change their approach to maintaining peace and international security and agree to work together to put in place a strategy to move the world in the right direction. Having common objectives (SDGs, MDGs,) negotiated at the UN is good and important, but it is not enough; to make significant progress in the world , **we must also (1) put in place a common strategy to achieve the (- and in parallel with the -) common goals (SDGs,) and (2) strengthen the UN** to address the serious global challenges we face, including maintaining peace and security (...), and to achieve **convergence** (as seen in Part III).

B Lessons (military and political) that can be learned from the conflict in Ukraine.

82. The little more than 2 years of war in Ukraine allow us to make some **observations important** militarily and politically, and should encourage the world (all countries) to obtain an immediate ceasefire, - and to find a lasting peace -, in Ukraine, and more generally in all the ongoing conflicts in the world (about fifty, [PJ no 10.20](#)), so I will draw some lessons from these 2 years of war, and then I will propose to you a peace plan (a) to resolve the conflict in Ukraine (...) and (b) to move the world forward in the next section.

1) The supposedly invincible hypersonic missiles (Kinjal,) are dysfunctional.

83. **Hypersonic missiles** (Kinjal,), which the President, the government and the Russian army thought *were invincible*, are regularly destroyed [more than 90% if we believe the Ukrainian announcements, and an article in Le Point mentions that **100% of the** Kinjal hypersonic missiles were **intercepted by Ukraine in 2023** ([PJ no. 10.8](#))] by the anti-missile systems (patriots) of the USA and the Europeans, and this is an important (military) observation because, if this had not been the case, the war would probably already be over and in Russia's favor. Indeed, if these hypersonic missiles had been invincible, Ukraine's advanced anti-missile systems (and other strategic targets) would have been destroyed relatively easily and quickly, and **the Russian bombing** of Ukraine would almost certainly have been **too**

destructive for Ukraine to defend itself as effectively as it has done so far. This observation further confirms the security concern about NATO enlargement, and implicitly the increase in its members' defense budgets, that Russia has invoked to justify its military intervention in Ukraine, among other things. Russia couldn't have an \$800 billion a year defense budget (like the US), and it couldn't convince the US to limit its defense budget, so to stay competitive against the US (the other nuclear superpower in the world), it sought to develop (hopefully) invincible hypersonic missiles, which I thought was smart, but to date it clearly hasn't worked; and, **in addition** , rich countries have been using unilateral economic sanctions (...) (since 2014, and even more so since the beginning of the conflict) against Russia to impose their point of view on the situation, and they have the technical means (with advanced AI systems) to develop new weapons (of mass destruction and others) that will give them considerable advantages in the event of a conflict with Russia, so Russia had and has good reasons to worry about the future, and the world also has many reasons to (and should) worry about this situation and the dangerous behavior of NATO countries (a) which impose an arms race that is a source of insecurity [especially in the context of the recent significant progress that the USA (...) has made in the field of artificial intelligence], (b) which divides the world, and (c) which prevents more investment in improving people's living conditions and in strengthening the UN.

2) The disproportionate response of rich countries to the conflict in Ukraine also confirms the existence of serious security problems for Russia (...) and their position endangers Ukraine and the world.

(a) The disproportionate response of rich countries to the conflict in Ukraine and their share of responsibility in it.

84. The disproportionate and dangerous response of the rich countries, which followed the launch of the Russian military operation in Ukraine [large-scale unilateral economic sanctions against Russia (to destroy its economy ...), seizures of Russian property and assets abroad, embargoes on advanced technologies, deliveries of weapons and ammunition and economic support to Ukraine, promises of sanctions against all countries that would militarily assist (...) Russia in its war effort; and this for as long (and as long) as Ukraine wants, without any consideration of the search for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the conflict, and without any consideration of the risk associated with the situation and the fact that it could trigger the sending of Russian nuclear bombs to Ukraine (!)], **clearly shows: (1) that** the rich countries (G7, NATO, Europe,) dominate the world and **impose** [or at least do not hesitate to (try to) impose] **their political and military points of view** on all other countries by threatening them and sanctioning them economically ... (even large countries like India and China are threatened); **(2) that** nuclear deterrence no longer scares anyone, which can be very dangerous; **(3) that the rich countries** behave like **dictatorships** at the global level, imposing their worldview and their economic and military domination, and seeking to weaken the UN and prevent any global cooperation to solve the serious (international) problems that we have to solve; **(4) that they use** (- and make take significant risks to -) the Ukrainian population to maintain their domination over the world; **and (5) that they do not want to understand** the good that the atomic bomb has brought to the world.

b) The position of rich countries endangers Ukraine and the world and violates the UN Charter.

85. The position of the rich countries (G7, Europe, NATO, ...), **which consists** of giving **unconditional support** (including arms deliveries to Ukraine, significant financial support, unilateral sanctions against Russia, ...) to Mr Zelensky and the Ukrainian government for as long as they request it, and without, at the same time, making the slightest effort to obtain a ceasefire and to resolve the conflict through negotiation quickly, **(1) apparently places the responsibility** (a) for the numerous Ukrainian and Russian deaths and injuries, and (b) for the destruction of property and infrastructure (which could be even greater if Russia uses a nuclear bomb in Ukraine), on the Ukrainian government alone, **(2) apparently expresses** a strong desire to condemn the aggression of a sovereign state and the alleged (for some) violations of international rules, **(3) apparently exonerates the rich countries** (Europe, NATO, G7,) **from any responsibility** in the conflict in Ukraine, and **(4) implicitly implies** that rich countries have nothing to offer that could convince Russia to stop the conflict; so this position has many advantages, **on the surface** , for rich countries, which have a significant share of responsibility for the conflict (and in particular France)

due to their lack of legitimacy to sanction and impoverish Russia, among other things, **but this position (a)** also indirectly encourages **Ukraine to continue the war** (and not to negotiate) **and does not take into account at all the well-being of Ukrainians** (including those in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions ...) who are forced to accept war (general mobilization, suspected of being a traitor as soon as you speak to a Russian ...), not to mention the nuclear risks associated with this position, **(b) seeks to manipulate** Ukrainian public opinion [by making them believe that they are fighting to defend values, democracy (...) and to help advance the world, when this is false] and world public opinion, (c) is not **appropriate** because we cannot win a nuclear war against Russia, **and (d) violates the UN Charter** (see above no. 77).

(c) We cannot and must not wage war, the UN Charter expresses this basic principle.

86. The atomic bomb taught us that we cannot, and must not, **wage war anymore** , and we created the UN, its Charter, and human rights to encourage countries to behave more responsibly (art. 26) and to no longer have to wage war, **yet, and despite the knowledge** we have acquired and the advanced technologies that have been developed (relatively recently for the Internet and AI) and which allow us to implement effective solutions to improve the living conditions of billions of people at the same time, **the rich countries maintain NATO , continue to encourage each of its members to spend ever more** on armaments (instead of strengthening the UN to encourage all countries to spend less on armaments), **maintain systems** (economic ...) that allow the plundering of the planet's natural resources without paying **the real cost** of these resources and without worrying about the impact on the environment, **promote the trade of war** , and **undermine the work of the UN** (and violate its Charter). **The atomic bomb is a wonderful invention** unless we ignore it or pretend to ignore it as the rich countries have been doing since the fall of the Berlin Wall and even more so since 2014 and the Maidan revolution, which led to the adoption **of unilateral and illegitimate sanctions** against Russia that bypass the UN and its Security Council. We have much more to lose in a nuclear war against Russia than Russia has to lose in a nuclear war against *us* (NATO), so unless the Russians are cowards, which, in view of the 2nd World War and the 2 years of war against Ukraine, is unlikely, they will not give up, and we will give up before them or we will suffer much more than them. The NATO countries, plus the non-NATO European countries and the other countries that sanction Russia, are **(1) much richer than Russia** [all G7 countries that sanction Russia are already individually richer (economically) than Russia; **G7 GDP \$36,730 million** and Russia's GDP about **\$1,776 million** , according to the Internet; and, with other non-G7 European and NATO countries the difference is even greater, of course], and **(2) much more populous** [G7 population, **768 million** (and with other non-G7 European and NATO countries, **over 800 million**) and Russia's population **143.4 million**], so **they have much more to lose** in a nuclear war against Russia than Russia does; and the threats of serious consequences for Russia if it uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which could be risky, are forms of public opinion manipulation.

87. When one is responsible for the well-being of over **800 million people** and the protection of considerable wealth and technological advances, one cannot (and should not) take the risk of a nuclear war with a very high probability of causing (a) massive destruction of property and knowledge, and (b) the deaths of over 500 or 600 million people; especially against an adversary who is (a) much poorer, and much less populated, **(b) who is playing for his survival** (economic, political, intellectual) in the conflict with Ukraine, and (c) who raises **serious** (global) **security issues** and **some solid** arguments to justify his war, I think (even if this adversary does not mention all of them), and especially not when ' *our* ' (the) motivations (of the rich countries and Ukraine) are not honest as we have seen above. Russia is (implicitly) trying to explain (or unwittingly explaining) to the world **(1) that we are all in the same boat**, and **(2) that the rich countries must (i) work (more) actively** towards the eradication of poverty and inequality, environmental protection (...) and **convergence** , **(ii) strengthen the UN** in the field of maintaining international peace and security, the Internet and AI, natural resource management (...), and **(iii) promote more actively cooperation** within the UN and with the help of the UN (**to achieve this convergence and to maintain international peace and security**), **instead of unilaterally sanctioning less wealthy countries** (bypassing the UN) and

forcing all countries to participate in an arms race; and the rich countries pretend not to understand this in order to continue (a) ruling the world, (b) stealing from the poor, (c) impoverishing Russia, and (d) profiting as much as possible from (or plundering) the planet's natural resources while blaming Russia, China, Iran for the problems the world faces (...); this is harmful and dangerous for the world.

(d) The position of the rich countries also has serious intellectual flaws and conclusion on this subject.

88. Finally, on this subject, the position of the rich countries also has serious **intellectual flaws**, **especially when combined with threats of a strong response** from NATO if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine. For example, **this position (a)** indirectly gives Mr Zelensky and his government the opportunity to launch military operations that (i) could lead to Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine because, apart from the Russians, no one really knows when Russia will become so affected by sanctions and fierce fighting or when Russia will feel so in danger (or so affected) of receiving Ukrainian missiles on Russian soil, that the use of nuclear weapons will become or could become the only solution to its survival or simply the appropriate response to the situation, and that (ii) could therefore automatically lead to **a strong military reaction** from NATO (and **automatically** NATO going to war with Russia if some commentators are to be believed); and (b) **therefore gives Mr. Zelensky** and his government (a ... foreign president) the responsibility to decide whether France, the USA (and other NATO countries...) go to war with Russia (and possibly a nuclear war), which seems to be (or rather is) **contrary to our democratic principles** which give the President, the parliament and indirectly the French people the right to decide whether the country should go to war. **In summary, the position of the rich countries** (G7, Europe, NATO,) is not in the interests of Ukrainians, French and **people** (of NATO member countries and) **of the whole world**, it violates the UN Charter, it could have very serious consequences for the world, it encouraged and still encourages Ukraine not to negotiate, and it surprised Russia and prevented it from quickly ending the conflict (through negotiation,), and it significantly increased the cost of the conflict for Russians, Ukrainians and people around the world, and, in the context of significant progress in the field of AI, it is even more dishonest, so rich countries should be encouraged to change their position and admit their responsibility for the war in order to achieve peace in Ukraine.

3) The Ukrainian resistance and the heavy losses (human and economic) inflicted on Russia have increased the cost of the war without changing the initial situation (Russia still has 6000 nuclear bombs and could end the conflict in 10 minutes).

89. In 2 years of war and despite all the efforts made by Ukraine, **hundreds of billions** of military, economic and humanitarian aid given to Ukraine by rich countries (and which were not used to improve the living conditions of all the inhabitants of the planet, including Ukrainians), and hundreds of thousands of dead, wounded and missing, the Ukrainian President and government have not changed the facts of the problem that Ukraine has been facing since the beginning of the war, namely: **(1) the fact** that Russia has between 5,000 and 6,000 nuclear bombs and could stop the war in less than 10 minutes if it decided to send 2 nuclear bombs to Ukraine; **(2) the fact** that Russia (and, for me, **the world**) is (are) facing a serious security problem related to (a) NATO enlargement to Ukraine ... (and, for me, also linked to the very existence of NATO , the increase in defense budgets of its members , the excessive defense budget of the USA ,), (b) the use of unilateral sanctions (which bypass the UN) by rich countries, and (c) the recent and spectacular development of AI in the USA mainly; **(3) the fact** that the inhabitants of Donbass and Crimea **voted** for their independence (even if the elections are questionable for some), and that Ukraine was waging war against its own people (from its point of view) in Donbass without respecting the Minsk agreements (and violating Article 33 of the UN Charter, no. 77); **and (4) the fact** that Crimea has not become a concentration camp since the vote for independence and annexation to Russia, on the contrary, obvious progress has been made [such as the construction of the Kerche bridge which is a significant progress], so it is absurd to seek to retake Crimea and even Donbass **by force** and to seek to destroy the Kerche bridge which connects Crimea to Russia, in the same way that **it was absurd** - on the part of Ukraine according to German journalists - to destroy the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines, which were **a common technological progress** between Russia and Europe. Everyone agrees that it would be horrible if Russia used a nuclear bomb in Ukraine, including Russia, which

has already lost many soldiers trying to prevent this, but the Ukrainian President and government continue to rejoice in the 500,000 Russian soldiers killed (or perhaps injured for some) without understanding that each additional Russian soldier killed and each additional economic loss inflicted on Russia, (1) significantly increases the cost of the war that it is waging on credit (and without the slightest diplomatic effort to resolve it as the UN Charter requires) and that it is making the people of rich countries, including the poorest, pay for, and (2) endangers the world without any honest justification because Ukraine does not defend any values, not democracy, and not the UN Charter (which it and the rich countries violate without a second thought, as we have seen above).

90. The Ukrainian Presidents and governments since 2014 have a significant responsibility for the ongoing war in Ukraine, and Mr. Zelensky and his government are the main culprits for the fact that the war in Ukraine has not yet been resolved because they stopped peace negotiations (in violation of the UN Charter and for reasons other than the interests of Ukrainians and people of the world), and they will be **the first and main culprits (1) for a long and deadly** war in Ukraine , (2) for a possible nuclear attack by Russia on Ukraine (if it happens) and the hundreds of thousands of deaths (at least) that will result from it in an instant, (3) for the consequences of such an attack on international relations, and (4) for the numerous sufferings that will result from it in all countries of the world, even if it would immediately end the conflict in Ukraine. And what the Ukrainian President and government call courage and heroism in fighting Russia and killing Russians (and Ukrainians) in large numbers could (if not should) be (more accurately) called total irresponsibility and recklessness , or even more accurately perhaps **a form of outrageous corruption** (selling the destruction of a country and the death of a significant part of its population in an attempt to please and serve rich countries) **on the part of the Ukrainian leadership** , who impose incredible suffering on the Ukrainian population and put them (and the world) at such great risk, again (a) **without making the slightest effort** (*i*) to understand the serious and real security problem that Russia **and the world face** because of NATO, the behavior of its members, the arms race that they impose on the world (...), (*ii*) to try to resolve the conflict through diplomacy (such as the Charter of the UN demands it) and (*iii*) to think about the indirect consequences of the conflict for other countries, and in particular for poor countries and their inhabitants who are indirect victims of this war, and (b) **without even asking the question** of whether NATO, which Ukraine wants to join, is good for the whole world (or even for its members) and whether NATO is not being used to divide the world, undermine the work of the UN, and impose a dictatorship led by the rich countries, and, in the context of this war, to prevent any global cooperation necessary to solve the urgent problems that the world has to solve. Ukraine must admit that it has a share of responsibility for the conflict (and its duration) in order to be able to find the just and lasting **peace in Ukraine that it wants (or claims to want) to achieve**.

4) **The two years of war have confirmed Russia's fears, the seriousness of the security problem it faces and the world faces, and the urgency and importance of dismantling NATO and strengthening the UN.**

91. As for Russia's position and situation, first of all it is obvious that **Russia** has not had (to date) the results it expected since the beginning of the conflict, among other things, for the 3 reasons mentioned above (its hypersonic missiles which do not work as its leaders had hoped, the disproportionate response of the rich countries to the conflict, and the cessation of negotiations at the beginning of the conflict by Ukraine), **but** , by opposing the enlargement of NATO, **it has pointed out** (implicitly) **a serious security problem** that *we* (the world and the UN) should have addressed a long time ago, I think, namely the risks associated with (a) the existence of NATO, (b) its enlargement, (c) the increase in the defense budgets of its members, and, in particular, the disproportionate defense budget of the USA, (d) **the arms race** imposed by NATO member countries, and (e) the fact that NATO undermines the work of the UN and is used to prevent greater global cooperation. More generally, *we (the world and the UN)* should also have been more vigilant (a) about the enlargement of a regional organization like the European Union, and (b) about the real objective of this enlargement (1) because Ukraine's desire to join Europe and Europe's desire to open its doors with

open arms to Ukraine, are **very suspect** and not in the interest of the world and Europe (in the way it is doing it), and (2) because the enlargement of Europe (*i*) has led to the subsidiarization of the Council of Europe, which is now 100% controlled by the European Union, which creates serious problems, particularly in the area of respect for human rights and the political role of the Council of Europe (the Council of Europe has become a propaganda tool of the EU), and (*ii*) has given Europe greater political weight and influence within international organizations like the UN, the ICC, which affects, among other things, others, the integrity of the decisions of the various UN entities.

92. To date, Russia has resisted the temptation to end the conflict and the sanctions of rich countries quickly by using the atomic bomb and it does not seem to want to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but the longer the conflict lasts , **the more it is costly and destructive** for Ukraine and Russia, **the more dangerous it is for the world** , and it prevents any increased global cooperation to solve the global problems that the planet must solve, and even solve **urgently for some** ; and there is no good end to the conflict that is not a negotiated end through diplomacy (**and not a negotiated end quickly**), but since Ukraine refuses to admit its responsibility for the conflict and to negotiate, and has stopped the negotiations that had started at the beginning of the conflict and that were ready to succeed, it seems, Russia can do nothing or little other than to continue the conflict, and to wait for Ukraine and the rich countries to admit their share of responsibility for the conflict and return to the negotiating table. And since Ukraine and rich countries bear the greatest responsibility for the conflict (as we have seen above), and the conflict raises important security issues for the whole world, Russia cannot weaken, and continuing the war is the only way to make Ukraine and rich countries understand that they are wrong. As we have seen above, Russia is not a perfect Democracy or better than the Democracy of NATO countries (and I am not saying this, even if I point out serious problems of *our* Democracies; and I am not saying that Russia is waging war in Ukraine to denounce the fact that rich countries plunder the planet's natural resources, pollute 10 times more than poor countries, and refuse to look for an alternative to market capitalism); and Russia could (**and should**) **have done more** (1) to address the (security and other) problems it (and the world) was facing before launching the conflict in 2022, and (2) to encourage the UN and its members to think about (a) dismantling NATO and (b) strengthening the UN in the field of maintaining international peace and security, and (c) the possibility of limiting the enlargement of the European Union after the fall of the Berlin Wall, **but it does not have** as much responsibility for the world's problems as the rich countries, as seen above, and it did not stop negotiations with Ukraine at the beginning of the conflict, so it is Ukraine and the rich countries who must admit their responsibility for the current situation and **for the fact that the world is going in the wrong direction**.

C Proposal of a peace plan including the organization of an international conference to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and to advance the world.

1) To achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine, it is essential that rich countries and Ukraine admit that they have made mistakes and that they bear some responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine.

(a) The democracies and systems (political, economic, justice) of rich countries are not so perfect.

93. The conflict in Ukraine is devastating for Ukraine and Russia, and it is harmful and dangerous for the world, so we must seek to resolve it through diplomacy **as a matter of urgency** , and not to encourage it as the rich countries (**G7, NATO, Europe, etc.**) do. And to find lasting peace in Ukraine and to move the world forward, as we have seen above, **it is first of all essential that rich countries admit : (1) that** their democracies and their systems (economic, justice,) are not perfect [(a) when we let a candidate, who was convicted by a popular jury for having committed 34 crimes, run for the American presidential election, we cannot and must not allow ourselves to give lessons in democracy to any country or pretend to defend values by financing the government of Ukraine to win the war against Russia and by sanctioning Russia, which supposedly does not have our values and which is supposedly a dictatorship; and (b) when you maintain an economic system that allows the 10 richest

people in the world (9 Americans and 1 Frenchman) to own more goods than the poorest 40% of the world's population, you cannot give moral lessons to any country on earth, especially when you use ' *six times more materials per capita and are responsible for ten times more climate change impacts per capita than low-income countries* ' (...)] ; **(2) that they** are not defending Democracy, Values and the UN Charter by financing Ukraine's war against Russia, providing Ukraine with weapons and intelligence, and unilaterally sanctioning Russia and stealing its property and assets abroad without making any effort to resolve the conflict through diplomacy, especially when at the same time they have not done anything significant for over 20 years to strengthen the UN and to make all countries of the planet benefit from the advanced technologies (such as the Internet and AI) that they have developed, and the knowledge they have acquired, and they are leading the world into an arms race that is contrary to the UN Charter and a threat to international peace and security; **(3) that** NATO (...) is dangerous for the world and must be dismantled; **and (4) that they** have a share of responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine.

(b) Ukraine should never have waged war against its own population.

94. And **it is also crucial that Ukraine admits: (1) that it** has a share of responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine; **(2) that** it should never have sought to recover Donbass **by force** (by waging war against its own population), the UN Charter is clear on this subject [Article 33 ' *The parties to any dispute the prolongation of which is likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security shall seek its solution, first of all, by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, ..., or by other peaceful means of their own choice.* '] , and here it was obvious that after the Maidan revolution and the vote for independence of the Donbass people (whether legitimate or not), the dispute between Ukraine and the Donbass people (supported by Russia) was likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, so it was necessary to negotiate, to make legal proceedings, but not to go to war, and not to ask for sanctions against Russia from rich countries, and not to allow (or let) rich countries to sanction Russia]; **and (3) that it** should never have stopped peace negotiations after the start of the conflict in 2022 as it did [the UN Charter required Ukraine to resolve the dispute through negotiation]; Ukraine should have even sought to avoid the conflict before it started since Mr. Zelensky admitted that he had been informed by the US that a conflict was imminent before it started. And Ukraine needs to understand that its allies (NATO, ...) who are funding its war are not perfect and should be busy *moving the world in the right direction* and improving their imperfect democracies instead of (a) trying to create problems between Russia and its neighbors and (b) criticizing *democracy* in Russia.

(c) The UN also bears some responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine and the world needs to rethink its approach to maintaining international peace and security.

95. And, more generally and as seen above, it would be useful for the UN to admit that it has made mistakes since the fall of the Berlin Wall; among other things, **the UN should have done more (1) to obtain the dismantling of NATO**, and to control the defense budgets of its members and, in particular, the excessive defense budget of the USA (Jeffrey Sachs has regularly highlighted this problem, but successive secretaries general have not heard or understood him), and **(2) to obtain a strengthening of the UN** in the areas of maintaining peace and international security and the Internet [and more generally, computer applications and networks (AI ...). And **it is also crucial: (1) that we** (each country) **think (think) our (its) security** without forgetting, - and even taking into account -, **the security of other countries** (no 45-48); **(2) that we accept (a) to dismantling NATO** [regrouping in a regional military organization like NATO and increasing the defense budgets of its members disproportionately does not bring more security, on the contrary, it creates security problems for other non-NATO countries, and it leads to **an arms race** that is harmful to all countries (and **which is contrary to the UN Charter** , no. 39-43)], **(b) to strengthen** the UN in the field of maintaining international peace and security, disarmament, ..., **(c) to demonstrate** greater **transparency** in the military field, and **(d) to increase** cooperation between countries in **all areas**, including **in the military field** , by creating a new IO dedicated to the modernization of armies, the maintenance of peace and international security, disarmament, etc.), and **in the field of the Internet** and AI by creating **a new IO** dedicated to computer applications in charge in particular of Internet governance and (technical aspects) of AI, the development and maintenance

of global Internet applications (...), and (3) that we use new technologies (the Internet, artificial intelligence,) more effectively to improve the living conditions of the more than 8 billion people in the world; and (4) that we stop promoting the trade in war and seek to maintain balances while acting (a) for disarmament, and (b) for the reduction of defense budgets, and (c) for the modernization of armies.

(d) The world has not a minute to lose.

95.1 ***The world has no time to lose*** in solving the many complex problems it has to solve quickly [the problem of global warming is becoming more urgent every day; environmental protection (cleaning the oceans, rivers, air pollution, and the plundering of natural resources, must also be addressed urgently (see the recommendations of the [Global Resources Outlook 2024](#)) ; and the same goes for terrorism, organized and transnational crime, the fight against poverty and inequality, the migration crisis, achieving the SDGs and convergence, the potentially catastrophic risks associated with the development of advanced AI systems (this is the latest complex problem that has fallen on our shoulders) ...] ; yet rich countries and Ukraine **are throwing hundreds of billions of dollars and euros out the window** to impoverish and try to destroy Russia and to destroy Ukraine, so we must stop the war immediately (with a ceasefire) and organize an international conference to find a just peace and decide together on the new direction the world should take. I think **Ukraine should ask for a ceasefire immediately or without losing a minute** because the world does not have a minute to lose.

2) The international conference for peace in Ukraine and to establish a strategy for solving our global problems.

(a) Ukraine should take into account the analysis presented above in requesting a ceasefire (...).

96. Ukraine should (1) **take into account the analysis** and arguments presented above, (2) **rethink its position** on the conflict in Ukraine, (3) **admit its share of responsibility** for the conflict and the mistakes it has made since 2014, (4) **ask immediately (a) the end of (i) unilateral sanctions** against Russia (...), and **(ii) arms and ammunition deliveries to Ukraine**, to rich countries, and **(b) a ceasefire with Russia** to be able to prepare **an international conference (i)** for peace in Ukraine, and **(ii)** to define a new strategy *to move the world in the right direction*, which could take place **at the end of August 2024** in a location to be chosen, and then continue **in September in New York (...)**, and (5) **commit to not taking any steps** (no negotiations, no legal proceedings,) and not asking for any votes in the territories occupied (currently) by Russia to try to recover these territories **until all the houses**, buildings and infrastructure destroyed in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia, and in Russia during the conflict **have been rebuilt**, and **until all the victims** of the conflict in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia and in Russia **have been compensated** for the damages they have suffered as a result of the conflict [and as long as the responsibilities of each party (of each party to the conflict) have not been established]. **It is absolutely essential (1) that we** (and in particular Ukraine and its government, Russia, the rich countries,) **think first and foremost about the victims** of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia (...) and about the reconstruction of Ukraine, the occupied territories and the parts of Russia affected by the conflict, **and (2) that we** (all countries) agree **on the strategy to move the world in the right direction (strengthen the UN, solve our global problems, etc.)**. Ukraine's goal is to achieve *a just peace*, which I assume includes the return of the territories occupied by Russia (including perhaps or certainly Crimea), and that is an achievable goal, I think, but not immediately, and not until the other issues that need to be addressed have been addressed (including security issues for Russia and the world), reconstruction is complete or well advanced, and victims have been compensated. Ukraine has **very little** chance of recovering the occupied territories **by waging war**, and it exposes itself to significant risks if it continues the war; and if Ukraine manages to continue the war successfully, it could take several years before all the occupied territories are recovered, so the 7 or 8 years to wait before addressing the issue of returning the territories is not exaggerated.

(b) The issue of the recovery of the territories occupied by Russia is not as urgent as the compensation of the victims, the reconstruction of houses (...) and infrastructure and the strategy to be put in place to move the world forward.

97. The dismantling of NATO and the creation of a new IO for the modernization of the armies (...) should address the security issues that Russia has put forward, and the security issues that Ukraine was trying to solve by trying to join NATO, and of course it would help the world and the UN to maintain international peace and security. The immediate **ceasefire will stop the suffering** of the people and will allow people to calm down; and **the work** of (1) rebuilding homes, ..., (2) compensating all victims in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia, and in Russia, (3) analyzing responsibilities in the conflict, and (4) negotiating to put in place a strategy to move the world forward, and *to make it go in the right direction*, **will allow** the different parties to the conflict to show their willingness to make peace, to resolve the problems that caused the war, and to move the world forward; and should improve the chances of finding *a just peace* for everyone [Donbass does not contain the world's largest diamond and gold mines and reserves, there are just some of its inhabitants who speak Russian and like Russia, so if Russia thinks that these people can live in peace and in good conditions in Ukraine, and not be punished for their interest in Russia, there are no major reasons that could prevent the retribution of these territories if the inhabitants agree]. Moreover, if the world goes in the right direction, it could make considerable progress in the next 7-8 years thanks to AI and the Internet, and thanks to increased cooperation between all countries, so negotiations and other steps for the possible restitution of territories could be simplified. Our goal is convergence, so the living standards in Ukraine and Russia (and in the occupied or annexed territories) should be the same.

(c) An agency responsible for reconstruction in Ukraine (...) and compensation for victims should be created.

98. **An agency for the reconstruction** of houses (...) in Ukraine (...), in Russia, and **for compensation for victims should be created** immediately, composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the rich countries and all other countries that wish to help in this enormous and vital effort for the world. It will manage the requests of victims, local communities, businesses, coordinate efforts and raise funds, and address environmental protection issues and environmental damage, among other things. And it **is also crucial that the ICC suspend the international arrest warrants** against Mr. Putin and the relevant Russian officials so that they can participate in the peace negotiations and other vital negotiations that the world will have to launch to strengthen the United Nations (and which I mentioned above), **until the reconstruction** of houses (...) and compensation for victims are completed and **until responsibilities** in the conflict have been precisely established by an independent commission that will have to be created.

(d) Rich countries could also take into account the analysis presented above to obtain a ceasefire.

99. And **if** Ukraine (a) does not do this work of analyzing the arguments presented here, (b) refuses to rethink its position and responsibility in the conflict, (c) does not ask rich countries to stop sanctions and arms deliveries (...) and (d) does not propose a ceasefire, **then rich countries should also: (1) take into account the analysis** and arguments presented above; **(2) admit their responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine** and the mistakes made since the fall of the Berlin Wall [the arms race they impose, ...]; **(3) immediately stop** (a) all arms deliveries to Ukraine and (b) all unilateral sanctions (economic, embargoes,) against Russia; **(4) immediately return frozen or confiscated Russian assets** and property; and **(5) call on the international community** to begin studying (*i*) the proposal to dismantle NATO and create instead a new IO for the modernization of armies (...), (*ii*) the proposal to create a new IO dedicated to IT and network applications in charge of, among other things, Internet governance and (technical or ...) AI governance, and (*iii*) the other proposals mentioned above (...); **(6) encourage Ukraine and Russia to implement an immediate ceasefire**; and **(7) propose to organize an international peace conference in Ukraine and in the world** end of August 2024, which could continue in September in New York **(a) to address all the security issues** that the world urgently needs to address [including (*i*) the problem of the arms race imposed by NATO, the desire to increase the defense budgets of its members and the excessive defense budget of the USA, (*ii*) the new risks linked to AI, (*iii*) the impact on peacekeeping of the development of global applications that can be used by all countries to improve the living conditions of the 8

billion people in the world (e.g. proposal to improve LA systems) that I mentioned above], and **(b) to put in place a (common) strategy** to move the world in the right direction.

99.1 Mr. Biden, in recent years you and your fellow Democrats have criticized several decisions of the US Supreme Court (most recently the decision on the subject of Mr. Trump's immunity for the crimes he is accused of having committed), and you have mentioned that democracy is in danger; and it seems obvious (1) that your democracy is not functioning as well as it should and (2) that it is not as perfect as ' *you* ' (the American political leaders) try to make the world believe when you allow yourselves to unilaterally sanction (and bypassing the UN) other countries and even sometimes to sanction the UN visibly, so I hope you will understand the importance of stopping the war in Ukraine *without losing a minute* and to start working with all countries to put in place the strategy and new structures that will allow us to improve our systems (political, justice, economic,), to advance the world (as well as your and ' *the* ' democracy), to end the war (in general), to protect our planet and improve the living conditions of all its inhabitants; and of course also to find a just peace for all in Ukraine.

V Conclusion.

A The SAPIN II law, CPP 40 and their consequences on the request for preliminary investigation submitted to the ICC.

100. The SAPIN II law of 2016 relating to the fight against corruption (...) and its amendment of March 2022, which allows victims of accusations that they have reported to the courts (...) to be considered as *whistleblowers*, **(1) make me a whistleblower** (a) for the accusations of unconstitutionality of the legal aid (LA) law in France brought before the courts in France, at the ICC (...), and **(b) for the accusations of crimes against humanity of persecution** linked to the unconstitutional LA law and OMLs brought before the UN Security Council and the ICC from 2020 to date [letter of 10-2-21 ([PJ no 1](#), EN [PJ no 1.2](#)) supplementing the letters of 10-7-20 ([PJ no 5](#), EN [PJ no 5.2](#)) and 23-11-20 ([PJ no 4](#), EN [PJ no 4.2](#))], and also (c) for the accusations brought against the Department of Essonne (and its leaders) in 1998 and more recently in 2022, and (d) for the attempted cover-up of the unconstitutionality of the LA law [see no. 2], **(2) (give me) important and useful new rights** in the particular (international...) context in which these accusations are presented, because they could be used, I think, (or at least **the spirit** of this law and its amendment could be used) by the ICC to [or at least by the Security Council and the ICC member countries to ask the ICC to] launch *phase II of the preliminary investigation* into the complaint of 10-2-21 as if the complaint were presented by France [because France and its leaders had **a legal obligation** to present these accusations according to CPP 40 and they did not do so, no. 5-6]. I therefore ask the ICC, the Security Council and the ICC member countries to take into account these new elements to launch or have launched the preliminary investigation into the complaint related to the dishonest LA law and the OMLs in France.

B The ICC's LA system, new evidence of the unconstitutionality of LA law in France and the merits of the charges of crimes against humanity of persecution linked to LA law, and a concrete example of the LA problems.

101. The ICC uses a legal aid system that pays defense and victims' lawyers **based on the legal and factual difficulty of the cases** (no. 9), so it should recognize that the French legal aid system, which is based primarily on **lawyers' charity** (nos. 9-10), is unconstitutional and results in serious injustices to the poor (as well as the commission of a crime against humanity of persecution in the context described). Moreover, lawyers' remuneration is not the only problem that affects the quality of service provided to the poor, several other serious problems also lead to the unconstitutionality of the legal aid law (no. 10). Above, I have provided **new evidence** (a) of the unconstitutionality of the LA Act (and the OMLs), (b) of the merits of the charges of crimes against humanity of persecution linked to dishonest LA law, in particular by presenting **a concrete example** of the consequences for the poor of the dishonesty of the LA law (nos. 15-35); and (c) **of the seriousness of the crime described** , in particular by highlighting the significant number (over 10 million since 1991) of offences of concealment of crimes against humanity that are committed in connection with this crime (**i**) by lawyers and (**ii**) by administrations (among others) that profit from the crime (no. 13). The proceedings at the Versailles Administrative Court against the CG91, the behavior of the lawyer appointed to help me, and the briefs of the CG91, which seek to take advantage of the unconstitutionality of the LA law, show how the poor are robbed of their right to justice and why the progress brought by new laws (such as the SAPIN II law) does not benefit the poor, even if I managed to find (with great difficulty) arguments that should (or could) allow me to win the case in a fair trial. And the procedure against the CG91 also highlights the serious injustices of which I was a victim in France from 1993 to 2001, in the USA between 2002 and 2011 (and **the merits of the refugee status** obtained in the USA in 2002), and since my return to France in 2011, when I worked in the interest of all and I presented serious and useful proposals for all countries, as we have just seen.

C The new proposals presented here and in the letters of 23-2-23 and 7-7-23, and the comments on the recent reports on AI from the UN and Gladstone AI Inc., and on the Global Resources Outlook 2024.

102. Above and in my 2023 letters to French politicians (...), I presented several **new proposals** [(a) proposal to dismantle NATO and create **a new IO for peacekeeping** ... (no. 39-43), (b) proposal to create **a new IO for Internet governance and (technical or ...) governance of AI** (... , no. 44-49), (c) proposal to develop **a new pension management system** usable by all countries (... , no. 35-38), which complemented the proposals presented in 1997, 2016 and 2021: (d) proposal to the Inco- Copernicus programme to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data at the global level, (e) proposal to develop a new legal aid system, (f) proposal to seek *the alternative to market capitalism* ... no. 53-55 ([PJ no. 3](#)),] to strengthen the UN in the areas of maintaining international peace and security, and the Internet and AI (computer and network applications), and to help all countries and the UN maintain international peace and security, achieve the SDGs, convergence, and other global goals, and make better use of the Internet and AI; and I also commented on recent reports on AI [[Governing AI for Humanity](#) and [Gladstone Action Plan](#)] and the [Global Resources Outlook 2024](#) , among other things, **(1) to justify** (a) the merits of the proposal I made in 2005 to create a new international organization (IO) dedicated to computer and network applications and responsible, among other things, for Internet governance, and, more generally, and (b) the strategy (*i*) I proposed to improve our international information system, to pool our IT expenditure (...), and to transmit to poor countries advanced knowledge and systems in important areas (justice, economics,), and (*ii*) which consisted of developing global IT applications to solve certain specific problems that could be used by all countries at the same time; **(2) to point out** (a) certain mistakes that rich countries and the UN have made since the fall of the Berlin Wall, (b) certain dishonest behaviors of rich countries, and (c) the inappropriate position of rich countries in the conflict in Ukraine, and **(3) to emphasize the urgency to move the world in the right direction** .

103. There are many advantages to attributing, - and many synergies are possible by attributing -, the governance (*technical* or ...) of AI and the governance of the Internet to the same international organization, and the two technologies support each other and multiply the capacities of the other so to speak because the Internet allows all countries and all inhabitants of the planet to benefit from AI, and AI allows to strengthen security on the Internet and to make global Internet applications more efficient and more intelligent (no. 46-57). The Global Resources Outlook confirmed that **it is crucial (1) to reassess the cost of doing business** , and in particular to reassess **the real cost** of natural resources, taking into account the limited quantities that are available on earth and the impact of their use (...) on the climate and more generally on the environment, and **(2) to act quickly** to put in place solutions that would allow natural resources to be used sustainably and without destroying the planet (and implicitly to find *the alternative to market capitalism*). And **all the proposals** that I have made since 1997 **now cover** [and present solutions to help the UN and its member countries achieve their goals (SDGs,) and solve problems in] **the 3 main areas of intervention** (3 pillars) of the UN, the maintenance of international peace and security, development, and human rights, and **should help us** resolve the conflict in Ukraine and other conflicts in the world and significantly improve the living conditions of the more than 8 billion inhabitants of the planet. Finally, these different proposals also show that my experience could be useful to the UN, so **I renew my offer of services (my application to) the UN** to carry out the different projects that I presented to you in my previous letters and that I present here.

D The causes of the conflict in Ukraine and the lessons that can be learned after 2 years of conflict.

104. **(1) The mistakes we have** made since the fall of the Berlin Wall, including (a) maintaining NATO and increasing its members' defense budgets (including the disproportionate US budget) which have led to **an arms race** contrary to the UN Charter and harmful to the world, and (b) the bad choices made in Internet governance, and **(2) the desire** of rich countries (*i*) to hide the imperfections of their systems (political, economic, justice, etc.) and their institutions, and (*ii*) **to maintain corrupt and imperfect systems** that allow them to accumulate ever more wealth while billions of people remain in poverty and to benefit from the planet's natural resources (...) more than poor countries [no. 40], **are important causes** of

the conflict in Ukraine (and other ongoing conflicts), or at least causes that explain the behavior of the parties to the conflict better than the so-called desire to defend Democracy, the Values of rich countries (NATO) and the UN Charter (as seen in no. 60-80). And **the position of rich countries** to provide unconditional support to Ukraine (delivery of weapons and ammunition, financial support, provision of military intelligence, etc.) and to unilaterally sanction Russia and all countries that would try to help it, without making any effort to resolve the conflict through negotiation or any other peaceful method, is inappropriate, contrary to the UN Charter and dangerous for Ukraine and the world.

105. Of course, **the position of Ukraine** , which accepts and even demands this unconditional support from rich countries and the sanctions imposed on Russia, which refuses any negotiation with Russia and which has ended the negotiations initiated at the beginning of the conflict, **without taking into account** (1) the specific context of the conflict [the war in Donbass that Ukraine has maintained since 2014, instead of seeking a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the conflict as the UN Charter requires], (2) Russia's responsibility for pointing out the security problems linked to the enlargement of NATO and even to the existence of NATO and the increase in the defense budgets of its members, (3) the responsibility of rich countries in the conflict in Ukraine and the imperfections of their systems (political, economic, justice, etc.), and (4) the mistakes that have been made since the fall of the Berlin Wall by rich countries and by the international community, in particular the mistakes made related to the misuse of advanced technologies such as the Internet and AI, seeks to conceal Ukraine's **responsibility for the conflict, prevents the resolution of the conflict, and is dangerous for Ukrainians and the world** . Ukraine should therefore reconsider its position and call for an immediate ceasefire so that it can work towards resolving the conflict and finding a more effective strategy for maintaining international peace and security and for solving our other global problems (and for moving the world in the right direction).

106. As for Russia, which apparently sought to bring the war in Donbass that began in 2014 to a rapid end, it did not achieve the results it expected due to, among other things, the disproportionate and dangerous response of rich countries to the conflict, its dysfunctional hypersonic missiles (No. 82-92) and Ukraine's abandonment of peace negotiations, but its failure still brought to the fore serious security problems for Russia **and the world** , such as the enlargement - and even the existence - of NATO, and the arms race it imposes and which is contrary to the UN Charter, which we should have addressed a long time ago, so Russia now has few options other than to wait for Ukraine and the rich countries to admit their mistakes and responsibilities in the conflict and start thinking more about the well-being of people in Ukraine and in the world than they do at hiding the mistakes they have made, the obvious imperfections of their democracies and their systems (justice, economic, etc.) and their responsibility in the conflict.

E The proposal of a peace plan to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and to move the world forward.

107. Ukraine should **(1) take into account the analysis** and arguments presented above, **(2) rethink its position** on the conflict in Ukraine, **(3) admit its share of responsibility** for the conflict and the mistakes it has made since 2014, **(4) ask** immediately **(a) the end of (i) unilateral sanctions** against Russia (...) to rich countries, and **(ii) arms and ammunition supplies to Ukraine** , and **(b) a ceasefire with Russia** in order to prepare for **an international conference (i)** for peace in Ukraine, and **(ii)** to define a new strategy to move the world in the right direction, which could take place **at the end of August 2024** in a location to be chosen, and then continue **in September in New York** , **(5) commit to not taking any steps** (no negotiations, no legal proceedings,) and not calling for any votes in the territories occupied by Russia to recover these territories **(a) until all houses** , buildings and infrastructure destroyed in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia and in Russia during the conflict **have been rebuilt**, and **(b) until all victims** of the conflict in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia and in Russia **have been compensated** or compensated for the damage they have suffered as a result of the conflict, and **(6) request the organization**

of a conference for peace in Ukraine by the end of August. And **the ICC should suspend the arrest warrants** against Mr Putin and Russian officials to allow them to travel to the Ukraine peace conferences and other related events that will follow **until** compensation for victims (...) and analysis of responsibility for the conflict are completed.

108. And if Ukraine refuses to do this, **then the rich countries should** also (1) take into account the analysis and arguments presented above and (2) immediately end (a) unilateral sanctions against Russia, and (b) arms and ammunition supplies to Ukraine, (3) call on Ukraine and Russia for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, and (4) propose to organize an international peace conference in Ukraine in August 2024 that could extend to September 2024 in New York to address, among other things, the serious security issues that the world urgently needs to address and the various proposals that I have presented here. The dismantling of NATO and the creation of a new IO for the modernization of the armies (...) should address the security issues that Russia has put forward and the security issues that Ukraine was seeking to address by trying to join NATO. The issue of Ukraine's return of territories will not be addressed immediately and perhaps not for 7 or 8 years or maybe less or more, but it is important that the inhabitants of the affected regions have time to return to normal life, and that everyone's responsibilities in the conflict have been established; and, moreover, if the world goes in the right direction, it could make considerable progress in the next 7 years thanks to AI and the Internet and thanks to increased cooperation between all countries, so negotiations for the possible return of territories could be simplified.

F The importance of not losing a minute to start actively solving the serious problems that the world has to solve (poverty, inequalities, environmental protection, fight against global warming, waste of the planet's natural resources, terrorism, organized and transnational crime, unprecedented migration crisis, ...).

109. We need to act quickly to end **the conflict in Ukraine** and to put in place **the new structures and strategy** that will allow us to (a) strengthen the UN, (b) maintain international peace and security more effectively, (c) help all countries achieve the SDGs and convergence, (d) control the new risks associated with the development of advanced AI systems and take advantage of the incalculable benefits that this new technology (advanced AI) combined with the Internet will bring to the world, and (e) protect the environment and the planet more effectively. And above, I have presented you with several proposals to do this; and the AI reports and the GRO 2024 have also made important and useful proposals.

110. I would be very grateful if you could forward this letter to all those mentioned in the header and whom I have not been able to reach by email [I will work on a translation of the letter into English (the English version of the letter will be at the following address: <http://www.pierre-genevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-to-UNSC-UNGA-ICC-EN-10-7-24.pdf>) , but it will take time]. Thanking you in advance for your interest in this letter, and in the hope that you will act together (1) to obtain an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, and the organization of an international conference for peace in Ukraine in August 2024, and (2) to strengthen the UN in the important areas mentioned above and to put in place a strategy to move the world forward, and also (3) to obtain the launch of *phase II of the preliminary examination* of the complaint for *crimes against humanity of persecution* related to the dishonesty of the LA law (OMLs,) in France, I remain

Your sincerely,

Pierre Genevier

PS: If you have any difficulty accessing the attachments through the web links, please let me know and I will email you the PDF versions of the documents.

Attachments.

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