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Mr. Volkan Bozkir, President of the UNGA, and Ms/MM. the Permanent Representatives of UN member states (MS)
Mr. Zhang Jun, President of the UN Security Council (SC), and Ms/MM. the Permanent Representatives of SC-MS
Mr. Rik Daems, President of the Parliamentary Assembly (COE-PA), and Ms/MM. the Members of the COE-PA
Mr. Vladimir Poutine, Mr. Sergey Lavrov
Mr. Boris Johnson, Mr. Dominic Raab
Mrs. Kaja Kallas, Mrs. Eva-Maria Liimets
Mr. Micheal Martin, Mr. Simon Coveney
Mrs. Erna Solberg, Mrs. Ine Eriksen Soreide
Mr. Joe Biden, Mr. Antony Blinken
Mr. Xi Jinping, Mr. Wang Yi
Mrs./MM. The leaders of ICC member countries
Mr. Antonio Guterres

Poitiers, May 23rd, 2021

Subject: Letter sent to the ICC on 2-16-21 [(PJ no 0.2) bringing additional elements on my charges of crime against humanity of persecution described in the letters dated 11-23-21 (PJ no 1.1) and 7-10-20 (PJ no 2.1)]; proposals to improve LA's systems (...) worldwide; application for the position of CITO from 23-11-20; and UNSG selection process launched on 5-2-21. [PDF : http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UNGA-UNSC-CPIM-COE-FR-23-5-21.pdf ; **EN** à : http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UNGA-UNSC-CPIM-COE-EN-23-5-21.pdf].

Dear Mr. Volkan Bozkir, and Ms/MM. the Permanent Representatives of UN-MS,
Dear Mr. Zhang Jun, and Ms/MM. the Permanent Representatives of CS-MS,
Dear Mr. Rik Daems, and Ms/MM. the Members of the COE-PA,
Dear Mr. Vladimir Putin and Mr. Sergey Lavrov,
Dear Mr. Boris Johnson and Mr. Dominic Raab,
Dear Mrs. Kaja Kallas and Mrs. Eva-Maria Liimets,
Dear Mr. Micheal Martin and Mr. Simon Coveney,
Dear Mrs. Erna Solberg and Mrs. Ine Eriksen Soreide,
Dear Mr. Joe Biden and Mr. Antony Blinken,
Dear Mr. Xi Jinping and Mr. Wang Yi,
Dear Leaders of ICC's member countries,
Dear Mr. Antonio Guterres,

1. Referring to my letters of 23-11-20 (PJ no 1, EN PJ no 1.2) and 10-7-20 (PJ no 2, EN PJ no 2.1) [addressed to some of you and describing my accusations of crime against humanity and the content of my 5 petitions against France to the ECHR of 2020], I take the liberty of writing you (again for some) **(1) to (a) describe** briefly the content of my letter of 10-2-21 sent to the ICC [(PJ no 0, EN PJ no 0.2) providing details and documents related to my various cases presented to the ECHR since 2001], **(b) highlight** some systemic problems of the French (among others) justice system and some solutions to the problems described, and **(c) support** the arguments, requests, proposals and candidacy for the position of CITO presented in my 2 previous letters; **(2) to come back on** the political dimension and the consequences of my accusations of *crime against humanity* [related to the dishonest legal aid (LA) law...] at the national and international level and on the selection process of the Secretary-General, and to comment on the ICC decision; **(3) to remind you** of the many benefits of my proposal to improve the LA systems around the world and of the content of my 2016 platform; and **(4) to replace** the various remarks and proposals presented in my letters in the context of (a) the recent work of the United Nations, (b) Mr. Guterres' vision statement, and (c) the process of selecting the Secretary General.

2. Of course, the topics covered concern all of you, but depending on the country you come from and the international organization or institution to which you (or your country) belong, you will feel more involved in certain topics and can intervene in different ways. **(1) Permanent representatives** (and leaders) of UN member states [who elect the Secretary-General of the United Nations, develop the objectives and strategy of the United Nations and may encourage the member countries of the Security Council to accept jurisdiction for the situation I have described], and **(2) Permanent representatives** (and leaders) of member countries of the Security Council [who recommend to the UNGA a candidate for the post of UNSG, and can (a) investigate the situation I have described, (b) extend the period over which the crime is to be investigated (i.e., allow for the investigation of crimes that took place before 2002) and (c) make recommendations for *the maintenance of international peace and security* that I advocate], will be particularly concerned (i) by my charges of *crimes against humanity* and by the proposals, remarks and associated requests I made in my 3 letters, (ii) by my candidacy for the post of CITO, and (iii) by the remarks on the work of the United Nations and the vision statement of Mr. Guterres. **(3) The leaders of ICC member countries** [who can also bring a case to the ICC, and directly launch Phase 2 of the preliminary examination which would ensure a detailed and public legal study of my accusations against the LA law, in order, I hope, to recognize, among other things, that the LA law and the **obligation to have a lawyer** (OHL, ...) have systematically violated the human rights of the poor for 30 years], will also feel particularly concerned by my accusations of crimes against humanity and by the ICC's lack of professionalism on my complaint (**no 48-51**). And **(4) the members of the parliamentary assembly of the COE** will feel more concerned by the accusations of malfunctioning at the ECHR (...) [for example, the malfunctions at the ECHR and the OHCHR that made possible the commission of the crime for so many years.].

3. **Part A** describes the content of the 2-10-21 letter related (a) to the 3 cases I had not yet described, (b) to the decisions of the ECHR on my petitions from 2001 to 2020, and (c) to the responsibilities of the COE and the OHCHR in upholding the dishonest LA law [PJ no 0, no 5-59, including a description of the 3 cases of 2001, 2012 and 2016 that I presented to the ECHR before the 2020 case; a discussion of the ECHR's decisions on my 5 2020 requests and the frequent errors it seems to make; and certain dysfunctions at the level of the ECHR and the COE that have allowed the dishonest LA law to remain in effect in France for so long]; **Part** B examines some systemic problems of justice in France (and in other countries) and the solutions that can be implemented at the international level to help countries to solve such systemic problems (topics addressed in part in PJ no 0, no 51-56); **Part C** discusses the political dimension and consequences of my accusations of crimes against humanity at the national and international level and on the selection process of UNSG, and comments on the ICC decision [topics addressed in part in PJ no 1.2 and PJ no 2.2]; **Part D** highlights the many benefits of my proposal to improve the LA systems around the world and the content of my 2016 platform; and **Part E** puts my accusations of crimes against humanity, proposals, demands and arguments in the context of the recent work of the UN, Mr. Guterres' vision statement, and the process of selecting the UN Secretary General (and/or of renewing Mr. Guterres' mandate). The letter is a bit long (again, more than 50 pages) and I apologize for that, but I have to deal with many complicated issues that need to be described as precisely as possible.

A The new elements and documents brought to the ICC in my letter of 10-2-21.

4. My letter of 10-2-21 to the ICC (PJ no 0, EN PJ no 0.2) does not go back over the elements of the crime against humanity and my case against the CA [and my 5 requests to the ECHR on this case of 18-3-20 (PJ no 5, PJ no 6, PJ no 8, PJ no 9), of 23-6-20, (PJ no 11, PJ no 12 , PJ no 14), and of 6-11-20 (3ème, PJ no 16, PJ no 17, 4ème, PJ no 20, PJ no 21, et 5ème, PJ no 24, PJ no 25)] described in detail in the letter of 23-11-20 (PJ no 0.2), but (1) it describes (in detail) my cases and proceedings (including before the ECHR) of 2016, 2012 and 2001 in which the legal aid (LA) law and the obligations to have a lawyer in court (OHL), among others, were used to violate my right to a fair trial (among others); (2) it comments on the 5 dishonest decisions (I think) of the ECHR on my 5 petitions of 2020; and (3) it highlights (a) certain systemic problems of the French justice system (among others) that facilitate the corruption of justice and systematic theft of the poor, among others, and (b) dysfunctions at the level of the OHCHR, and the COE, including the ECHR, so I will only discuss briefly here some of the important points discussed to help you better understand the situation related to my accusations *of crime against humanity* and the well founded of my requests and proposals made to the Security Council (PJ no 2, no 25, 66-67, PJ no 1, no 21-42) and to all UN member states.

1) The case against Pôle Emploi of 2016, and related proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the ECHR.

(a) The use of dishonest OHL and the non-compliance with the order to address the issues to avoid judging the LA.

5. The 2016 case refers to a proceeding against the unemployment agency (PE) to have the 2011 decision refusing to pay me the Special Solidarity Allowance (SSA, a minimum income granted in certain circumstances, see details in PJ no 0, no 7-12); The 2 main issues of this procedure, which began in 2011 and ended before the Conseil d'Etat (CE, administrative supreme court) and the Constitutional Court (CCo) in 2015 (and then in 2016 before the ECHR), were (1) the unconstitutionality of the LA Law and OHL, and (2) the link between the LA law and OHL (or more precisely the fact that the unconstitutionality of the LA law leads to the unconstitutionality of the OHL); this link is obvious, and it had already been recognized (or admitted) by the CE and by the ECHR in their case-law (PJ no 0, no 8, PJ no 8, no 28), thus the bad faith (among others) of the Administrative Court of Appeal of Bordeaux (CAA-B), the Conseil d'Etat (CE), the Constitutional Court (CCo) and the ECHR (which ignored this link and made in addition many errors of fact and law...) is obvious, I think. After a decision in my favor at the TA reversing PE's decision, but not granting me all the compensation requested because of the OHL, the CAA-B rejected (a) my request to defend myself (on appeal), (b) my appeal (to obtain all the compensation requested in the 1st instance) and (c) my QPC on the LA law by ignoring the link between the dishonest LA law and OHL (PJ no 0, no 8-9); Then, the Conseil d'Etat lied to reject my request for LA, did not judge my QPC within the time allotted, when it was crucial to try it as a matter of urgency and priority, and rejected my appeal unjustly because of the OHL, and it did so even before the Constitutional Court judged the QPC that I had transmitted directly after the 3-month period had elapsed. And then the Constitutional Court, which had received all the necessary briefs and arguments to judge the QPC, also cheated (lied about the filing date of the QPC at the CCo, used the dishonest decisions of the CE ...) to avoid judging the merits of my QPC (PJ no 0, no 9-12).

(b) The CE and CCo fraud carried out with the consent of the senior politicians concerned and the ECHR.

6. Regardless of the fact that the CCo lied about the QPC's filing date to claim that it had been seized after the end of the proceedings at the CE and to reject the QPC [it was seized on 9-6-15, **5 weeks before the dishonest end of the proceedings** at the CE related to the CE's dishonest decision of 16-7-15], the CCo had at least 4 good reasons (obligations) to judge the merits of the QPC: **(1) the statutory order** to examine the issues, the CE could not use the OHL before judging the QPC or letting the QPC be judged by the CCo (because the OHL ends the proceeding despite the fact that its dishonesty is linked to the LA law's dishonesty..., see PJ no 0, no 9-12); **(2) the CE's obligation** to address the issue of the OHL's constitutionality in the context of the QPC on the LA law [by using the OHL to dismiss the appeal, the CE implied that this OHL was constitutionally compliant, whereas the purpose of the QPC on the LA law was to prove otherwise, see R2016-PJ 2, no 31-34, PJ no 0, no 8, 11]; **(3) Mr. Stirn's fraud** (or lies) on my LA application which resulted in in its rejection and in the use of the OHL (see PJ no 0, no 9); and **(4) the importance of judging the QPC** on the merits for the French justice and society; but it decided to cheat and to unfairly find the QPC inadmissible; and it did so with the consent of the presidents of the republic, the senate and the national assembly (and implicitly also of the prime minister and the minister of justice) because I filed *a request for correction of a material error*, and, in parallel, I asked these politicians to denounce the CE and CCo fraud used to refuse to judge the QPC on the merits (PJ no 0, no 10-12). And then the ECHR (judge Ranzoni who also judged my 2020 petitions), which had been seized within the 6-month time limit and had clear evidence of injustices and violations of Article 6.1, among other articles, ruled the petition unjustly inadmissible and without giving any specific reason. The errors committed by the ECHR are similar to those committed in the decisions of 2020 and 2001 and discussed in detail in PJ no 0, no 40-47, and **at no 13-14**; and here I just remember that it had all the documents it needed to (and the duty to) address the question of the dishonesty of the LA law in France and that it did not (illegally).

2) The 2001 case concerning my illegal dismissal from the Essonne department.

7. My letter of 10-2-21 to the ICC describes this 2001 case in detail (see PJ no 0, no 21-39.1), so I would like to focus here only on the use of the dishonest LA law and OHL to cover up and encourage the corruption of politicians, and for this I will speak again about the (travel expenses and fictitious employment) frauds of Mr. Dugoin, President of the Essonne Department from 1988 to 1998 where I worked from 1991 to 1993 [this type of frauds was and is frequently used by politicians (Mr. Chirac, Fillon, Dugoin, Tiberi ...) to get rich (see aff. Fillon, PJ no 2, no 36) or to finance campaigns or a party (MM. Chirac, Juppé, Mrs. Le Pen,), so they are of obvious interest to support my accusations of crime against humanity].

(a) Mr. Dugoin's frauds and his conviction by the correctional court.

8. Mr. Dugoin was stealing about 200,000 FF (40,000 euros or dollars, I believe) per year in travel expenses, and at the beginning of July 1994 someone sent an anonymous letter to the prosecutor (or the police) denouncing this fraud, and an investigation was launched. In 1992, I was working on the development of a computer system to better track and control travel costs; and, after installing the system to the 2 officials

who controlled the travel expenses of all the department's agents, I was asked to install it to the agent who controlled the politicians' travel expenses (end of 1992), and I was dismissed a few weeks later, on 18-1-93 (effective **on 31-3-93**, see PJ no 0, no 21-22). It is therefore not difficult to understand why I was threatened and discouraged to complain in court about my illegal dismissal (see PJ no 0, no 21, 31). After the police opened an investigation in July 1994, Mr. Dugoin immediately said that he had defrauded in good faith, and he had always planned to reimburse the stolen travel expenses (which had been discovered by the investigation), and he reimbursed them immediately, so the department he headed took a civil action to ask the judges for reimbursement of travel expenses; but, in the case of his wife's fictitious employment, his position was that his wife had done a real job, so the department did not file a civil suit and did not seek reimbursement of wages paid illegally. The judges of the correctional court did not follow Mr. Dugoin's position, (1) they decided in May 1998: (a) that he had knowingly defrauded travel expenses (and that these stolen expenses were to be reimbursed, which was already the case), and (b) that Ms. Dugoin had received wages (for more than 2 years) without any work in exchange; (2) they sentenced Mr. Dugoin to prison (one year, I believe); but (3) they did not order the refund of wages paid unduly to Ms. Dugoin [because the Department had not claimed the refund, they only ordered the refund (by the pension agencies) of pension contributions paid on behalf of Ms. Dugoin (PJ no 0, no 25, 26.1)].

(b) The election of Mr. Berson in March 1998, and his dishonest position in my dismissal case.

9. Mr. Dugoin (members of the RPR, the right)'s frauds were widely publicized because he had also given a fictitious job to the wife of Paris' Mayor [and he had also been caught stealing several hundred bottles of wine from the department's cellar], so his political opponent, Mr. Berson (a member of the Socialist party, the left), used these frauds to try to win the election, and, in April 1998 (approximately), he became the new president. After I returned from Germany (09-96), I heard about the fraud, so when my unemployment benefits stopped, I contested my dismissal at the administrative court (TA) of Versailles on 1-17-98 (PJ no 0, no 21-25); the department explained that the dismissal was legal; then, when the judgment of the correctional court was delivered in May 1998, I explained to the judges that I thought I had been dismissed for the purpose of facilitating the travel expenses' fraud, and on the day (31-3-93) when Ms. Dugoin began to be paid for no work in return (1-4-93); and the judges canceled the dismissal decision and granted me the financial compensation I had requested [and also, I think, the payment of pension contributions and the reinstatement of my unemployment rights, see details at PJ no 0, no 23-25]. Once (1) I had obtained a judgment from the TA, and (2) the Correctional Court had determined that Mr. Dugoin had stolen the travel expenses knowingly (contrary to what he had explained), the Department's new president, Mr. Berson, could not know whether I had been dismissed to facilitate the travel fraud or not without making a new (or additional) trial to possibly obtain that Mr. Dugoin be forced to pay for the damage I had suffered as a result of the unlawful dismissal, so he could not appeal my judgment without first bringing the matter before the criminal court [as he did in the fictitious employment case to obtain reimbursement of the wages unjustly paid to Mrs. Dugoin (and the wife of the mayor of Paris)]; but the department refused to pay all the

compensation I had obtained with the judgment, and unfairly appealed the judgment because other politicians (including Mr. Berson) were also stealing travel expenses [even though these other politicians had not stolen as much money as Mr. Dugoin as the Court of Auditors noted in its report at the end of 1998, see PJ no 0, no 37.1], and if he requested a new trial, he and the other politicians (who had also defrauded on travel expenses) could be held responsible for my dismissal like Mr. Dugoin (! PJ no 0, no 26-37.1).

(c) The grave errors committed by the judges of the CAA of Paris to steal the judgment of the TA.

10. Of course, the judges of the CAA could (and should) have easily prevented the Department from stealing the judgment from me, and should never have allowed the Department and Mr. Berson, in particular, to behave as they did, but instead, with the help of, among other things, (a) the dishonest LA law, (b) a false obligation to have a lawyer (OHL), (c) numerous lies and deceit (including the acceptance of the authorization to appeal after the hearing when this is normally not authorized), (d) a completely inconsistent interpretation of the judgment made by the President of the CAA to steal from me (i) more than FF 300 000 (about EUR 50 000) in cash, (ii) 5 years of retirement pension fund contribution, and (iii) the reinstatement of my right to unemployment, the judges of the CAA rendered a dishonest judgment which robbed me of the judgment obtained and, in addition, made me liable for a significant amount of money (PJ no 0, no 35). To do so, they canceled the hearing, which had already taken place, (a) to accept the department's authorization to appeal, which was completely unjustified and even constituted a fraud, and (b) to cover up the criminal liability of Mr. Dugoin and other politicians who had also defrauded on travel expenses. Second, the Conseil d'Etat (CE) and the ECHR ignored and covered up (a) the errors of fact and law and the undeniably inaccurate assessments that led to a miscarriage of justice by the CAA judges, and (b) the serious misconduct and frauds of the Department's officials [and also committed the offense of obstruction to justice, at least I believe, (PJ no 0, no 37.1)]. In particular, the CE used the obligation to have a lawyer (OHL) to ignore my request for permission to defend myself alone in the particular context of this case (!); and the ECHR held unlawfully that the inadmissibility of my proceedings before the CE was due to an error on my part, and not on the fact (1) that the CAA and the CE had improperly used the OHL in this case, and (2) that the OHL was violating the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy (it is often doing this, PJ no 0, no 38). This case shows how judges and politicians use the dishonest LA law (...) to rob the poor and escape prosecution (...).

3) The 2012 case about the rejection of my LA request to file a complaint against the USA.

11. I filed a petition with the ECHR in 2012 (see case details in PJ no 0, no 18-20) to denounce the violation of the right to an effective remedy (art. 13) related to the rejection of my 2011 LA application to file a complaint or petition against the USA (INS/DHS, State of California and LA County) and some of its officials who (1) harassed me (sent me in the street more than 16 times between August 2002 and November 2003...), (2) stole my right to justice (for about 10 years and millions of dollars in compensation) and my refugee status, and (3) detained me at

home for 9 months (with an electronic bracelet,), (4) imprisoned me for 5 days, and (5) deported me with only a shirt on my back (!, stealing from me in the process what little good I had; and all the legal documents of various proceedings over 13 years, including my asylum application!) with a deportation order filled with lies. This case shows that the United States, the richest country in the world, also has serious problems of efficiency and integrity with its justice system, and, of course, no public LA system in non-criminal matters, and a very imperfect LA system in criminal matters. A global approach to addressing the dishonesty of LA systems therefore helps both rich and poor countries (I return to this point in detail below **at no 54-62**).

4) The ECHR's decisions on my 5 petitions of 2020.

12. My letter of 10-2-21 comments in detail (1) the 2 ECHR decisions of 26-11-20 (PJ no 10 , PJ no 15) on my first 2 requests [of 18-3-20 (PJ no 5, PJ no 6, PJ no 8, PJ no 9) and of 23-6-20 (PJ no 11, PJ no 12 , PJ no 14) denouncing the dishonesty of the LA law], and (2) the 3 decisions rendered 2 weeks later (PJ no 19 , PJ no 23 , PJ no 28) on the 3 petitions on the merits of my case against the CA [3rd (PJ no 16, PJ no 17), 4th (PJ no 20, PJ no 21) and 5th requests (PJ no 24, PJ no 25) as described in the letter of 23-11-20 (PJ no 2)]; so here I come back briefly only on some specific points of these decisions [and of the decisions on my requests of 2001, 2012 and 2016] to highlight serious problems of integrity and organization at the ECHR that you (the member countries of the COE, at least) must address and correct for everyone's benefit, I think.

a) The 2 decisions on my first 2 requests on the dishonesty of the LA law, the OHL and the short deadlines.

13. Firstly, the 5 decisions are very vague, which is (1) a serious problem because human rights violations often highlight the commission of criminal offenses, and therefore the ECHR regularly covers up the commission of criminal offenses with little or no motivation; and (2) a cause of the corruption of justice (! as discussed into more detail below). On the fact that the LA law violates Articles 6.1, 13 and 14 of the ECHR, the decision (PJ no 10) does not address any of the elements, arguments, and case law that I presented [PJ no 5, PJ no 6, PJ no 8,]; and it uses 3 case law which do not support the rejection of my application at all; although my arguments that the rights of the poor are violated both (1) at the level of the LA offices when LA applications are rejected, and (2) at the level of the proceedings by the lawyers, were numerous, clear and unquestionable. Second, a key aspect of my petition was the fact that the decision of 25-9-19 on my QPC violated article 6.1; and it was very easy for the ECHR to comment on the reason for rejecting the QPC (R1 PJ 1), namely '*the question is not serious supposedly because the 'legal aid law, ..., is intended to guarantee the constitutionally valid principle of the right to a fair trial*' and to say that this motive violates art. 6.1; this argument is absurd (stupid even and undoubtedly an undeniably inaccurate assessment) because it is not because a law is drawn to solve any problem of society, that it necessarily achieves its objective all the time, and without violating the Constitution at the same time (otherwise one would never have allowed to present QPCs)! With regard to the other violations related to my unjustly rejected LA applications, and the dishonesty of the decisions rejecting my previous QPC [which were also related to the merit of the case], it appears that they were not examined because

the ECHR also held that my grievances on the merits of the case were filed out of time, which is false (here **no 14**, PJ no 0, no 45-47). The decision on the 2nd petition (PJ no 15), which dealt with the violation of Art. 17 related to the dishonest LA law [among others, see (PJ no 11, PJ no 12 , PJ no 14)], and which was therefore necessarily related to the 1st petition and had to be attached to it (and the 3 others too), claims that the judge sees no violation of the convention, which is the direct consequence of the fact that the decision on the first petition is dishonest and that the ECHR refused to join the 5 requests and to try them at the same time as I had requested it on several occasions (see more detailed remarks on these 2 decisions and on the reasoning used to present the 5 requests at PJ no 0, no 42-44, 40-41).

(b) The 3 decisions on the 3 requests on the merit of my criminal proceeding against the CA.

14. With regard to the 3 decisions [PJ no 19 , PJ no 23 , PJ no 28 ; on the last 3 requests, 3rd (PJ no 16, PJ no 17), 4th (PJ no 20, PJ no 21) and 5th (PJ no 24, PJ no 25)] addressing the substance of my criminal proceedings against the CA [detailed in PJ no 1], the ECHR clearly judges that my 3 applications are not submitted within the 6-month deadline after the decision which it considers final, but it does not say which decision it considers final and why; and it commits a serious fault, because, for me, the 3 requests were submitted 1 month before the end of the 6-month deadline [which, due to Covid 19, had been extended by (or suspended for) 3 months, see explanation PJ no 0, no 45]. It seems that (what I believe to be) the mistake committed is a mistake committed frequently which allows the ECHR to get rid of a large number of requests while appearing to respect the law rigorously. Indeed, the Convention provides that if an appeal (to the CE or CC...) is deemed to be inadmissible on the grounds of a procedural error made by the applicant, then the petition to the ECHR must be deemed inadmissible (on the grounds of a breach of Articles 34-35, and more precisely for failure to exhaust the remedies ...). For example, if there is an obligation to have lawyer in the appeal proceeding, and the appeal is deemed inadmissible because the applicant has filed his appeal alone, then his application to the ECHR denouncing this inadmissibility of the appeal as a violation of Art. 6.1 (or 13) shall be deemed inadmissible. But this rule has exceptions that flow from common sense; for example, when the CE or the CC finds an appeal inadmissible after having considered the merits of the case (as was the case in my case), the application must be considered admissible because, of course, it is very possible that the CE or the CC has violated Art. 6.1 or 13 in their analysis of the case to judge the appeal inadmissible (as it was the case in my various cases). I believe (1) that the ECHR has committed this serious fault in my 2020 case [and in my 2016 and 2001 cases (PJ no 0, no 45-47); this dishonest ground of inadmissibility shows a form of courtesy to the highest judges of the country concerned because it allows them to avoid being corrected by the ECHR when they do not want to be corrected, and use a dishonest non-admission of the appeal; in the USA, there is a somewhat similar system, the Supreme Court never (or almost it seems) corrects decisions that have not been published by the courts of appeals, therefore (practically) the appellate courts are the ones that decide when they want and can be corrected by the Supreme Court (and they publish only a very small number of decisions, see estimate of 5% to PJ no 45)!], and (2) that it has ignored its own jurisprudence. In addition, in my case, I also criticized the dishonest rejection of my LA applications to present my appeals at the Court of Cassation, so the recognition of the unconstitutionality of the LA law (the fact that it violates Articles 6.1, 13 and 14 of the ECHR) should also have led to the admissibility of my

requests, as no appeal can be considered inadmissible when the LA application is granted, hence the importance of judging my 5 requests at the same time and of honestly judging the 1st request which addressed the question of the unconstitutionality of the LA law (!).

5) The responsibility of OHCHR and COE in maintaining the dishonest LA law in France.

(a) The silence of OHCHR and of the Commissioner for Human Rights (COE) on the LA law in France.

15. For the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe (COE), which are necessarily interested in the work done by the ECHR and the COE, it is important to note that the ECHR and the COE had the responsibility: **(a) to point out** the dishonesty of legal aid (LA) law, OHL (...) in France that I described in my recent letters and in my ECHR requests since 2001, **(b) to encourage** France to set up, among other things, a LA system which respects the fundamental rights of the poor (including the right to a fair trial, the right to an effective remedy, the prohibition of discrimination,), and **(c) to denounce** the grave injustices of which tens (if not hundreds) of thousands (if not millions) of poor people were victim in the last 30 years or so, and of which I have been victim during more than 20 years, because of, among others, the work I have done to denounce the problems of our LA system, which made me ***a human rights defender*** whom the COE Secretariat and the Commissioner for Human Rights are supposed to protect; **but,** clearly, they did not assume their responsibility and did not do their job with a level of quality that can be expected from international bodies whose work affects a large number of countries and people; and one can even deduce (or detect) from their silence on these various subjects (and from their public interventions in parallel), an obvious desire to cover up the dishonesty of the French politicians and high judges who have kept the dishonest LA law for so long, and this despite the many efforts I made to encourage them to address these problems. Unfortunately, the OHCHR I also contacted (R1 PJ 40), and which is supposed to protect human rights defenders, remained silent and turned a blind eye to the systematic violations of the fundamental rights of the poor in France and the injustices I suffered in denouncing the dishonesty of the LA law, among others [the letter of 10-2-21 (PJ no 0, no 57-58) refers to the public interventions of Ms. Mijatovic (Commissioner for Human Rights) and Ms. Bachelet on the National Security Law to highlight their obvious effort to avoid criticizing French judges and politicians on the LA law subject. Mrs. Mijatovic and Mrs. Bachelet may have ignored the problems of the LA law in France in order to conceal the problems of the LA systems in their countries of origin, as Bosnia and Herzegovina spends EUR 2.13 per capita for its LA system compared to EUR 5.06 in France (2016, PJ no 38, p. 20), and Chile 6.6 10 dollars against $5.85 in France (2013, PJ no 81, p. 93), but this is not an excuse because the situations are different, no 83.].

(b) The importance of improving the quality of ECHR decisions and its information and computer systems.

16. My letter of 10-2-21 (PJ no 0, no 51-56) uses (a) the (very) dishonest (I think) or at least very imprecise decisions on my 5 requests of 2020 and my 2016 request (among others) to the ECHR, (b) the statistics on the work of the ECHR (number of requests deemed inadmissible), and (c) the ECHR's Internet request tracking system to point to the scant efforts that the ECHR has made for more than 20 years to improve the quality (a) of its decisions, (b) of its information system on procedures and (c) of its computer systems. Even though the decisions on my 2020 petitions give the ground for inadmissibility, which the other decisions on my 2001, 2012 and 2016 petitions did not do, they remain too vague to be able to identify (easily ...) the so-called fault

that was committed and the reasoning followed by the judge to reach such a conclusion. And the procedure tracking system gives almost no useful information about the procedure (such as documents that have been sent and recorded), except that a request has been filed and a decision is expected. However, it is not very difficult to record the documents of the cases and to allow the litigants to check that their documents are taken into account by the judge. The inaccuracies (or the poor quality) of the ECHR's decisions, and the imperfections of the ECHR's information system, are more due to the fact that the ECHR deems inadmissible 95% (about) of the requests it receives each year, than they are due to a lack of means, I think [it's convenient to be imprecise and vague when you steal tens of thousands of people every year or even millions of people on a single case like for example the theft of the (+ of 14) million poor in France who depend on the LA law]. The launching of Phase II of the preliminary examination by the ICC would encourage the 47 COE member countries to analyze and correct the ECHR's shortcomings (procedures, quality of decisions, etc.), to significantly improve its information system (procedure monitoring system), and its computer systems as soon as possible [the justice system does not stop at the Court of Cassation ... (at the supreme Court), it is therefore important and useful to have a global vision of justice and to draw up information and computer systems of justice that are linked to (and take into account) those of international courts of justice such as the ECHR].

6) Conclusions on the description of my 10-2-21 letter's content and the ECHR's decisions of inadmissibility.

17. In summary, the 10-2-21 letter to the ICC presents several important new elements that support (a) the appropriateness of the request for the Phase 2 of the preliminary examination to the ICC, (b) the review (and transfer to the ICC) of the situation by the UN Security Council, and (c) the interest of justice in investigating this case. The various cases examined have (1) confirmed that the highest judges have cheated and lied in order to maintain the dishonest LA law and obligations to have a lawyer in court (OHL) (…), and that the political leaders (who had a duty to intervene) have allowed them to do so, and (2) showed that the dishonest LA law and OHL are not used solely to rob the poor of their right to justice and to cause them very serious harm [as seen in my various cases over a period of more than 20 years], but also to express hatred towards the poor; and they are among the main causes of the corruption and clutter of justice as we will see in more detail **in part B**. The ECHR (and the OHCHR) has (have) had the opportunity to study the problem of the dishonesty of the LA law in France several times, but it (they) did not [for the ECHR with the commission of serious mistakes (I think) (a) to rule my 2016 and 2020 applications inadmissible at least]; it (they) has (have) therefore an obvious responsibility (a) in maintaining the dishonest LA law and OHL in France for 30 years, and (b) in certain serious systemic problems of our justice system (in France, at the ECHR, and which exist in other countries); and the international community should study the dysfunctions that have emerged and correct them for the good of all. I will now turn to some of the systemic problems of justice.

B Some systemic problems of justice in France (and other countries).

18. The 10-2-21 letter to the ICC (PJ no 0, no 51-56) also points out certain systemic problems of justice in France (...) linked to the dishonest LA law and OHL, and presents the recent reform proposals of the Court of Cassation to reduce the clutter of justice which will solve nothing, and which, on the contrary, may worsen the situation, so I would like (a) to briefly revisit some of these systemic problems, (b) to bring you new elements justifying the proposal to develop a new LA system [and the 2 Internet applications to implement it around the world ...], and (c) to talk about the importance (of redefining or) of clarifying the role (or function) of lawyers in society to combat more effectively the corruption and clutter of justice and to guarantee a better functioning of justice, and for this I will use as example a recent corruption case involving Mr. Sarkozy (former French President).

1) The dishonest LA law and OHL and the dishonest behavior of lawyers are important causes of the corruption and clutter of justice.

(a) The dishonest LA law and OHL facilitate the corruption of justice.

19. The dishonest LA law allows the French government to impose dishonest obligations to have a lawyer in court (OHL) in many types of proceedings that facilitate the corruption of the justice system and of Society (administrations, companies ...) because the OHL facilitate the creation of privileged links between judges (...) and lawyers [judges (...) regularly work with the same lawyers, and can thus create privileged links that facilitate and simplify the obtaining of undue advantages in exchange for decisions or conduct favorable to the lawyers' clients; the Court of Cassation (CC) and the Conseil d'Etat (CE, and the CCo) do not hesitate to maintain the monopoly of specialized lawyers at the supreme courts (which dates back more than 200 years and is completely unjustified and insulting ...) to be in regular and frequent contact only with this small group of 100 specialized lawyers!]. The dishonest LA law and OHL are therefore 2 important causes (a) of justice's corruption, (b) of decisions' poor quality, (c) of seeking or maintaining immunity for judges and prosecutors, and (d) of the clutter of justice, among others. Judges (prosecutors and court clerks) in France are very attached to these obligations to have lawyer in court (OHL) (1) (precisely) because they facilitate the corruption of justice; (2) because they allow judges (...) to work (almost) only with persons who are their equal [intellectually, in terms of knowledge of the law (or who have higher knowledge or a higher social level for the clerks); judges (... including clerks) hate the poor and the unemployed whom they consider to be inferior (as my experience has confirmed)]; and (3) because they allow them to get rid of (or to dishonestly reject) a large number of cases (petitions, appeals, appeals from the poor and others) without risk and without having to address the substance of the case.

20. The development of a new and effective LA system would render the obligations to have a lawyer in court unnecessary [the poor have a clear interest in having an honest and effective lawyer to assist them in the legal process, so they do not need to be forced to have a lawyer if the LA law is effective and honest] and would therefore not only guarantee the respect of poor human rights (of course), but also reduce the corruption and clutter of justice (PJ no 0, no 29). Lawyers, who take advantage of (and are also very attached to) the dishonest LA law and OHL, and who prevent the reform of the LA law in France (here no 22, and R2 PJ 33, p. 4-5), also have an important responsibility in the corruption and clutter of justice as Mr. Sarkozy's recent case shows.

b) The dishonest behavior of lawyers is also an important cause of justice's corruption.

(i) Mr. Sarkozy's wiretaps case, and the extraordinary circumstance that led to Mr. Sarkozy's conviction.

21. The wiretap case in which Mr. Sarkozy was sentenced to 3 years in prison (of which one year is not suspended) on 1-3-21 illustrates well the problems of justice's corruption (related to the LA law and OHL) that I describe, and highlights the importance of clarifying the role of (or function of) lawyers, so I'll come back to that briefly. In this case Mr. Sarkozy was (is) accused of having sought (through his lawyer) the assistance of a magistrate of the Court of Cassation (CC) in one of his cases which was tried at the CC, and in exchange the magistrate had asked for the help of Mr. Sarkozy to obtain a position in Monaco; Mr. Sarkozy, his lawyer and the magistrate were sentenced to similar sentences (3 years in prison including 1 year not suspended). The way in which they were caught is interesting because this type of fraud, which is certainly much more frequent than we think, is almost impossible to detect without an extraordinary circumstance like this one. Indeed, if a lawyer discusses with his client (friend or even just accomplice) a fraud like this during a squash game, or during a lunch with his client, nobody will ever know; the police can't keep an eye on all the lawyers at all times of the day, and especially when they go to lunch or play sports or meet their friends. In this case, Mr. Sarkozy was wiretapped in another case (a corruption case, funding of his 2007 campaign by Mr. Qaddafi, I believe), and the police realized that he and his lawyer were using two phones recorded under a false name (Bismuth) to try to escape police surveillance; and in one of their phone conversations on those two phones, Mr. Sarkozy's lawyer mentions that the magistrate would like to get Mr. Sarkozy's help to get a position in Monaco, and Mr. Sarkozy says "that he will help" and that he had an appointment with the Minister of State in Monaco. Then, it appears that Mr. Sarkozy did not make the request he had planned to make to this minister because, in the meantime, he was apparently informed that his conversations had been heard by the police, but on 26-2-14, the Financial Prosecutor's Office (PNF) nevertheless opened a judicial investigation for corruption (on the basis of this telephone conversation) which led to the conviction of 1-3-21 (PJ no 69).

(ii) The legality of telephone tapping and the breach of solicitor-client privilege.

22. To defend themselves, Mr. Sarkozy and his lawyer claimed, among other arguments, that eavesdropping on telephone conversations violated solicitor-client privilege (or the confidentiality of conversations between a lawyer and his client), but this argument is very dishonest, even though the judges thought that 2 (out of dozens) of the recorded conversations violated solicitor-client privilege and should be rejected [the two in which Mr. Sarkozy and his lawyer were talking about Mr. Sarkozy's defense strategy, and Mr. Sarkozy was receiving legal advice]; the other wiretaps, and in particular the one in which Mr. Sarkozy says he will help the magistrate in exchange for his help, were deemed legal by the judges. Mr. Sarkozy's lawyer received the support of 3,000 criminal lawyers to justify his argument that wiretapping is illegal because it violates solicitor-client privilege; and, after Mr. Sarkozy's conviction, known politicians intervened to say that phone tapping should have been illegal (because it violated solicitor-client privilege), which is an obvious aberration. The job of the lawyer is not to assist his client in concealing crimes or misdemeanors or to participate in the commission of crimes and

misdemeanors with his client, so the conversations between a lawyer and his client should be able to be used in a criminal trial (or even civilian trial) to convict a lawyer and/or his client or to seek the truth; in addition, in the context of a criminal trial, the secrecy of the investigation protects the contents of the file, so the confidentiality of these conversations is respected. Solicitor-client privilege is important to prevent a lawyer from talking about a client's business to another client or an interested person who could use this information to harm that first client, for example; but it cannot and should not be used to cover up crimes and misdemeanors. This problem also exists in the USA (I believe), and it shows the political power of lawyers and the dishonest use they make of their power [in France, lawyers play an important role in maintaining the dishonest LA law and OHL that bring them undue advantages; the argument "*lawyers are resolutely opposed to a LA system using public-sector lawyers*" is often used by the Department of Justice (…) to reject this solution despite the many advantages it presents (R1 PJ 40, no 77, R2 PJ 33, bas de p. 4, I come back to this topic **at no 60-61**)].

(iii) The search for the informant that allowed Mr. Sarkozy to know that his Bismuth line was being listened to.

23. It seems obvious [or at least seemed obvious to the PNF and police investigators] that Mr. Sarkozy and/or his lawyer were informed (by a mole) that the conversation in which Mr. Sarkozy agreed to assist the magistrate of the Court of Cassation in exchange for his assistance in one of his cases had been recorded by the police (and the PNF, and could be used against them) because Mr. Sarkozy very quickly changed his position on this subject (in his subsequent phone calls), and decided not to intervene in favor of this magistrate, therefore the prosecutors of the PNF (National Financial Prosecutor's Office in charge of the case) tried to identify the mole who had informed Mr. Sarkozy or his lawyer [Mr. Sarkozy, former lawyer, former minister of the interior in charge of the police, former president of the republic, and former leader of a large political party (…), is one of the people most likely to be informed of the wiretaps directed against him]; and they thought that the mole (within the PNF or the police or the Department of Justice) might have gone through a lawyer close to Mr. Sarkozy or his lawyer (Mr. Herzog); so they decided to study *the fadettes* of the phone calls (the data on the calls) of these lawyers and of PNF employees (…) to determine whether any of these lawyers had been in telephone contact with a PNF or police (or Department of Justice) employee and could have informed Mr. Sarkozy or his lawyer. This act of investigation was - for me at least – fairly smart because they did not have many solutions to identify this mole, and this solution did not violate (much) the privacy (or confidentiality of the contents of the phone calls) of the lawyers concerned [this act allowed them to know when these lawyers had called and with whom they had been in contact, perhaps, but it is not a great violation of privacy when we know that the goal was to identify a criminal magistrate or police officer who helped to cover up a crime committed by a former president of the republic!]; but it failed to identify the mole, and instead, the lawyers used it to complain about the methods of PNF prosecutors [the current Minister of Justice, Mr. Dupont-Morreti, who was one of the suspected lawyers, even filed a complaint against the PNF (before he was appointed Minister of Justice, then he abandoned his complaint after being appointed, it seems)].

(iv) Undue advantages given to lawyers and the importance of clarifying the role or function of counsel.

24. This case of Mr. Sarkozy's wiretaps highlights (1) certain unfair advantages [such as the solicitor-client privilege that allows (– at the eyes of the -) lawyers to commit crimes and misdemeanors with impunity (!)] that lawyers have and (or) unjustly think they deserve [and in addition to the unfair benefits associated with the dishonest LA law that I mentioned in my ECHR 2020 petition no. 2, PJ no 11, no 59,], (2) the dishonest behavior they have to preserve these unfair benefits, and (3) the important role the lawyers have in the justice's corruption. Another unfair and equally absurd advantage (or practice) is the fact that when a lawyer is bugged (secretly) (by the police) because of a probable involvement in a crime or misdemeanor, the president of the bar association (from whom he depends) must be informed (!); it is a dishonest advantage which increases the already high chances that the lawyer be informed of these wiretaps [by virtue of their function (and as we have seen above), the lawyers are necessarily in frequent contact with the magistrates and police (…)]. And of course (in France and the USA, among others) there are many lawyers among the members of parliament and senators who influence the parliamentary debates to prevent reforms (of the LA law ..., here no 22) and maintain all the undue advantages they have; and this justifies, I think, that the international community intervene on these different topics or areas to establish more honest and effective justice systems, and not only LA systems. The fight against the corruption and clutter of justice should therefore include, I think, a clarification of the function (or role) of the lawyer, and the Security Council could do this work as part of the study of the situation related to the dishonest LA law in France and the project to develop the new LA system (…) that I presented to the SC and that must include the development of a working methodology for LA (public) lawyers [**no 60-61**].

2) Solutions to fight the corruption and clutter of justice.

a) Corruption also leads to the search for judges' immunity (...), which is harmful to the efficiency of justice.

25. The (almost total) immunity of judges (and prosecutors,) also results in (a) the corruption of justice, (b) the chronic poor quality of justice decisions, (c) the clutter of justice; and the corruption of justice and (related) poor quality of decisions lead to the search for immunity for judges (prosecutors and clerks) and the maintenance (or development) of systems or ways of working that result in judges' immunity (prosecutors and clerks) such as the use of summary decisions (without specific motives) at the ECHR, the US Supreme Court, and to respond to LA requests in France (as explained, among other things, in the letter of 10-2-21, PJ no 0, no 3). For example, the judges of the French Court of Cassation want to fight against the scourge of the clutter of justice by setting up (or maintaining) filtering systems that legalize summary decisions (and therefore the very poor quality of decisions) which only makes the problem worse because an important goal of the supreme courts is to control the quality of the work done by the lower courts, and they cannot do it with a summary decision (!). My letter of 10-2-21 mentions the April 2017 CC Reform Report (PJ no 71) in which the Court of Cassation proposes, in particular, to reduce the number of appeals that it must judge each year by filtering all appeals somewhat as it filters the LA applications of the poor wanting to present petition for review, but this

proposal is very dishonest and not at all appropriate when one knows the dishonesty of the LA system, and in particular the dishonesty of the decisions of LA offices which do not make instructions and do not base their LA decisions on the merits of the cases (PJ no 0, no 3). What the judges of the CC are really looking for is the possibility of getting rid of a large number of appeals with summary decisions (incorrectly and dishonestly motivated as the ECHR, the US Supreme court do it), and therefore to rob thousands of people of their right to justice without any (criminal or civil) responsibility for the serious injustices they cause, as it happens in the context of the LA applications; and, unfortunately and in addition to that, this very negatively affects the quality of lower court decisions and encourages them to be corrupted as well. We must try to avoid this at all costs and find other solutions to the clutter of justice [although many other countries use the same processes (see other European countries that use appeal filtering systems in the CC's report, PJ no 71 , and in the US, the Supreme Court also uses such filters, PJ no 0, no 53)].

b) Solutions to fight the corruption and clutter of justice.

26. In summary, in order to improve the functioning of justice systems, it is essential (1) to fight against the corruption of justice, and thus, among other things, (a) to develop a new more honest, efficient and less costly LA system (and to eliminate OHL when they exist); (b) to improve the quality of court decisions (at all levels), in particular (i) by making judges (more easily) criminally and civilly responsible for the human rights violations and the harms they cause (and the crimes they commit) in the context of court proceedings, (ii) by giving judges more time to judge cases (an effective LA system, less corruption, less clutter of justice, ..., would free up time for judges ...), (iii) encouraging the amicable resolution of cases, and (iv) by significantly improving justice information and computer systems and using advanced technologies [AI ..., Task Force on Justice report, PJ no 83, ch. 5]; and (c) to clarify the role (or function) of lawyers [remove (*i*) the confidentiality of conversations between a lawyer and his client before the courts to allow the search for the truth, and (*ii*) the other unfair advantages given to lawyers, like the information of the president of the bar association during the investigations of a lawyer …]; (2) to severely punish the parties' dishonest behavior (rich, corporate, administrative,) at trial (which encourages judges to cheat ...); and (3) to improve the functioning and quality of decisions of Human Rights Courts such as the ECHR. Although some countries make more financial efforts than others in the LA system area [see, among others, Sweden, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Ireland which spend 7, 6, 5 and 4 times more than France per capita on their LA system, PJ no 38, p. 20, PJ no 0, no 59.1], many countries have similar problems in the area of justice [see UN Global Study on Legal Aid 2016, PJ no 81], and justice is very expensive for all countries, so the global solution that I advocate and that allows (a) to pool and reduce the costs of LA and justice systems everywhere, (b) to improve our overall justice information system [and, at the same time, (c) to generate key data to improve the justice system and better combat organized and transnational crime and terrorism], and (d) to transfer advanced knowledge and computer systems to poorer countries at a lower cost, is in the interest of all [**see no 55-62, 75**].

C The political dimension and consequences of my accusations of crimes against humanity.

30. My letters of 2020 [PJ no 1, EN PJ no 1.1, PJ no 2, EN PJ no 2.2] study the political dimension and certain consequences of my accusations of crime against humanity of persecution related to the dishonesty of the LA law, but I would like to come back on some of the arguments presented and provide additional arguments (presented in my letter to the ICC of 10-2-21 and here) to facilitate the work (a) of understanding and assessing the situation (related to my charges of crimes against humanity) and (b) assessing the merit of my proposals to resolve the problems I identified.

1) The competence of the UN Security Council to consider my charges of crimes against humanity.

31. The letter of 10-7-20 (a) describes (briefly) my proposals for improving the LA systems worldwide, (b) justifies the solution presented by studying the problems of the LA law in France (PJ no 1, no 11-20), and (c) studies the competence of the UN Security Council [on the basis of Article 13 of the Rome Statute and Chapter VII (Art. 39...) of the UN Charter which allows the Council to recognize the existence of a threat to peace and to make recommendations to restore or maintain international peace and security, PJ no 1, no 21-42] (i) to assess the situation related to my accusations of crime against humanity of persecution [linked to the use of the dishonest LA law in France for 30 years to deprive the poor of their fundamental rights; the letter of 23-11-20 (PJ no 2, no 6-28) describes and considers the various elements of this crime that enable the ICC to launch an investigation or at least a preliminary examination of these charges], (ii) to refer the situation to the ICC, and (iii) to make recommendations to UN member states on the LA subject. And, in particular, it explains (1) that the large-scale corruption system (linked to the use of the LA law) set up (and maintained for 30 years) by French politicians (and judges, etc.) to violate the fundamental rights of the poor is a threat to international peace and security [due to, inter alia, (a) the close links between respect for human rights, the fight against poverty and the maintenance of international peace and security, (b) the serious consequences of the corruption system linked to the LA law on the respect for human rights and the fight against poverty, and (c) the fact that France is not the only country to have problems with its LA system (PJ no 1, no 22-23)]; **(2)** that the refusal of French leaders, high judges and lawyers to admit the dishonesty of the LA law and to recognize its serious problems (composition of the LAOs, inadequate remuneration of lawyers, etc.), which diminish the relevance of my 2016-2017 proposals to improve LA systems around the world and thus prevent the improvement of these systems, also constitutes a threat to international peace and security [due to, among other reasons, the numerous advantages associated with the new LA system and the 2 Internet applications necessary to implement it that I propose to develop, including, among others, the improvement of justice information systems, a more effective fight against organized and transnational crime and terrorism, the reduction of inequality, poverty, the number of displaced persons, and unsolicited immigration, not to mention the respect of the human rights of the poor, of course (PJ no 1, no 24-25)].

32. And finally it also explains (3) that (a) the serious injustices I suffered from 1993 to 2001 because of the dishonest LA law (and OHL), and (b) the dishonest behavior of politicians [notably the refusal (of Mr. Chirac, Mr. Strauss-Khan) to finance my 1997 proposals (Inco-Coperincus program) to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data at world level (see PJ no 1, no 27-28 and proposals to PJ no 49.1); (of Mr. Chirac, Mr. Strauss-

Khan, M. Jospin, M. Berson,), to correct the injustices I suffered in the Essonne's Department (PJ no 0, no 21-39.1), and to seriously consider my 2005 proposals on the governance of the Internet ...] had serious consequences (i) for the international community whose poor (or under) use of the Internet to solve our global problems [poverty, inequality, environment and global warming, digital divide,] contributed to the emergence of certain conflicts, and to the serious migration crisis that could and should have been avoided [my 1997 proposals (Inco-Coperincus program) would have allowed the UN to make a better use of the Internet to solve our global problems (poverty, reduction of the digital divide ..., **no 35-36**, PJ no 1, no 27-28)] and (ii) for France [corruption … (PJ no 1, no 34-39)]. These serious consequences resulted in a significant increase of the number of indirect victims of the crime against humanity of persecution (related to the dishonest LA law that I describe) and its seriousness as well of course (PJ no 2, no 16), and thus further justify an ICC investigation and the competence of the Security Council (UNSC). My letter of 23-11-20 [(PJ no 2) which examines in detail the elements of the crime against humanity of persecution and justifies the launch of Phase II of the preliminary examination by the ICC] addresses also briefly some of these topics and thus also supports the competence of the UNSC to study this situation; and encourages the UNSC (a) to hold a vote to refer the situation to the ICC (and expand the period over which the crime must be investigated, as did the letter of 10-7-20), (b) to request the UN Secretariat and Mr. Guterres (i) to launch the project to develop the new LA system which I recommend to develop, and (ii) to consider my candidacy for the position of CITO (PJ no 77, which was opened in November/December 2020, I believe, PJ no 2, no 66), and (c) to play a full part in this project. I will go into more detail on some of these topics.

2) The possible consequences of the crime against humanity in France and the scope of my 1997 proposal.

a) The political consequences of the Essonne scandal and Mr. Chirac's reasons for not supporting the Inco project.

(i) The benefits of the project for the international community (.) did not weigh heavily in the face of the political risks of the scandal.

33. By studying the details of my layoff (from the Department of Essonne in 1993) case described in my letter to the ICC of 10-2-21 (PJ no 0, no 21-39.1), one can easily imagine the motivations behind Mr. Chirac (and Mr. Straus-Khan) refusal to support my 1997 project proposal [the proposal in a European program to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data worldwide, PJ no 49.1, PJ no 49.2, PJ no 49.3] despite the numerous advantages of the proposal for the international community (and France, **no 35-36**). Once a political scandal (such as Mr. Dugoin's fictitious employment and travel expenses fraud scandal) is discussed (almost) every day in the press and media, politicians no longer have many options to minimize the impact on the public opinion; they can seek to minimize the seriousness of the facts and to lessen the political consequences of the scandal [for example, they seek to avoid possible election losses, conflicts of people within a political party …]; and, in the case of Mr. Dugoin's fraud scandal, the political consequences were serious and not limited to the loss of the presidency of the General Council of Essonne (in April 98) because Mr. Dugoin had also given a fictitious job (wages without work counterpart) to the wife of Paris mayor [M. Tiberi, successor (1995-2001) of M. Chirac as mayor of Paris; and therefore not only to his wife], and there was thus (1) a risk of losing the mayor of Paris position in 2001 (after having lost the presidency of Essonne's General Council in 1998) which was aggravated by an internal struggle in Mr. Chirac's party linked to this fraud [Mr. Toubon, Mr. Chirac's former Minister of Justice, asked Mr.

Tiberi to withdraw (because of his wife's fraud) and allow him to run for mayor of Paris in his place], and (2) a risk of losing the 2002 presidential election for Mr. Chirac [the political party of Mr. Chirac lost the town hall of Paris in 2001!].

34. A politician who increases his salary and one of his political friends by paying wages without any work in exchange is a serious fraud of course, but if, in addition, he fires at the same time a conscientious employee who develops a computer application that can prevent his other fraud on travel expenses that also allows him to increase his salary illegally [see here no 9, and PJ no 0, no 37.1], and there are several other politicians of the same party who use this type of fraud [such as Mr. Chirac, Mr. Fillon, Mr. Juppé (...) at the time, and who were later convicted], then it is almost organized crime, and it is more serious (from a media perspective than a simple fictitious employment affair) especially when we know that unemployment was (a) high in France at that time and (b) the first concern of the French; so Mr. Chirac (and his party) had an obvious interest in not publicizing my termination case and not highlighting the seriousness (1) of my work and (2) of our proposal to the INCO program, and he ignored the project. By refusing to support my 1997 project to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data worldwide (PJ no 49.1, PJ no 49.2, PJ no 49.3) in giving me a job and helping me (indirectly) to obtain justice against the Department of Essonne, Mr. Chirac [and Mr. Strauss-Khan who were also being prosecuted for similar fictitious employment fraud at the time] avoided (or tried to diminish the risk) that the press and the media talk about the serious injustice I suffered [my dismissal (a) to facilitate travel fraud and (b) at the same time as Mr. Dugoin's wife was paid to do nothing] and the real dishonesty of Mr. Dugoin and his fellow politicians from Essonne who also stole travel expenses, but to a lesser extent [as we saw it at no 13, and in the description my dismissal case (PJ no 0, no 37.1), socialists were also stealing travel expenses, but not as much as Mr. Dugoin, so justice did not prosecute them]. The fact that my 1997 project proposal (Inco-copernicus) had many benefits for the international community (and in particular for poor countries) and France, did not weigh heavily in the face of the political risk linked to the possibility of the press and the media talking about the injustice of which I was victim, the real extent of the corruption and dishonesty of politicians (colleagues of Mr. Chirac and socialists, among others), and the lack of respect (of politicians) for work in general and for the poor that my dismissal case brought to light.

(ii) The scope of the 1997 INCO proposal.

35. Today it is (maybe) a little easier for me to explain (and for you to understand) the importance and significance of my 1997 project because the UN now has a *Data Strategy of the Secretary General for action by everyone, everywhere* [May 2020 (PJ no 55)], then I will try to do it here, although I will also come back to this subject below. M. Guterres explains on page 3 '*... we focus not on bureaucracy, but start with data action that adds immediate value for our organization. (...) In agile iterations, we will master analytic capability that help us better understand 'what happened', 'why it happened', 'what may happen next' and how to respond with insight, impact and integrity* '. *(...) None of these shifts will happen overnight. Our roadmap is designed for the long term. While focused on the US secretariat, we also hope that this strategy can serve all members of the UN family who*

seek to accelerate a data driven transformation. ', And the document on page 4 '*Recognizing that better data use is integral to our future, our journey begins with a vision of the data-driven organization ...* '; I agree - for 24 years now - that a better use of data (a data strategy) is essential for our future; and will allow us to better understand *'what is happening', 'why it is happening', 'what could happen' and 'how to respond insight-fully, effectively, and honestly*'; and this is why I presented *my research project proposal to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data at the global level* in 1997 [to the INCO program, PJ no 49.1, PJ no 49.2, PJ no 49.3] whose objective was, among other things, to classify and codify (and therefore to collect, save and publish knowledge on) all statistical data used by international organizations (UN, IMF, World Bank, OECD, Eurostat, WHO, UNESCO, ILO, ...) to facilitate the integration and analysis (and the real-time transfer from countries to Ios ..., and the dissemination) of all this data; it was *a data strategy* limited to a particular type of data (statistical data which falls under the open data category of the data strategy, see PJ no 55, p. 9), while the '*data strategy*' refers to all types data [such as feelings to diagnose stability and identify potential for conflict, or data to prevent hate speech, PJ no 55, p. 9], but vital data to help countries achieve MDGs and SDGs.

36. If you study carefully the purpose and content of our 1997 proposal (PJ no 49.1) and *the data strategy* (PJ no 55), you will see that the objectives and the steps to follow overlap; I'm just taking a few examples: (on page 5) data management, '*optimize the value chain for managing data: describe, organize, govern, integrate and share data so everyone can discover and access the data they need*', and it was one of the basic objectives of the proposal; then, partnerships '*integrate gradually with other data ecosystem outside the UN family to unlock more value*', our objective was to create an international codification and classification of statistics used in Ios, and to allow (or encourage) countries to use this new codification, and this can only be done gradually. And it is true that this type of change (a better use ... of this data) takes time (as the data strategy mentions) (1) because (for example in the field of statistics) all the countries which have already started to generate data, have done so using different codes and classifications (specific to each country) and sometimes even different definitions [or calculation methods] for particular statistical data, and (2) because, to do analysis at the international level, we must first have defined (or it is better to define and use) common standards (definitions, calculation methods) for each data, and this necessarily takes time to unify the different methods or standards used. By refusing to support the Inco project of 1997 (a data strategy and data-driven action), Mr. Chirac and France have, among other things, prevented the UN (and the Ois) from launching, there are 24 years, an effort (1) which would have enabled us (to transfer, disseminate and) analyze (...) more easily and more effectively statistical data at the global level, and (2) which would have encouraged the United Nations (and the IOs and countries) to launch other data-driven actions (like the one I am presenting here related to LA law) and to better use the Internet to solve our global problems; the fault committed by France (which did not support the project) was therefore serious, and the consequences listed in no 32 exact.

36.1 I did not follow (since 1997) the work of the statistics departments of the various international organizations involved in our project proposal, but after reading the CEB System-wide roadmap for innovative UN data and statistics of 14-5-20 (PJ no 78) stipulating that '*The UN's data and statistical systems are not sufficiently coordinated*

and interoperable to support the 2030 Agenda Decade for Action ...'; it seems that the project proposal that we presented, and which would have allowed a better coordination and interoperability of the statistical management systems ... of the different IOS, was not realized. In 1997, Eurostat collected statistics from European Union countries, then transmitted them to the OECD, which collected data from other non-EU OECD countries, and transmitted them to the IMF, i believe; The aim was to prevent countries from doing the same job multiple times. If international organizations use the same international codification and classification to codify their statistics, they no longer need to transmit their statistics to other organizations, they put them in the Cloud (as soon as they have verified and / or explained them...); and they are automatically accessible by other IOs which also use them; this simplifies data management (no data duplication on several computer systems, a single backup, instead of backup in each of the Ios ...), data integration, and data dissemination, and reduces the cost computer systems for Ios. But it takes time to set up - and to use - the same codification ... in / on all IOS. Then, at the country level, it's the same, if the countries use this international codification, they can create a single database for all the ministries (…) [I take advantage of these remarks to thank the partners (…) who accepted to help me present this proposal (Metadynamics, UK, University of Thessaloniki Aristotle, GR, University of Rousse, BG, Arkus Electronics, Poland, Institute for Informatics, Armenia, PJ no 49.1), and the experts and politicians who expressed their interest in the project].

b) The possible political consequences of my accusations of crimes against humanity in France.

37. Today, we have a similar situation with my project proposal to improve the legal aid (LA) systems around the world; and we see that the behavior of politicians has not changed much; Covering up the LA law's dishonesty for over 30 years and maintaining the corrupt justice system are far more important to Mr Macron (and other party leaders, and their fellow MPs and senators) than finding a solution to the many problems of the LA law in France and to develop and set up - at a lower cost - a new and more efficient LA system in all the countries (which would like to use it). And of course evading criminal prosecution for facilitating the many injustices linked to LA law for almost 30 years, is also a high motivation for refusing to admit (a) that the LA law (and OHL) is (are) dishonest for the poor, (b) that I have been the victim of serious injustices because of the dishonest LA law (OHL...), and (c) that the proposals I have made to improve LA systems and the justice information systems around the world are serious and would be useful to a large number of countries. Mr. Macron, who was Deputy Secretary General at the Elysee Palace under Mr. Hollande (from 15-5-12 to 15-7-14, when I denounced the dishonesty of the LA law and asked for the help of Mr. Hollande to obtain justice in 2013 and 2014), then Minister of the Economy (from 26-8-14 to 30-8-16, in charge of public procurement when I wrote to him in 2014, R1 PJ 18), and finally president of the republic since 2017 [who launched a justice reform without changing anything in the dishonest LA law despite my various letters (R2 PJ 12,…), and my QPC of 2015 on this subject], knows that he has a criminal responsibility in maintaining the dishonest LA law for more than 7 years, which is perhaps why he chose Mr. Dupont-Morreti (a renowned criminal lawyer) as Minister of Justice in July 2020 [in my letter of 10-7-20 (PJ no 1, no 27-28), I speak of a local politician who was sentenced to 3 years and 5 years in prison for tax evasion and corruption and who was released from prison , danced in the street in front of the cameras, and intervened on television to denounce the politicized justice after less than 2 months in prison, his lawyer was the justice minister Me Dupont-Morreti!].

38. So the launch of phase II of a preliminary examination (and even more of an investigation, or a trial) by the ICC, which would necessarily be made public (according to the current practice of the ICC), and would entail a public debate on the subject in France, could have serious political consequences for Mr. Macron, certain members of his government, and the LREM (party of Mr. Macron) deputies (MP) who were elected in his wake (and others like M. Mélenchon), including, among other things, the impossibility of running for the presidential election of 2022, or at least chances of winning the presidential election and a re-election to the assembly (for LREM MP) much lower than what they are now. And, of course, this situation (or possibility) explains (a) why Mr Macron and the MP, to whom I have written on several occasions, do not speak publicly about this problem, (b) why obvious efforts are being made to prevent the press and the media from talking about the problems of the LA law (the OHL,), the injustices of which I am the victim to denounce the LA law's dishonesty, and the proposals I made, [and (c) why, among other reasons (as seen at **no 15**), figures like Ms. Mijatovic and Ms. Bachelet have avoided speaking publicly about the serious LA law problem in France]. The LA law's problems are obvious, and I didn't exaggerate anything when I criticized the LA law, the lawyers themselves admitted that the LA system did not pay enough to defend the poor effectively (PJ no 0, no 3), and several countries such as the UK, Sweden, and Ireland spend much more (6, 7 and 4 times more per capita, PJ no 0, no 59.1) than France for their LA system; moreover the low remuneration of lawyers is only one of the many problems which affect the LA system efficiency, so it is obvious that the rights of the poor are systematically violated, that the MP and Mr. Macron (...) who were informed, had an obligation to speak about this subject publicly, that they did not do so, and that they deceived the French people (and their voters) and prevented an honest public discussion on my proposals at the international (and national) and do not deserve to be re-elected at least.

3) The international consequences of my accusations of crimes against humanity.

a) The - intellectual - consequences of my accusations of crimes against humanity (described in the letter of 11/23/20).

(i) France's lack of legitimacy to sanction Russia and China for human rights violations (...).

39. (In my letter of 23-11-20, PJ no 2, no 56-65,) I spoke about what I called the ***intellectual*** **consequences** of my accusations of crimes against humanity, and, more particularly, about the fact that these accusations deprived France of all legitimacy (…) to sanction Russia for the annexation of Crimea, the Navalny affair (…); and I explained that these sanctions did not seem to be in the interests of the French, Europeans and the UN, that they did not help the persons who were victims of human rights violations or the inhabitants of the Crimea who were opposed to the annexation, and that they were **more** a communication technique (a) to lessen France's responsibility for the problems they seek to denounce, and (b) to minimize the seriousness of human rights violations which France is guilty of (including those due to the dishonest LA law, PJ no 2, no 56-65), **than they were an effort** to obtain justice for (or to help) the victims. Obviously, my letter did not convince the French government and the European governments who added sanctions linked to the return of Mr. Navalny to Russia and his immediate arrest (perhaps, among other reasons, because many European countries do not do better than France in the field of the LA system). Today, one might add that my accusations nullify the legitimacy of sanctions against

China related to Uyghur human rights violations and re-education camps (or specialized prisons). I am not saying that there are no problems (of human rights violations ...) in Russia and China, and that we cannot talk about it (we can talk about it, at the UN ...); and as a victim of (what I think are serious) injustices (human rights violations) in France and the USA [described in my letters of 10-7-20, 23-11-20 and 10-2-21 and the 8 petitions to the ECHR], I am particularly sensitive to the situation of victims (of these rights violations) wherever they are, but that does not prevent France from also systematically violating the human rights of a significant part of its population (especially the poor); and therefore that before sanctioning other countries, it should (1) speak publicly about - and resolve - its own problems of human rights violations [further, as with Russia, the sanctions linked to the situation of Uyghurs will not help them and will not help to solve the problems (religious extremism,) which are at the origin of this situation and which do not exist only in China], and (2) be interested in solutions or proposals that allow all countries to improve their justice systems (like the ones I made).

(ii) Religious extremism has serious consequences that are sometimes difficult to manage for many countries, including France.

40. The leaders of European countries or the USA would not qualify the war against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq as genocide or the imprisonment of its members (the terrorists surviving the war) and their wives (and children) arbitrary detention; ISIS terrorists were (and still are in some places) obvious threats to *the maintenance of international peace and security*, which required military intervention (and therefore the death of many of them, and the imprisonment of others); therefore, even if the situation in China is not identical to what we saw in Syria and Iraq, there are terrorist groups, and there have been terrorist attacks and demands for autonomy that would be unwelcome (or badly interpreted) in many countries, and which surely worry China. A situation similar to what happened in Syria and Iraq would seriously affect the many advances China has made in other areas such as poverty reduction. (As a recent article in Les Echoes, PJ no 67 explains it,) China has lifted 800 million people out of poverty in the past 40 years (and it made a robot roll on the planet Mars, congratulations), so although these results must be nuanced (as the article explains), and do not excuse human rights violations, they show that the Chinese government is not knowingly seeking to harm its people, and, on the contrary, that it even seeks to improve the living conditions of as many of its citizens as possible. The situation of the Uyghurs is (a) a difficult situation to resolve because it is closely linked to a form of religious extremism which, in a country of more than 1.3 billion inhabitants, risks having very serious consequences that European countries may not take sufficient account of; and (b) a situation that European countries (...) could perhaps help resolve differently [again, I don't think the sanctions (against China in connection with the Uyghur situation) of France, which violate the rights of the poor (and implicitly of the European countries which let it happen; even those which obviously make much more efforts than France on the LA system subject such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland,), and which was, recently, accused of a war crime in connection with its actions in Syria (see recent complaint sent to the ICC relating to the treatment of certain survivors of the Islamic State, PJ no 68), are legitimate, and the best way to help (a) Uyghurs who are not

extremists or terrorists (as were the IS terrorists in Syria and Iraq), or (b) Nigeria (…) which has similar problems, and that the dialogue with China, and finding effective solutions to some problems of religious extremism would be more useful to Uyghurs (and to all)]. On this subject, I would like to make a further remark which might help you better understand my argument.

b) The use of the concealment-for-profit crime to deem illegal the unilateral sanctions of Europe and the United States.

(i) The constitutive elements of the concealment-for-profit offense and the commercial, political (...) profits linked to unilateral sanctions.

41. The criminal offense of *recel* (concealment) in France makes it possible to punish persons who profit - knowingly - from a crime or misdemeanor; for example, a person who buys a stolen car at a price much lower than its value because this car has been stolen, and who knows that this car has been stolen, commits the offense of receiving stolen goods (recel) since he/she is profiting from the car theft offense [in the US the equivalent offense is, I believe, 'concealment', a name that seems appropriate because, by definition, it means hiding something; and the receiver does not just profit from the crime of theft (...), he also often conceals this crime]. This offense of concealment [in particular concealment-for-profit covers many and varied situations: '*The concealment-for-profit covers extremely numerous and varied situations so that repression reaches all those who, directly or indirectly, take advantage of a crime or misdemeanor (2 °). The objective is all the more widely achieved since the benefit can be material or simply moral*' (see PJ no 72, no 15-52) and] applies to all misdemeanors and crimes (including the crime against humanity, I believe), therefore, in theory, when France or the French leaders (or more generally, the European countries and the USA and the European and American leaders) use (s) a crime committed in Russia or in China (poisoning of Mr. Navalny, imprisonment considered illegal of certain Uyghurs ...) to sanction (economically,) Russia or China (...), and profit from this crime (a) by minimizing his (their) own human rights violations (in particular those related to the dishonesty of the LA law ...), and (b) deriving economic benefits (...) when (they) impose economic sanctions (i) which affect the competitiveness of Russian and Chinese companies (...), and (ii) which create poverty (...) [such as (1) European and American economic sanctions (based on violations of human rights or crime ...) which create poverty and prevent companies in all countries from doing business with certain Russian and Iranian companies (...) under penalty of criminal prosecution; or (2) sanctions which seek to prevent the Nord Stream 2 project (and to facilitate the sale of American gas ...) or which seek to discourage countries from buying weapons (or other products) from Russia (notably its allies such as India, which the American defense minister recently asked to avoid exposing itself to - probable - sanctions by not buying weapons from Russia); the USA derive obvious economic advantages from these sanctions such as the possibility of selling (its) gas to Europe or (its) weapons to its allies], it (they) are committing, it seems, the offense (or crime) of concealment-for-profit of the crime that it (they) denounces because it (they) knows (know or are informed) or, at least, think (s) that Russia and China are committing the crime that it (they) denounce.

(ii) An international body like the ICC and the UNSC in theory does not benefit from a conviction or sanction it imposes.

42. This analysis explains, among other reasons, why Russia and China violently denounce the recent sanctions and criticisms of Europeans (…), and should or could encourage Europeans and Americans to find other solutions to avoid violations of human rights, and behaviors they consider criminal (human rights violations, etc.). If the ICC or the ECHR sanction a head of state (...) who commits a war crime or a crime

against humanity (…), or a country which violates human rights, they do not benefit personally (financially , economically ...) of their convictions, whereas when a country or a group of countries imposes unilateral sanctions (against a country or its leaders), the risk of the commission of an offense or crime of concealment is serious. Of course the ICC and the ECHR can - in theory - be *manipulated, influenced or corrupted* (by some of their members…), and are corrupt (…) in view of the decisions they took on my cases (among others, no 12-14, 51, 83), but it is the responsibility of all their member states to avoid that they be *manipulated* ... (and the economic gain… would not be so obvious). Even when the UN Security Council imposes sanctions against a country, it may happen that some of its member countries profit commercially and financially (and politically) from these sanctions [for example when the Council sanctions North Korea for its actions and activities linked to the development of atomic bombs (…) and prevents it from selling arms, the 5 permanent member countries of the Council which also sell a lot of arms profit commercially from these sanctions], but, at least, in this situation, these Council member countries have received a mandate from the UN to impose these sanctions, so they are necessarily more legitimate than unilateral sanctions (and, in addition, given the composition of the Council, consensus is relatively difficult to achieve); so I believe that the international community must be vigilant on this subject and that Europe and the USA, which are fond of this kind of actions (outside the UN mandate), should perhaps seek other ways to help the victims they claim to want to help with their penalties; and the proposals that I make (development of global applications ...), present solutions that avoid taking advantage of the sufferings of victims, while helping to advance our societies and improving the living conditions of victims.

(iii) Global solutions seem more appropriate and more useful for victims.

43. I understand that this reasoning can seem frustrating and sometimes seem to oppose the criminal offense which punishes the behavior of not assisting a person in danger because if one witnesses an injustice, it seems reasonable to denounce it and to act to protect victims, but it is important to choose the best action and the action that is legal and that benefits the victims [and indeed all victims in the world when it comes to human rights violations]. Another problem with unilateral sanctions is the fact that they point to a particular human rights violation in Russia, China (...), while, at the same time, human rights violations equally serious and grave happen in other countries [sometimes in countries which are much poorer; mainly because these other countries are much poorer and cannot put in place justice and detention systems that guarantee respect for human rights for all], and go unpunished, and their victims remain anonymous. Also, as explained in the letter of 23-11-2020 (PJ no 2, no 59), the economic sanctions that create poverty and / or decrease the economic growth of the country have negative consequences on poor countries since they limit the capacity of the sanctioned country to help poor countries (in particular to distribute ODA). All of these arguments support the validity of the proposals I am making, particularly in the area of justice. If a global solution (such as the proposal to develop a new LA system and the 2 computer applications to implement it all over the world) makes it possible to help all countries improve their justice systems and reduce the costs of their justice systems (which is necessarily important for all countries

that seek to respect human rights), it is better than sanctions that impoverish the country and therefore reduce the chances of improving the situation. Of course, if a country refuses to use a global solution recommended by the Security Council that improves the functioning of justice and therefore the human rights situation in the country, then we know (or we are sure) that this country does not want to improve the human rights situation, and it will be easier for the Security Council to decide whether this country deserves sanctions.

[**44.** Parenthesis on the interferences in the American elections (…), the USA also punishes Russia for interference in its presidential election, I believe; and this is an important topic. If the US has physical evidence that a country tried to influence the vote in a presidential election (using social media or otherwise), it is understandable that they are upset and punish those responsible; but it is important also to remember that there are several ways of influencing an election, for example unilateral sanctions by a country against Russia, which has elections, are also a way of influencing the elections in that country since they highlight a possible serious fault committed by the government in power and indirectly, they therefore support the opposition and interfere in the democratic process in this country. This remark supports the fact that unilateral sanctions have a lot of negative consequences for very little benefit, if any.].

c) The consequences of my accusations (of crimes against humanity) on the process of reappointment of Mr. Guterres.

(i) The silence of Mr. Forst and Ms. Bachelet on my accusations against the LA law and of crimes against humanity.

45. (As we saw it at **no 37-38**,) Mr. Macron has a clear interest in the UN's (and the press and the media's) refusal to talk about my accusations against the LA law and of crimes against humanity and to recognize that the LA system violates the fundamental rights of the poor systematically, therefore the refusal of Mr. Forst and Ms. Bachelet (a) to respond to my letter of 30-3-19 (R1 PJ 40) describing my accusations against the dishonest LA law and the persecution of which I have been - and am - a victim for exposing the dishonesty of the LA law, and (b) to speak publicly about the systematic violations of the human rights the poor are victim of because of the dishonesty of the LA law (and of the OHL for approximately 30 years), is an obvious effort to conceal the criminal responsibility of the political leaders and high judges in France in the systematic violations of the fundamental rights of the poor; and, (as we saw at **no.15**,) it perhaps also puts forward a desire to minimize the problem in other countries such as Chile (which Ms. Bachelet led) and Portugal (which Mr. Guterres led) which make as little budgetary efforts as France since they spend per capita just a little more than France [Portugal spends 5.85 euros per capita against 5.06 euros for France (2016, PJ no 38, p. 20, p. 20), and Chile 6.60 dollars in 2013 against 5.85 dollars for France (PJ no 81, p. 93)], but this is no excuse (**no 83**). Mr. Guterres was also informed (a) of the problems of the LA law in France described in my letter of 8-12-17 (R1 PJ 42) and in my candidacy for a UN post of 16-8-19 (R1 PJ 41) and (b) of my charges of crimes against humanity described in my letter of application for the post of CITO of 11/23/20 (PJ no 2), and he did not mention these issues publicly either. The fact that other countries do not make more efforts than France for their LA system does not diminish the merit of my accusations against the French LA law (...) and the seriousness of the crime and faults committed by the French leaders (and high judges) [see **no 83**, PJ no 0, PJ no 2 and PJ no 1], therefore the public intervention of the Secretary General [who is '*the incarnation of the*

ideals of United Nations and the spokesperson for the peoples of the world, especially those who are poor and vulnerable', and who, according to his words in the Call to Action in favor of human rights (PJ no 63), must '*... demonstrate the highest qualities of integrity, impartiality and independence, be grounded in evidence and standards and be guided by the voices of those whose rights are violated.* '], and of the UN on this subject of the LA law and my proposals to improve the LA system around the world, would have been and would be justified [especially when we know that (1) the eradication of extreme poverty and halving at least the number of poor people, (2) reducing inequalities, and (3) improving institutions (justice systems, etc.) are objectives of the SDGs], and his silence may show a possible lack of independence or affect the relevance of parts of his vision statement [**no 67-79**].

(ii) The veto power of France and the USA in the context of the selection process for the Secretary General.

46. A rich country and a permanent member of the Security Council which sets up and maintains for 30 years a LA system and OHL which systematically violate the fundamental rights of the poor, and creates poverty, deserves to be called to order by the UN, but, in the case of France which has the power of veto, Mr. Macron could, in theory at least, oppose the renewal of Mr. Guterres' mandate of [it has already happened, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who did not have the favor of the United States, did not obtain a second mandate in 1996] if the UN spoke publicly about this problem, denounced the injustices of which I was victim, and supported an investigation at the ICC or at least asked France to recognize that the dishonest LA law (…) systematically violates the basic rights of the poor. France's refusal to publicly admit the dishonesty of the LA law (when it knows perfectly well that the LA law is very dishonest for the poor) therefore implicitly seeks to force the hand of the UN Secretariat (and of the OHCHR) and of Mr. Guterres so that they do not intervene on this subject (!). And if we still use the criminal offense of concealment-for-profit defined above, we can also say, I believe, that, in theory, when the USA (or its leaders) refuse to grant me justice and, by doing so, takes advantage of the dishonesty of the LA law and the refusal of France to grant me the legal aid to denounce the injustices of which I was the victim in the USA between 2002 and 2011 due (or facilitated) by the dishonesty of the LA law [see the case of my request for LA rejected in 2012 described above at **no 11**, and at PJ no 0, no 18-19], they commit the offense (or crime) of concealment-for-profit of crime against humanity [if the ICC judged that the French leaders (…) committed a crime against humanity in connection with the dishonest LA law] because they know (or are informed) that the LA law is dishonest and that the French leaders are accused of crimes against humanity ; and this situation creates a reason why the US could refuse to discuss (in the Security Council) the situation related to my charges of crimes against humanity, and to refer this situation to the ICC, and implicitly encourage the UN Secretary General not to discuss the subject (a) of the dishonesty of the LA law in France and (b) of my proposals to improve the LA systems around the world publicly.

(iii) Article 99 of Chapter XV of the UN Charter allowing the Secretary General to draw the attention of the SC to a situation.

47. Finally, to close this topic, I would like to mention that Article 99 of Chapter XV of the United Nations Charter states that '*the Secretary-General may draw attention to any matter which, in his opinion, might*

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security', so **if** my accusations of crimes against humanity are well founded, and the jurisdiction of the Security Council is established, Mr. Guterres' silence on (a) the LA law's problems in France, (b) the injustices of which I have been victims and (c) the proposals that I made to improve the LA system, could put forward an oversight or an error of appreciation of the situation that I presented, or possible pressures imposed by France, among others. To avoid this kind of problem of **implicit** pressure on the process of renewal of Mr. Guterres' mandate, I believe that France should: (1) admit that the LA system in France systematically violates the rights of the poor and that I have been victim of serious injustices in France, and compensate me for these injustices, and (2) publicly support my proposals to improve the LA system around the world. And I would be grateful (a) to Mr. Biden if he admitted that I was the victim of grave injustices in the US from 2002 to 2011, and if he agreed to encourage the US to make up for these grave injustices, and, also (of course) if he supported my proposals to improve the LA system around the world (see **no 71, 84, 91**); and (b) to Mr. Guterres if he agreed to give his point of view publicly on these LA law related matters [accusations against the LA law (...), proposals to improve the LA systems,] to help UN members states and the Security Council in their work related to his reappointment (or their other ongoing works). Also in view of the fact that I sent (1) an informal candidacy for the post of Secretary General in 2016 (see PJ no 41, PJ no 45); and (2) an application for the post of CITO (PJ no 2), the fact that I am drawing the attention of the Security Council to a matter which, in my opinion, could endanger *the maintenance of international peace and security*, should not be surprising to the UN member states (and the SC), but only, (a) confirm in their eyes, my interest in the work of the UN and the knowledge of the responsibilities that fall on the members of the Management Board of the SG (Senior Management Group), and (b) support the merits of my candidacy for the post of CITO.

4) The decision of the ICC and conclusion on this part on the political dimension (...) of my accusations.

The precision of my accusations and the dishonest decisions of the ECHR and imprecise decision of the ICC.

48. I use a '**if**' my accusations (against the LA law and of crimes against humanity) are well founded, so I would like to clarify this point without going into too much detail; the merit of my accusations depends, among other things and first of all: (1) **on the fact** that the LA law systematically violates the fundamental rights (...) of the poor, and the proofs of this fact are numerous and given, among others, in the parliamentary reports, my QPCs ... (see PJ no 0, no 3), and also stem from the little money allocated to the LA system in comparison to other countries (no 26, 38; 6, 7 and 4 times more per capita for some countries, PJ no 0, no 59.1); and (2) **on the fact** that the ICC has (*temporal, subject matter, and territorial, or personal*) jurisdiction for these charges, and, more particularly, that the elements of the crime against humanity of persecution are met [that the ICC has *subject matter jurisdiction* because the 2 other aspects to study (temporal and personal or territorial jurisdiction) are obvious, I believe]. The seriousness of the crime committed is a factor in determining the admissibility of the complaint, so it's important, but not in order to qualify my charges as a crime against humanity, I think. My QPCs in France, my ECHR requests (since 2001), and my complaint to the ICC which precisely described the elements of *the crime against humanity of persecution* and explained why these elements are present in the context of this case (PJ no 2, no 7-12), allowed

the courts to give a precise answer to the question of the systematic violation of poor 's fundamental rights, and the complaint to the ICC allowed, in addition, to give a precise answer to the question of the (subject matter) jurisdiction of the ICC, and of the gravity of the accusation, and other answers, but they did not (1) because France (the highest courts CE, CC, CCo and the highest level politicians), and the ECHR cheated to refuse to answer the 1st question (**no 4-14**, to PJ no 0, no 7-48, PJ no 2, no 12,), and (2) because the ICC was very imprecise (and contemptuous) in its recent decision of 6-5-21 (PJ no 0.4).

The ICC's refusal to respond specifically to the arguments presented and the vagueness of its decision.

49. The ICC explains (PJ no 0.4) that '*the Court can only have jurisdiction over persons accused of the most serious crimes…, in particular genocide, crimes against humanity… These crimes… are explained in depth in the supporting documents crime …*', '*Based on the information currently available to us, the behavior described in your communication does not appear to meet the strict definitions provided. Therefore, as the allegations do not appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, the prosecutor confirmed that there is currently no basis for further analysis.*' Obviously I used the Elements of Crimes document (PJ no 75, EN PJ no 76, placed on the ICC website) since I copied from this document the elements of *the crime against humanity of persecution* at PJ no 2, no 8-8.1, and it was not necessary to talk about other crimes than *the crime against humanity of persecution* and about this document. Then, why say, *according to the information at our disposal*, why not refer directly to paragraphs **7 to 10** of my 23-11-20 letter (PJ no 2) which specifically address the question of the ICC's jurisdiction [based on ICC documents on the elements of the crime (PJ no 75, EN PJ no 76,) and on ICC legal authorities, OTP Policy Paper, 2013 (PJ no 73, EN PJ no 74)] and why not say precisely the reasons which, in view of the explanations given at PJ no 2, no 8-19, make the ICC not competent (!). Finally, why say '*doesn't seem to match*', there are potentially over 80,000 direct victims and billions of indirect victims, so isn't it important to be sure and explain precisely why the ICC is sure that it is not competent! The decision also reminds me that the ICC complements (and does not replace) national courts, and therefore that I should seize the appropriate national court, while my complaint explains that I have already seized several times national courts (and the CEDH) and that they cheated to refuse to judge the question of the systematic violation of the fundamental rights of the poor [see the question of complementarity discussed in PJ no 2, no 11-14, inaction of the state…]; then, it explains to me that many serious charges will not be investigated by the ICC, as if I did not know; I do know it (I have read the ICC documents), and moreover I was very precise on this subject in my study (a) of the elements used by the ICC to know if a preliminary examination and an investigation is justified, and, in particular, (b) on the questions of the complementarity and gravity of my accusations (discussed in PJ no 2, no 15-18).

An unfair decision towards the victims.

50. I am not saying that I am an expert and that I cannot - or did not make - mistakes in my analysis; the legal qualification of the facts is a difficult exercise even for the experts [in France, it has happened that a prosecutor requests an investigation against a suspect on the basis of a first legal qualification of the facts, and that the examining magistrate requests a referral to the criminal court on the basis of a 2nd legal qualification different from the 1st, and finally that the criminal court condemn the accused on the basis of a 3rd legal qualification different from the 2 others, so even the experts can be wrong], but, at least, I made the effort (a) to read the ICC documents, and (b) to explain in detail why I

thought the ICC has jurisdiction and the complaint is admissible (… and I translated my 3 letters into English to help the ICC and the UN read them). I am fully aware of the significance of my accusations (1) for the judges, among others, in particular the fact that they imply that the highest French judges (among others) are the worst criminals that France has had during the last 30 years [and that some of them have probably committed hundreds or thousands of crimes and misdemeanors against the poor (…) over a career of over 30 years as a judge]; and (2) for some senior politicians who could lose upcoming elections, among others; but it is important to remember (a) that some judges have an opportunity to commit a felony or misdemeanor in almost every decision they render on a given case, and that, for the poor, to correct a dishonest decision is, most of time, an impossible mission in the context of our justice system so corrupt (…); and (b) that, as my letters explain it, the political scandals in France for 30 years and the relatively recent convictions of Mr. Sarkozy, Mr. Fillon, Mr. Chirac (…) support the merits of my accusations against the LA law and of crime against humanity. This decision of the ICC is unfair to the many poor victims of the crime described, it covers up the crime (or serious faults) committed or at least the dishonesty of the LA law in France and of the French leaders, and it insults me because it ignores all the arguments I brought and the long work I have done over many years, and, in addition, it prevents me from giving you (the members of the Security Council, of the UNGA,) more details on the merits or not of my accusations, and forces me to criticize the ICC after having denounced the dishonesty of French jurisdictions and the ECHR (!).

The criticisms leveled against the ICC and the demand made on the leaders of ICC member countries.

51. I read that Russia criticized the ICC (in a Security Council debate report), that the US sanctioned Ms. Bensouda (and that Mr. Biden rescinded those sanctions), and that in 2016, South Africa, Gambia and Burundi had decided to leave the ICC because it was only prosecuting African countries (PJ no 77, South Africa and The Gambia have changed their minds, it seems, as they are still members to this day, I believe), so I do not want (and besides I have no interest in) adding more critics, but it would be insulting Mrs. Bensouda and Mr. Dillon to pretend that they did not understand that the precision of the decision was crucial for the many victims (including me), for the Security Council, and for the French people and the whole world [in December 2020, the prosecutor's office had already ignored the precise description of the elements of the crime and of the admissibility of the complaint, see its refusal to register the complaint (PJ no 0.5, associated with the description of the elements to study PJ no 0.6), then in March 2021 (PJ no 0.3), the acknowledgment of receipt tells me that the decision will contain a reason, but not such an imprecise and insulting reason], and I think they should have done proof of greater intellectual rigor in the drafting of this decision, among others. I would therefore be grateful to the leaders (or at least one leader) of ICC member countries (1) to encourage the employees of the ICC prosecutor's office to show more intellectual rigor and precision in their decisions, especially when there are a large number of potential victims affected by the charges that are presented, and (2) to ensure that the phase II of the preliminary examination including a detailed and public legal analysis of my charges is carried out (in sending a formal request to the ICC which automatically launches phase II) if the Security Council decides not to take up the situation I have described and to refer it to the ICC.

D The many advantages of my proposal to improve the LA systems and my 2016 platform.

53. Before commenting on the recent work of the United Nations and on Mr. Guterres' vision statement (...), I would like to return briefly (a) to the many advantages of the proposal to create a new LA system that can be used by all the UN member states, and (b) on the 2016 proposals' platform (or the vision statement, PJ no 45) submitted as part of my informal UNSG application (PJ no 41).

1) The general description of the new LA system usable in all countries and its many advantages.

54. In my previous letters and candidatures [see letters of 7-12-17 to the UN (…) (PJ no 50, no 61-65), of 30-3-19 to French deputies (…) (R1 PJ 40, no 73-95), 16-8-19 (R1 PJ 41), 7-2-20 (R1 PJ 46, no 20-21), 10-7-20 (PJ no 1),], I spoke of the many advantages of the proposal to develop a new LA system and 2 computer applications to implement it everywhere, so I summarize here some of the arguments I presented in these letters and present you some new ones to facilitate the understanding of the proposals and to emphasize the importance of launching this project.

a) The general description of the new LA system and its objectives.

55. First of all, the project consists of developing (1) a new, more efficient and less costly legal aid (LA) system, based on the creation (a) of a group of civil servant judges specializing in the adjudication of LA requests, and (b) a group of civil servant lawyers specializing in legal aid (LA) missions [these 2 groups would be under the hierarchical responsibility of the State and the OHCHR]; (2) a classification and codification of all types of cases tried each year around the world; and (3) 2 global (Internet) applications necessary to implement this new LA system in all countries wishing to use it [the 2 applications helping judges to judge and manage legal aid (LA) requests and lawyers to defend and manage the affairs of the poor, would also make it possible to record (1) the time spent (a) to adjudicate LA requests (and possibly resolve cases amicably through mediation), and (b) to defend the affairs of the poor for lawyers, and (2) all costs associated with adjudicating LA requests and defending the poor]. And the objective of the new system is of course (1) to correct all the imperfections of the French LA system; (2) to avoid the systematic destruction of the rights and freedoms of the poor of which I speak in my letters and requests to the ECHR; (3) to fight more effectively against the corruption and clutter of justice; (4) to make better use of the most advanced technologies [AI ..., see Task force on justice report, PJ no 83, ch. 5], and to provide new functionalities allowing us (a) to optimize the legal aid and justice systems and (b) to fight more effectively against organized and transnational crime and terrorism (…); (5) to transfer knowledge and advanced computer systems (and technologies) to poor countries; and (6) to allow rich countries to fulfill part of their ODA obligations while solving one of their important problems, and, of course also, to help countries to achieve the SDG (especially targets 1, 10 , 16, and 17). This solution has many advantages both at the level of the legal aid offices (LAO), which judges legal aid requests, and of the lawyers who defend the poor, I will only summarize them here.

b) The advantages of using a single LAO under the responsibility of the State and the OHCHR.

56. For the legal aid office (LAO), first of all, having a single LAO at the national level will make it possible to have judges specialized (1) in the judgment of LA requests and (2) in the field of mediation, and judges (a) who help to resolve cases with mediation before they are presented to the courts or the prosecutor's office in the criminal field; and (b) who, if mediation is not possible, monitor the cases before the various courts and throughout the proceedings; that is to say that it will possibly (often) be the same judge who will judge the LA request for a procedure in 1st instance (to the TA,), and then for the possible presentation of an appeal (to the CAA,), of a supreme court petition (CE, CC, CCo), and even possibly of a request to the ECHR [the judge should also try to resolve the cases amicably before the appeal, the supreme court's petition (...), if possible]. Such an organization should: (a) help decrease the workload of the various jurisdictions by using mediation as much as possible to resolve disputes [22% of cases tried in France every year have at least one party having LA]; (b) allow the use of a unique working methodology for judges (and advanced technologies, **no 55**); (c) simplify the judgments of LA requests at higher levels of jurisdiction because the judges who will be called upon to judge LA requests for an appeal or a supreme court petition, will have already studied the files and cases of the LA applicants when he/she judged the LA requests for the lower level courts; (d) reduce or rather minimize the operating cost of the legal aid offices (LAO), in particular by pooling management and IT expenses (...) with other countries. Also, one of the objectives of the national LAO is to significantly improve the quality of LA decisions, that is to say that LA judges can and should do what is currently planned, but is never done, an instruction of the LA request (collect documents and information, hear the parties present ...) to try to resolve the cases amicably if possible, and, if not, render LA decisions that are well motivated and precise, and that will decrease the risk of losing the attorneys fees for the state. Another important advantage of the creation of a national LAO (and a group of lawyers specializing in LA), is linked (a) to the improvement of our LA and justice information system in general, (b) to the improvement of the evaluation of the costs of LA [currently we cannot calculate the total cost of the LA system in France and the detailed costs (management, fees, transport, etc.), in fact we know next to nothing except that lawyers supposedly give billions of euros in gifts to the state and the poor every year, which is wrong, of course], (c) better coordination with other information systems of the justice ministry, and (d) better use of expenditure mitigation mechanisms (R2 PJ 32, no 21-22, PJ no 39.2, no 27-31, R1 PJ 40, no 73-95,).

c) The advantages of creating a group of civil servant lawyers specializing in LA missions.

57. The creation of a group of civil servant lawyers specializing in LA would first of all guarantee the respect of poor constitutional rights, - which is not currently the case (as explained in my QPCs, my requests to the ECHR and my previous letters, and for various reasons) -, while (1) minimizing the total LA expenditure and management expenditure, and (2) maximizing (or optimizing) the use of expenditure mitigation mechanisms and revenues to reduce public expenditure. The respect of the constitutional rights of the poor will be the consequence of, among other things: (a) the establishment of a (single) working methodology for the lawyers in charge of the LA missions, of a system to control the quality of the work done by the lawyer, and a computer

system allowing the recording of the work done and the detailed monitoring of this work; (b) the possibility of having the work of lawyers with less than 5 years of experience supervised by an experienced lawyer; (c) the allocation of more difficult cases to more experienced lawyers, and therefore the possibility of having several levels of *unit of value*, which was impossible with the old French LA system (and of paying lawyers according to their skills and experience); (d) the creation of a grid of the time necessary to resolve the different types of cases much more precise than the one we have now (and which takes into account the competence and experience of lawyers and the factual and legal difficulties of cases, see R1 PJ 40, no 73-95); (e) reducing conflicts of interest linked to the use of independent lawyers; and (f) the fact that the lawyers (paid regularly) will not have to advance money to LA clients. And the optimization of the total expenditure of the LA will be the consequence of, among others: (a) the possibility of establishing precisely the total cost of LA [all management costs (including travel expenses, secretarial, IT,); the costs of adjudicating LA requests (judges' salaries, etc.); and lawyers' fees to the nearest cent], which the Court of Auditors recommends - rightly - to evaluate (R2 PJ 33); and (b) the possibility of pooling management expenses more effectively (IT, etc.), in particular by developing the IT system to help lawyers defend the poor, and the system for monitoring the work of lawyers that I recommend, and by using advanced technologies (**no 55**) and video conferencing systems to communicate with courts and judges (as it is already happening in the US,) and with offenders in prisons to minimize costs and travel expenses; (c) the possibility of generating income with certain cases (by taking a percentage of the compensations obtained as is done in the USA in certain cases) and of maximizing the use of expenditure mitigation mechanisms [more mediation (…); more frequent repayments of the LA by the losing party…]; and (d) the possibility of simplifying the payment of lawyers [in France instead of 1 million LA assignments paid to more than 25,000 lawyers, we would have 12 salaries / year paid to around 8,000 lawyers!].

[**58.** Parenthesis. The speakers of the parliamentary fact-finding mission (PJ no 38, p. 87-90, R1 PJ 40, no 91) spoke of the lack of professional interest (and little career prospect) that this group of lawyers specialized in the LA would have for lawyers (young or others), but while it is true that the cases' types that the LA lawyers will have to defend are limited to the cases of the poor, which are not necessarily very interesting cases for a young lawyer or others (criminal defense of delinquent, drug cases, divorces, conflicts over the payment of social minima ..., no merger and acquisition cases ...), there are also sometimes cases more complex in terms of law and facts, and which entail serious prejudices (such as my criminal case against the CA described in the letter of 23-11-20, PJ no 2, no 31-55). In addition, there is likely to be more and more group actions involving the poor (class action in English, I believe), and the young LA lawyers could follow the cases up to the supreme court (CC, CE,) and have the help of other more experienced lawyers. Also, the career possibilities would be interesting, especially for those who speak other languages, because if many countries use the same LA system and if the OHCHR supervises the system with the states in each country, it will be possible for lawyers from a country to go and work in other countries, and to gain experience in justice systems in other countries and in (the legal aspect of) the fight against poverty, against delinquency (...). Careers at the UN (OHCHR,) will also be possible. There are still several billion poor people in the world, and the fight against poverty and inequality remains and will remain an important and complex problem to solve for many years to come, so the LA lawyers and judges will play an important role and will be of great benefit to society and the United Nations.].

d) The advantages linked to the development of the 2 global IT applications.

59. The development of 2 global IT applications, (1) an application to manage LA requests and help judges judge them, and (2) an application to help lawyers manage their LA cases, would allow us to record the time spent on each LA request and case by the LA judge of the national LAO and by the LA lawyer

specializing in LA, and therefore calculate the average time that judges take to judge a LA request and to resolve the poor people's cases with mediation, and that lawyers take to resolve the poor people's cases for each type of cases (taking into account the skill and experience of lawyers and judges and the factual and legal difficulty of the cases). The development of these 2 global applications would also allow us to create (1) *an international classification and codification of all cases* that are presented to justice (in each country and) each year, (2) databases of cases tried and of poor parties to cases, including delinquents and criminals (which are essential to more easily control the work done by LA judges and lawyers and to fight against organized and transnational crime, and terrorism ...), and (3) management data (which are essential for improving our justice and police systems, etc.); It is therefore ***a (cross-pillars) data action*** (**no 62**) that fits well into the UN Data Strategy (PJ no 55). (1) If we want to verify and control the quality of the work done by LA judges and lawyers, (2) if we want to find the best way to optimize our justice and police systems, and better fight against the corruption and clutter of justice, (3) if we want to make useful comparisons with other countries, and (4) if we want our researchers and experts to be able to analyze the harmful behavior of delinquents (and criminals, ...) and find the best ways to correct them (...), we need (to save the documents related to each case, and to record the time spent in judging cases..., and) to have (a) *a classification and an international codification of types of cases*, (b) a database of all LA cases, and (c) an accurate estimate of the average time that LA judges spend to judge LA requests or to resolve each type of cases with mediation and lawyers spend to defend each type of cases (depending on the experience and knowledge of the LA judge and lawyer, and the legal and factual complexity of cases ...); and, more generally, and in the longer term, one needs to have an accurate estimate of the average time that all judges spend adjudicating claims for each type of cases (depending on the experience of the judge and of the technical and factual complexity of the cases…). And, of course, the cost of justice being considerable, the possibility of reducing the costs of justice by pooling the significant management expenses (IT, etc.) is also an obvious advantage of the development of the same computer system used by a large number of countries.

e) The benefits of a global approach involving the UN Security Council.

60. Finally, I would like now to talk about a benefit of the global approach involving the UN Security Council that I had not talked about in my previous letters and which, however, is not negligible. Indeed, as we have seen it above and in my previous letters, there are certain systemic justice problems which are difficult to resolve at the national level, not only because of the significant cost of the necessary reforms, but also because of the (a) the sensitive nature of the subject, (b) the advantages that certain groups derive from current justice systems (lawyers, politicians, magistrates,), (c) the large number of years of existence of certain justice systems, and (d) the political weight of lawyers in parliaments in particular; and, in such a context, the participation of the Security Council in the project (as project manager in a way) has a clear advantage. For example, in France and the USA, at least, lawyers are probably the profession most represented in parliaments; many professions are represented in the American Congress and in the French national assembly and senate [heads of companies or entrepreneurs, doctors, nurses, journalists, civil servants,

teachers or researchers,], but I think that the profession of lawyer is the one which has the most representatives [I did not make a precise account, of course, but by reading at random the CVs of the members of these 2 parliaments, it seems obvious]. This is not surprising because lawyers are experts in law; moreover, it is a liberal profession that can easily be exercised at the same time as a political commitment [local or other, see (PJ no 78) the example of Mr. Copé, who, in 2019, earned 97,167 euros per year as mayor of a city, and 1,284 million euros as lawyer; in 2016, he was an MP and presidential candidate, and as a part-time lawyer he earned 3-4 times his salary as an MP.].

61. And this fact makes justice reforms more difficult because these lawyer politicians tend to firmly defend the (undue) advantages acquired by the profession; this can be clearly seen in France, numerous official reports mention the hostility of lawyers to any reform of the LA law which proposes to use a group of civil servant lawyers to ensure the LA missions [see **no 22**], and the group of specialized-to-the-supreme-courts lawyers has existed for over 200 years (since 1805, I believe), while this monopoly is totally unjustified, insulting, and an invitation to corruption. In the United States, we have seen that the computer systems are more efficient than in France and at the ECHR, but the way of judging cases, in particular at the Supreme Court, does not change much, if not at all. For example, the number of Supreme Court justices (9) has not changed since around 1860 when the population has increased tenfold or more, and over 95% of decisions remain summary decisions ('*the petition is denied*'). The study (a) of the situation related to the crime against humanity that I have described, and (b) of the proposals to improve the LA systems in the world and our international justice information system that I made, by the Security Council would allow the Council to make recommendations on these subjects which would help all countries to reform their legal aid systems and, more generally and in the longer term, their entire justice system. For example, one of the advantages of the new LA system is the development of a single working methodology for all LA lawyers, and, I think this phase could allow the Security Council to clarify the role of lawyers in society or to redefine the limits of solicitor-client privilege and to make recommendations to UN member countries on this subject. Finally (as explained in the letter of 23-11-20), the experience acquired on this project will be useful to the UN and its member states because it will make it easier to develop other similar global systems to improve - at a lower cost - the functioning of administrations in other fields and thus help all countries to achieve their international and national objectives.

f) A (cross-pillars) data action, reports and study by the UN, the World Bank and the Task Force on Justice.

62. The proposal to develop a new LA system (...) is ***a (cross-pilars) data action*** which fits well into ***the UN data strategy*** because it allows us to generate useful data in different important-for-the-UN fields, human rights, peace and security, SDG, and to put in place analytical tools that increase the value of data for countries and the UN. For example, the system will calculate an average time that a lawyer spends defending a poor person in all types of court proceedings and depending on the factual and legal difficulty

of the cases, and the experience and knowledge of the LA lawyer, and this information is essential to monitor the work of the lawyer, to predict the cost of the procedures (in terms of lawyers' fees), and to judge the efficiency of the system from one country to another (and similar statistics will also be calculated on the work of LAO judges). Greater the number of cases adjudicated is, the more accurate the estimate of the time spent and the cost of cases will be. Also, the classification and codification of the types of cases judged will eventually allow us to develop similar global computer systems to record the documents of all cases (not just those of the poor under LA), the time spent on cases and the names of parties (including names of offenders and criminals, which are vital information to fight transnational and organized crime ...). Finally, the UN and all the governments of member countries are well aware of the difficulty of (and the cost of) setting up an effective LA system, and the importance that a successful LA system can play in achieving the SDGs and in maintaining international peace and security; in 2012, resolution 67-187 (PJ no 84) defined standards on this LA subject; in 2016, the UNDP and UNODC presented their (very detailed …) global study on LA systems around the world (report PJ no 81, country profile PJ no 85) highlighting, among other things, the importance of improving the quality of the service provided through LA systems; and in 2019 the Task force on justice issued a report (PJ no 83) pointing out the justice gap [244 million people are in what they call extreme conditions of injustice, 1.5 billion people cannot solve their daily justice problems, and 4.4 billion people are excluded from the opportunities that the law brings (!)], and the World Bank made a study on the cost benefit of LA systems (PJ no 82) stressing that the benefits of legal aid far outweigh the cost of the service [page 40 '*this report summarizes the results of around 50 cost benefit analysis conducted around the world. ... the results from the survey* ***suggest overwhelmingly that the benefit of legal aid investments greatly outweigh the costs***'.], but this should not prevent us from seeking to minimize costs while maximizing the quality of the service rendered. The proposal, which I am presenting to you and which would help all countries (rich and poor), therefore responds to an obvious need that has been well identified and well documented by the United Nations and the World Bank. And it is important to note that this proposal does not prevent foundations or private funds (...) from participating in the financing of legal aid granted to the poor as is already happening in many countries.

2) The 2016 Proposals' Platform (presented in the context of my informal candidacy for the UNSG position).

63. The proposal to develop global Internet applications (to help us solve some specific problems) mentioned above, was one of the main proposals of my 2016 platform presented as part of my informal candidacy for the post of UN Secretary General (see vision statement, PJ no 45 , and informal candidacy, PJ no 41); So I would now like to go back briefly to my 2016 vision statement, before commenting on the UN recent work and Mr. Guterres's vision statement.

The general strategy and specific actions of my 2016 platform.

64. The vision statement presented (1) a general 3-point strategy: (a) to put the Internet at the center of our efforts to solve our global problems and to achieve the SDGs; (b) pay more attention to what is happening in rich countries, in particular to use the knowledge that the rich countries have acquired to improve our administrative, justice,

economic processes (...) and to develop global applications that can be used by all the countries; and (c) use our information society more effectively, while addressing the psychological and systemic problems that cause poverty (…); and (2) several specific actions: (a) the creation of the new international organization dedicated to the Internet [in particular in charge of Internet governance, the development and maintenance of global computer (Internet) applications that can help us solve certain problems, and the transfer of information technologies to poor countries]; (b) research and development of the alternative to market capitalism [the objective is to develop an economic system (i) which pays each person in relation to their relative contribution to the progress and proper functioning of society, (ii) which respects human rights and helps to fight against global warming (...), and (iii) which facilitates convergence]; (c) improving our justice systems in rich countries and indirectly in all countries, including poor countries [the aim is to build more efficient and less costly justice processes and systems that can be used by all countries, and in the first place to develop a new LA system which respects the fundamental rights of the poor… which is essential to achieve our objectives]; (d) the development of several global applications which will help us to solve certain global problems [notably the application necessary to implement fairer pricing system for websites which takes into account the use of resources and the revenues and profits generated by this use …]; (e) launching the necessary efforts to reach a legally binding agreement not only on the climate, but also on the SDGs (notably on poverty eradication); and (f) strengthening and broadening inter-religious dialogue.

The importance of paying more attention to what is going on in rich countries.

65. On reading the remarks on the political dimension, on the national and international consequences of my accusations of crime against humanity of persecution (linked to the dishonest LA law and OHL...) against French (political…) leaders [**no 30-51**], and on my proposals to improve LA system at the global level [**no 54-62**], my proposal to pay more attention to what is happening in rich countries takes on its full significance, not just to use the knowledge and skills and experience acquired in rich countries to develop (a) new administrative, justice, economic (...) more efficient and less expensive systems, and (b) global Internet applications making it possible to implement these new systems anywhere in the world at lower cost; but also because of the integrity problems at the level of the French state [fraud of the judges to prevent the judgment of the QPCs on the LA law, silence of the politicians (Presidents, members of the government deputies, senators,) on the dishonesty of the LA system ...] and the consequences that these problems have had (and have) at the national and international level, and the reactions from certain international bodies such as the OHCHR (UN), and the COE (CEDH,). I would like to remind you that France waited 24 years and May 3, 1974 before ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights, to, according to some experts, avoid being prosecuted for the torture of French army in Algeria, and avoid having to grant human rights to the populations of its (African,) colonies (!); the bad faith, dishonesty and the desire to deprive millions of poor of their fundamental rights of French politicians, judges, and lawyers (in the LA field) are therefore not without precedent; and, as my letter of 10-7-20 explains it, many high-level politicians have been convicted in corruption scandals ... (fictitious jobs, travel expenses, ...) and have taken advantage of the dishonesty of the LA law to escape prosecution.

E Comments on recent UN work and Mr. Guterres's vision statement.

66. I would now like to (1) put the various subjects discussed above in the context of (a) the recent UN work, (b) Mr. Guterres' vision statement (PJ no 54), and (c) your work on the UN Secretary General selection process; and (2) explain (a) why the new elements and arguments brought above confirm that some of my proposals could fit into the UN strategy (or vision or work plan) for the 5-10 years to come, and would play a key role in helping countries achieve their 2030 goals (...); (b) why and how Mr. Guterres's vision statement could be improved; and (c) why my application for the CITO position is useful and would help countries achieve their goals. I'm not going through the different topics in the order Mr. Guterres used in his vision statement, but I will cover most of the topics he touched on.

1) The report on digital transformation and Mr. Guterres' proposals in this area.

a) The high level experts do not propose to create a new IO dedicated to the Internet.

67. The report of the high-level experts (2019, PJ no 56) does not propose (a) to create a new international organization dedicated to the Internet (in charge of the Internet governance…, see details in PJ no 44, no 17-24, PJ no 50, no 73-79), and (b) to develop global Internet applications necessary to solve certain common and specific problems, to strengthen cooperation in the digital space [between governments, the private sector, the civil society, international organizations, academic institutions, the technical community and other stakeholders]; and this despite the many advantages that these 2 proposals present for all countries, and the capital role they would play: (i) to improve (and reduce the cost of) the functioning of the Internet, (ii) to fight against cybercrime, (iii) to reduce the digital divide, (iv) to accelerate and succeed the UN data strategy ('*to ensure that everyone, everywhere can discover, access, integrate years share the data they need*', to create data to better understand *'what happened', why it happened ',' what may happen next ',' how to respond*'), (v) to strengthen international cooperation, and (vi) to help countries achieve their 2030 goals and to maintain international peace and security. And it presents 3 different solutions that, I think, will not sufficiently strengthen international cooperation in the digital space and allow the Internet to be used more effectively to solve the global problems that the UN needs to solve, and to help countries to achieve their 2030 targets.

68. The development of global Internet applications is not technically necessarily dependent on the creation of a new Internet IO, I think, but, in the long term, it might be useful to give the responsibility for the development and maintenance of these global Internet applications to the new Internet IO; moreover, the creation of a new IO dedicated to the governance of the Internet (…) presents many advantages independent from the fact that it would facilitate the (and could be responsible for) the development and the maintenance of global applications allowing to solve specific problems. In my letters of 11-4-16 (PJ no 41, no 9-11), of 23-8-16 (PJ no 44, no 17-24), and of 8-12-17 (PJ no 50, no 73-79), I have described in detail the many benefits associated with building a new Internet IO [(a) improving the - and accurately estimating and reducing the cost of - running the Internet, (b) developing a more efficient information system linked to the Internet, (c) implementation of

a new pricing system for websites (depending on the use of Internet resources, on the income and profits generated by the use of the Internet, ...) generating significant revenues, (d) fighting more effectively against cybercrime, (e) improvement of services provided to large companies, (f) reduction of the digital divide…; and the development of a new pricing system for websites and the improvement of the Internet-related information system would also be a (cross-pillars) data action that would generate vital information in different areas], so I won't go over these advantages here, but I would like to talk about the disadvantages of this solution which I did not mention [because they were (are) implicit…], and present some advantages that I had not mentioned before.

b) The disadvantages of creating a new Internet IO.

69. A major (but not insurmountable) drawback of the creation of a new international organization dedicated to the Internet is, I think, that this solution would necessarily entail a kind of 'nationalization' (or transfer) (1) of associations (non-profit) or activities of such associations which are related to the operation of the Internet [ICANN, Internet Systems Consortium, ISOC, IAB, IETF, IANA,], and (2) activities (a) of private companies [Verisign, Cogent communications, registrars and registries ...], (b) of universities (USC, University of Maryland), (c) of private organizations [RIPE NCC,], and (d) of American (and other countries) government agencies [NASA, Defense Information system agency, US Army research lab], which allow the Internet to function, in particular the activities related to the functioning of the DNS root servers, to the management of domain names, to the collection of the fees for having a websites (…); and that the (or inter) nationalization (or transfer) of these entities - or of the activities of these entities linked to the functioning of the Internet - to bring them together within the same organization, would surely represent a significant cost [Verisign has a capitalization of $ 20 billion in 2020, a turnover of $ 1.2 billion in 2019, a profit of $ 612 million in 2019, and 872 employees in 2019, I believe, but all of it activities may not be directly related to the operation of the Internet], and would (probably) lead to job losses, even if a significant number of employees could be immediately hired by this new IO dedicated to the Internet [since the objective is, among other things, to simplify the organization - and lowering the cost - of operating the Internet]. I understand that this inconvenience is necessarily a delicate subject for many, especially in the USA, but the advantages gained thanks to this solution are so considerable that the refusal to consider and evaluate this solution into more detail is a serious fault for the world, including for the USA.

c) Many international organizations have been created with the aim of promoting international cooperation.

70. I would like to stress that all international organizations were created with the aim (among others or exclusively) (1) of promoting (or playing an active role in strengthening) cooperation in their fields of activity (Interpol, IMF, UN,), (2) to raise the quality level of services provided to populations in their fields of activity (WHO,), and (3) to be centers for harmonizing the actions of nations; and, in the field of the Internet, it would be the same, the new IO dedicated to the governance of the Internet would bring many advantages and would allow us to promote cooperation in the field of the Internet and to reduce the

digital divide, among other advantages; and this is probably why, during the debates on this subject (at the UN, ITU,) many countries supported the idea of giving more control over the Internet to the UN (and governments in general) [for example, in 2012, at the telecommunication conference, 89 states were in favor of giving more control to the UN, and 55 against or undecided (mainly the USA and Europe; my letter of 23-8 -16, PJ no 44, no 2-16 , referring to a US Congressional research paper on Internet governance written by M. Kruger, PJ no 47.2 , discusses in detail the different views expressed during the different debates), but the benefits I have described have never been publicly discussed]. I'm not criticizing the way the Internet was created, including the initial use of a multistakeholder model, but now we can do better, I believe; and it is urgent to do better. Giving the management of .com .tv domain names (…) to a private company, it's a bit like if the American tax service asked a private company to collect the tax returns from McDonald's, Burger King and Domino's Pizza, and check that all the pages have been completed before sending them to the tax service (not checking if the information is correct); and in return gave this private company 50% of the income tax paid by these 3 companies each year (!); after a while someone in the tax department would say, '*but why don't we collect these tax returns ourselves, we could keep all the taxes paid each year by these different companies*' (!); and the politicians would probably say that this employee is right, and they would change the system and the law allowing it.

d) Mr. Guterres's vision for the Internet and Information Technology.

71. Mr. Guterres' vision in the field of Internet and information technologies is to ensure the implementation of the digital cooperation action plan of 29 May 2020 (PJ no 58), including to advocate for more orderly and efficient governance of the Internet and cyberspace, and overcome the digital divide; but to put in place more efficient and orderly governance of the Internet (and cyberspace), and to overcome the digital divide (and '*connecting the remaining 4 billion people to the Internet by 2030*'), the creation of a new international organization charged with governing the Internet, and the development (and maintenance) of global applications to solve certain problems (...), are (very) important, I think. So at the same time as the Internet Governance Forum discusses about the problems, I advise the UN member states, and in particular the USA and Mr. Biden, (1) to ask the secretariat to do a detailed analysis of the solution to create a new IO dedicated to the Internet described above [including an analysis of the costs (notably of the resumption of activities of commercial enterprises which participate in the operation of the Internet) and of the associated revenues or gains; specifications of the new system of tariffs for websites,], and (2) to encourage the member states of the Security Council to launch the project which I have presented to improve the LA systems around the world which puts forward the important (not to say capital) role that global computer applications can play in solving certain problems of humanity.

72. Also, the UN presented its data strategy and highlighted the important role that data can play to make better decisions and help achieve our goals, but, as explained in the data strategy on page 6 (PJ no 55), '*This is not a digital strategy to advance digitization of our process and service. We will need that*'; and to

set up a data strategy without planning at the same time to develop global IT applications (like the ones I proposed to develop), it's a bit like walking on one leg, we go slower and it's more tiring and less comfortable because the vast majority of data is created, calculated, saved, transmitted or published using computer applications, and organizing the development of global Internet applications to solve specific problems that countries have to solve, would allow us to generate data and analysis tools to increase their values, and to help achieve the data strategy faster, and would be of considerable use to the UN and its member countries [the responsibilities of the CITO position include to lead the 'design and implementation of the digital elements of the UN Data strategy', it seems, PJ no 79]. If I was chosen for the CITO position (and member countries wished it, and as I mentioned above), I could (supervise the drafting and) present to you: (1) specifications for the new LA system and the 2 global applications to implement it and work with the Security Council (and the UNGA) on this project; (2) a detailed analysis of the proposal to create a new dedicated Internet IO [in particular, (a) a precise assessment of the costs, gains and potential losses of jobs (…), a more detailed analysis of the benefits associated with the creation of this IO, and (b) an organization proposal (number of employees, etc., functional organization chart of the new IO,)]; (3) specifications of the new pricing system for websites (...) before the end of the first year; and (4) a (proposed) list of global IT applications to be developed in various areas of importance to the UN and its members states, before the end of the 3rd year of office. Assigning this job to the CITO position would slightly expand the responsibilities of the position (as outlined in the job posting, PJ no 79), but to help countries meet their 2030 goals, maintain peace and security, and respect for human rights is an important function of the United Nations, and better use of the Internet can play a vital role in helping the United Nations to fulfill this function, so it is is a logical development consistent with the crucial role that the Internet and computer applications play in the advancement of society.

2) The proposals of Mr. Guterres in the field of the maintenance of peace and international security.

73. Mr. Guterres plans, among other things, (1) to continue working (a) with member countries (i) to improve the UN's capacity to address the various causes of conflict and (ii) to seek more investment in the prevention of crises; and (b) with the Security Council to mobilize greater support for political solutions to some protracted conflicts; (2) to develop *a new vision for future peace operations, improving actions for peacekeeping, peace support, and protection of civilians ...* '; and (3) to promote '*meaningful participation of women and young people in the peace process, including putting women at the center of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and mediation efforts, and increasing the number of women peace guardians*'. I agree that it is important (a) to improve the UN's capacity to prevent crises and conflicts (*to maintain international peace and security*), (b) to invest more in the prevention of crises, and (c) to promote the meaningful participation of women (and young people) in the peace process, but I still believe (1) that the world has at its disposal a technology, the Internet, which has incredible (almost infinite) possibilities to help all countries to solve their administrative, justice, police,

economic problems, ... at a lower cost [the project to improve the LA systems around the world (which I presented to you) is an obvious example of this fact]; and (2) that if countries and the UN do not make the necessary efforts to use this technology to the best of their ability, and, among other things, to develop global applications that help all countries at the same time to solve certain specific problems (which they have in common) at a lower cost, they will not demonstrate their will to make peace, to maintain international peace and security, to put in place an effective conflict prevention strategy, and help countries achieve their 2030 goals. So the first thing to do *to maintain international peace and security* and to prevent future conflicts is to have a strategy to make a better use of the Internet, and, among other things, to take advantage of the possibility that the Internet offers us *to develop global computer applications that can help us solve specific problems common to all countries*.

74. If countries cooperate more in many areas to develop global applications and to set up identical systems and standards that are more efficient and less expensive, they decrease the chances of conflicts emerging, especially if the new systems they develop (a) accelerate poverty eradication, (b) facilitate respect for human rights, and (c) improve the functioning and integrity of institutions. Once again, the creation of a new Internet IO responsible for the governance of the Internet, and the development of global applications helping to solve certain specific problems would make it possible to reduce the digital divide, improve justice systems at a lower cost, and better fight against cybercrime, among others, so they would play a vital role in the maintenance of international peace and security and the prevention of conflicts. Moreover, as M. Guterres explains it (at PJ no 54, p. 12): '*we know that within a decade, national security will be more about data, critical infrastructure and cyber than about tanks, guns and soldiers*', therefore we must prepare, and a better governance of the Internet (managed by a new Internet IO) which would improve the functioning of the Internet, develop an efficient Internet information system, and fight against cybercrime, would help solve a large number of problems that countries will encounter in 10 years, and would play a significant role in the maintenance of peace and international security, so the feasibility study of this project that I have presented above should be part of the UN strategy, and as we saw it above, I could supervise this study if I were chosen to the position of CITO.

3) The call to action for human rights.

75. In his call for action in favor of human rights (PJ no 64, EN PJ no 63), Mr. Guterres explains, among other things, on page 3 that '*Human rights are universal and indivisible. We must see human rights with a vision that speaks to each and every human being and encompasses all rights: economic; social; cultural; civil and political.', 'Our efforts must be characterized by the highest standards of integrity, impartiality and independence, based on evidence and norms, and guided by the voices of those whose rights are affected. 'Our purpose is, above all, to have a positive impact. This means being open to all available channels and opportunities to engage. There is a place for negotiations behind the scenes, a place for building and strengthening national capacities, a place*

for supporting different stakeholders, and a time when speaking out is essential.'; and on page 5 '*Continue our efforts to help design policies that support the most vulnerable and/or excluded groups, recognizing and responding to multiple and intersecting deprivations and sources of discrimination that limit opportunities and make it harder to escape poverty, live with dignity and enjoy human rights on a healthy planet*'. To publicly denounce the dishonesty of the LA law in France (and the dishonest behavior of politicians, high judges and lawyers who have maintained the LA law for so long, of the ECHR, the OHCHR and the COE ...) and realize my proposal to improve the LA (and justice) systems around the world, would therefore fit perfectly into the call to action in favor of human rights of Mr. Guterres, because, among other reasons, **it would** break the silence on this subject of the dishonest LA law in France for 30 years (and on the 1.5 billion people who cannot solve their daily justice problem ..., see the figures of *the Task force on justice* at **no 62**), and strengthen national capacities in the field of justice (and respect for human rights), and help the most vulnerable or excluded groups. More generally (and as we saw it above), the Internet offers (almost unlimited) possibilities to improve our justice systems at a lower cost (and therefore to advance respect for human rights around the world); and it allows us to have a global vision of our (and to develop) justice information systems, and case management systems which includes also international courts of justice such as the ECHR, and therefore to improve the functioning and efficiency of justice in all countries and at the international level at a lower cost; not to mention fighting more effectively against crime in general and organized and transnational crime and terrorism in particular. If I was chosen to the position of CITO, I could work with the Security Council (and the UNGA) on this subject of the LA law and present precise specifications for the development of the new LA system … (no 72) .

4) Mr. Guterres' proposals on gender equality.

76. Mr. Guterres writes on page 10 (PJ no 54): '*the inequalities and discrimination which afflict women and girls are perhaps the most damning of injustices*'; and I agree that these inequalities and violence against women are a (very) serious injustice that must be addressed and corrected as soon as possible; and the 193 member countries of the UN think so too, I believe, since they have reserved a specific objective of the SDGs (obj. no. 5) for this problem, but this serious problem should not make us forget that there is still has a large number of people (including women and girls) living in extreme poverty [number that could increase by 100 million (or even much more) due to the Covid 19 epidemic according to various estimates (World Bank and UNDP)], and that there are also an even greater number of people (including women and girls) living in poverty, and that the suffering associated with extreme poverty and hunger is also overwhelming injustices for the 193 member countries of the UN. The fight against poverty and extreme poverty is closely linked to the fight against global warming, so we must be careful that a polarization on the problem of gender inequalities and violence against women is not used to raise our guard

in the fight against poverty to give rich countries more time to act on the climate and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.

77. The SDGs are indivisible, a bit like human rights, and when Mr. Guterres says in his '*Women and Power*' speech (PJ no 62) '*Gender equality is the prerequisite for a better world*', this is only partially true, the achievement of all SDGs is '*the prerequisite for a better world*'. For example, Mr. Guterres explains that "*137 women around the world are killed by a family member every day.*" Then immediately after "*the impunity rate is over 95% in some countries*"; of course, it is a grave, shameful and unacceptable injustice, but an injustice which is partly due to the fact that the violent behavior which it puts forward, is not punished by justice because of the lack of effective justice and police systems (of effective institutions) and appropriate laws to punish this behavior, so if we want to reduce violence against women, we must significantly improve our justice (and police) systems, and therefore achieve objective 16 (ensure access to justice for all and set up effective institutions, etc.). And when Mr. Guterres and Ms. Bachelet remain silent on the dishonesty of the LA law in France and on my proposals to improve the LA systems around the world, while, at the same time, they officially seek to stop violence against women (including poor women), they do not help women and do not fight effectively against violence against women! Also, the people who died or were amputated of a limb or traumatized (a) in the trenches between France and Germany between 1914 and 1918, (b) on the beaches of Normandy in 1944 (…), were mostly men; rigorous feminists may not see this as yet another serious injustice made to women, but rigorous intellectuals may infer (1) that men are also victims of most of the causes of violence against women identified or not by Mr. Guterres (male dominated world, patriarchy, macho posturing, religious extremism ...), and that they also suffer from our violent world, and (2) that many men have paid with their lives to defend freedoms and rights from which women benefit today, and therefore that, in addition to specific actions taken in favor of women, combating violence in our societies (our world) in general would also help to reduce violence against women [we must show more intellectual rigor and integrity to achieve Gender equality and to end violence against women]. Also, the fight against inequalities and, for me, *the search for an alternative to market capitalism* would also make it possible to achieve Gender equality more quickly, as we will see now.

5) Mr. Guterres' proposals for achieving the SDGs and the "Nelson Mandela Lecture".

78. Concerning the SDGs, the Secretary General called for a general mobilization to reach the SDGs, and a call all the more important given that the serious consequences of Covid 19 have made us go back in the field of poverty and many other areas as well [see no 75]; and he plans to '*redouble efforts to defend equality between states and to promote social cohesion, equality, and non-discrimination on all fronts within society: gender, racial equality, orientation sexuality, protection of minorities, fight against poverty and misery, refugee support for displaced people, migrants, and people without status*'. And I agree with him when he writes that '*education and digital technologies are 2 enablers and equalizers*', and that

‘*the implementation of SDGs requires massive investments and a new approach to fund it*’; This is why, among other things, the proposal to develop global computer applications to help us solve specific problems (like the proposal to improve LA systems) that I am making, is so important. This proposal allows rich countries to meet their ODA obligations and to transfer technology and knowledge to poor countries while solving their own national problems, so it is a win-win situation. This will not solve all the problems, so we should not stop all the efforts currently being made, but the potential gains are many and significant, so we cannot ignore them. Mr. Guterres also speaks of inequalities (in his '*Nelson Mandela Lecture* ', PJ no 61.2) and of '*the importance of making the fight against inequalities a central issue so that the new globalization is fairer, more inclusive, sustainable, and people-centered*'. To effectively fight against inequalities (of wages, of wealth,) and to facilitate convergence, we absolutely must find *an alternative to our current economic system* (*market capitalism*) which is the main cause of inequalities (of wages and wealth).

79. We saw it again clearly during the Covid 19 pandemic, the fortunes of Mr. Besos, Mr. Musk and Mr. Arnault increased by 80 billion dollars (or almost) in a year, and more generally the fortune (and the number of) billionaires have also increased, while millions of people have lost their jobs, a large number of businesses have gone bankrupt, and between 100 and 500 million people could fall into poverty; and the economic system is primarily responsible for this situation. Of course, we can increase taxes for the rich as it is done by Mr. Biden, among others, but it is above all a good short-term solution (which is politically unstable ..., and) which should not prevent us from finding an ideal long-term solution (for several reasons, PJ no 50, no 80-83); the economic system must remunerate all people more precisely according to their relative contribution to the progress and proper functioning of society. I am not questioning the multiple talents of Mr. Musk, Mr. Besos (…), but the leaders of countries, large administrations, international organizations (like the UN), judges (…) also have very complex and difficult jobs which require multiple talents, and which deserve to be remunerated according to the multiple talents which they request and the contributions relating to the progress and the good functioning of society which they have. And, more generally, most jobs become more complex like the work of police officers who risk their lives and, at the same time, must show restraint when they arrest people who are sometimes very violent. Of course, the search for the alternative to market capitalism is a complex job which requires, I think, to have much better information systems at the national and international level; this is also why, among other things, I think the proposals to create a new IO dedicated to Internet governance and to develop global Internet applications (similar to those related to the new LA system) to solve certain problems specific and common to all countries, are so important. If I were chosen to the position of CITO, I could work on a detailed strategy to improve our international economic and financial information systems and to develop global computer applications to solve specific problems in these areas.

6) Mr. Guterres' proposals in the area of climate change and environmental protection.

80. On these questions, Mr. Guterres '*State of the Planet*' speech highlights the many problems that we must solve to achieve the objectives that we have no right to miss and that we did not yet arrive to respect [*biodiversity is collapsing, ecosystems are disappearing, deserts are spreading, wetlands are being lost, 10 million hectares of forests are lost every year,…, air and water pollution are killing 9 million people annually…*]; and in his vision, he again notes the need for massive investments in this area as well. All the solutions that make it possible to invest more massively in the serious problems of (a) environmental protection, (b) the fight against global warming, and (c) development (which are linked as the SDGs recognize it) are safe to take. As Mr. Guterres implies it, to decrease the tensions and the number of conflicts in the world in order to free up funds (by gradually decreasing the budgets of the ministries of defense), and our minds to focus more on the serious problems of the protection of the environment, the fight against global warming, and development (SDG) would be useful; and to strengthen international cooperation in the digital (Internet) field, to develop global applications to solve specific problems and help countries achieve the SDGs, and thereby decrease international tensions, and the number conflicts, of migrants and displaced people, are ways of freeing funds and our minds to focus on environmental, climate and development issues (...).

7) Conclusion on this part on the UNSG selection process.

81. I believe (1) that the Internet could be used more effectively to help countries achieve their 2030 goals and to maintain international peace and security, (2) that Mr. Guterres' vision in this area could be improved, and (3) that the UN should launch several projects to make better use of the Internet which could be overseen by the new CITO, so I am proposing them to you as part of my candidacy for the position of CITO.

a) My application for the position of CITO and the projects I am submitting to you.

82. If I were chosen for the position of CITO and if you so wished, in addition to performing the duties of the position described on the job advertisement [see PJ no 79, responsible for all OICT's activities, lead the formulation and implementation of the UN ICT strategy ...], I could present to you: before the end of the 1st year of function (1) detailed specifications of the new LA system and the 2 global applications necessary to implement it everywhere in the world (with cost estimates…); and (2) a detailed proposal (organization, cost, etc.) of the project to create a new international organization dedicated to Internet governance (and responsible for, among other duties, the proper functioning of the Internet, the development and maintenance of global Internet applications allowing us to solve specific problems common to all countries ...) including detailed specifications of the new pricing system for websites (which takes into account the use of resources ...), and the global computer application necessary to calculate this tariff and to

collect important information on owners of websites; and, before the end of the 3rd year in office, (3) a (proposed) list of global Internet applications to be developed in various areas of importance to the UN and its member countries [and which would be useful in solving specific problems, help countries achieve their 2030 objectives (...), and accelerate the implementation of the data strategy]; and a strategy to improve our international information systems in the economic and financial fields, which are important for considering the development of the alternative to market capitalism [assigning this work to the CITO position would slightly expand the responsibilities of the position described in the job offer (PJ no 79), but helping countries achieve their 2030 goals, maintain international peace and security, and respect human rights is the primary function of the United Nations and a better use of the Internet can play a vital role in helping the United Nations to fulfill these functions, so expanding the responsibilities of the information and communications technology office to - ultimately - create a new department is a logical development that would confirm the strategic role that the Internet and computer applications (Internet) have for the United Nations and the world]. Of course, if you think one or more of these projects are important to the United Nations and its member countries, I would be grateful if you recommended my candidacy for the CITO post to Mr. Guterres or his possible successor.

b) The merit of my accusations of crimes against humanity and my requests to the Security Council.

83. Before concluding, I must return briefly (1) to my charges of *crime against humanity of persecution*; and (2) on the request made to the Security Council (a) to organize a vote to transfer to the ICC the situation related to my charges, (b) to extend the period that the ICC must take into account for its investigation in order to be able to investigate before 2002 (and more precisely from 1991 to today), (c) to make recommendations to countries in the field of LA system, (d) to ask the UN secretariat to launch the project to create a new LA system and to develop the 2 applications necessary to implement it all over the world, and (e) to recommend my candidacy for the position of CITO to supervise this project. The fact that many countries do not do much better than France in the field of LA system (USA, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.) does not change (a) the seriousness of the faults and crimes linked to the dishonest LA law committed by the French leaders and high judges, among others, and (b) the merit of my charges of crimes against humanity of persecution (and of my accusations against the dishonest LA law ...); and the deliberately dishonest decisions of the ECHR (in 2016 and 2020, among others, **no 5-6, 12-14**), of the Court of Cassation (in 2019), and of the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat, CE) and the Constitutional Court (in 2016, **no 5-6**) on my proceedings denouncing the dishonesty of the LA law (...), the imprecise decision of the ICC (PJ no 0.4, see **no 48-51**), and the silence of Ms. Bachelet (and Mr. Forst) and Mr. Guterres on my accusations against the LA law (...) do not change the merits of my accusations against the LA law (...) and of crimes against humanity either; on the contrary, dishonest court decisions confirm their validity [why make decisions so dishonest, imprecise, and so absurd for some (…) if it is obvious that the LA system respects the rights of the poor!]. It is important to remember (1) that countries do not have international legal obligations to provide attorneys for the poor in areas other than criminal defense (so they cannot be held legally responsible for a faulty LA system in areas other than penal), but (2)

that France imposes on the poor (a) the dishonest obligations to have a lawyer in court (and the short deadlines in certain procedures), and, by the same token (b) the dishonest LA system which makes it possible to rob the poor systematically during justice proceedings (!), thus violating the rights of the poor knowingly, while claiming (officially) that it wants to respect them, in order to give undue advantages to politicians, lawyers and judges; and when a poor man explains the problem, the highest judges and politicians cheat and lie to ignore the accusations and maintain the undue advantages of the dishonest LA system, and this while the lawyers themselves have admitted that the system does not pay enough to defend the poor effectively and that the budget problem is only one of the many problems which affect the quality of the service rendered to the poor (!).

[**83.1** And of course, the constant political scandals for 30 years (Mr. Strauss-Khan forced to resign from the IMF because of accusations of rape and involved in various other frauds ...), the recent convictions of Mr. Sarkozy (3 years in prison), Mr. Fillon (5 years in prison), Mr. Chirac (…); and the fact that the 2 candidates for the presidential election of 2022 already known, Ms. Le Pen and Mr. Mélenchon (deputies), are or have been involved in fraudulent fictitious jobs and travel expenses (Ms. Le Pen is prosecuted for fictitious jobs in the European Parliament, and Mr. Mélenchon, vice president of the General Council of Essonne in 1998 which cheated and lied to steal the judgment that I had obtained in 1998, also stole travel expenses **no 7-10**), establish a high level of corruption in France and support the merit of my accusations against the LA law and of crimes against humanity.].

84. I would therefore be grateful to the member countries of the Security Council (1) to take into account the new arguments and information presented here to assess the situation related to my accusations of crime against humanity of persecution (related to the dishonesty of the LA law… in France) that I described in my 2 letters of 2020, (2) to organize the vote to transfer this situation to the ICC and extend the period to be taken into account for the investigation, and (3) to ask the UN Secretariat to launch the development project of a new LA system and the 2 computer applications to implement it in all the countries that wish to use it. I would be grateful to Mr. Guterres (and perhaps also Ms. Bachelet) if he took a public position on these subjects related to the dishonest LA system in France (accusations against LA law and of crimes against humanity, proposals to improve the LA systems around the world) and my other suggestions for improving his vision statement. I would be grateful to Mr. Biden if he: (a) admitted - and corrected - the grave injustice I suffered in the USA between 2002 and 2011 [my refugee status was well founded because my accusations against the LA law are and were well founded, the injustices I suffered from 1993 to 2001 are obvious, they were repeated when I returned to France in 2011, and the 1997 project proposal was useful to the international community], (b) supported the project to improve the LA systems around the world and the requests made to the Security Council, and (c) supported the proposal to make a detailed study on the possibility of creating a new IO dedicated to the Internet governance so that the US Government and Congress, and UN member countries can make a fair decision on this matter. Finally, I would be grateful to (or at least to one of the) leaders of ICC member countries if they: encouraged the ICC prosecutor's office to show more intellectual rigor in its decisions, and (in the event that the Security Council does not vote for - or does not obtain - the transfer of the situation to the ICC) made sure that the Phase II of the preliminary examination on my charges (and the detailed and public legal study linked) be initiated by the ICC (using their prerogative which allows them to submit a case to the ICC).

F Conclusion.

1) The new elements and documents brought to the ICC in my letter of 10-2-21.

85. The letter of 10-2-21 to the ICC (PJ no 0, EN PJ no 0.2) presents several important new elements and documents which support (a) the merit of the request for phase 2 of the preliminary examination to the ICC, (b) the review (and transfer to the ICC) of the situation by the UN Security Council, and (c) the interest of justice in investigating this matter. The various cases studied [2016 procedure highlighting the frauds of the Council of State, the Constitutional Court ... (PJ no 0, no 7-12); 2012 proceedings highlighting the injustices I suffered in the USA (PJ no 0, no 18-20); and the 2001 procedure linked to my dismissal in 1993 (PJ no 0, no 21-39.1)] allow to establish (1) that the highest French judges cheated and lied to uphold the dishonest LA law and obligations to have a lawyer in court (OHL) (…); (2) that politicians (who had a duty to intervene) allowed them to do so while remaining silent on this subject and fraud; (3) that the ECHR had the opportunity to study the problem of the dishonesty of the LA law in France on several occasions, and that it did not do it [in particular by committing serious faults (I think) to rule inadmissible my requests of 2016 and 2020 at least], and (4) that I have been the victim (a) of serious injustices, (b) of the dishonest LA law (and OHL…), (c) of the crime against humanity of persecution over many years, and (d) of the inefficient and corrupt justice system in France [**no 4-26**]. Mr. Forst and Ms. Bachelet (OHCHR) and Ms. Mijatovic (COE) also had the opportunity to denounce the dishonesty of the LA law (and the OHL) and to ask France to respond to my specific accusations against the LA law (...), but neither of them did, thereby covering up the dishonesty of senior judges, (representatives of) lawyers (at least) and politicians who maintained the dishonest LA law (and OHL) to steal from the poor for 30 years and to gain undue advantages [Ms Mijatovic and Ms Bachelet may have ignored the LA system problems in France to cover up similar LA system's problems in their countries because Bosnia and Herzegovina spends 2.13 euros per capita for its LA system against 5.06 euros for France (2016, PJ no 38, p. 20), and Chile 6.60 dollars against $ 5.85 for the France (2013, PJ no 81, p. 93), but this is no excuse because the situations of countries and the justice systems are different, among others (**no 15, 83**).].

2) Certain (serious) systemic problems of justice in France (and in other countries).

86. The (dishonest) LA law allows the government to impose (dishonest) OHL in many types of proceedings which are also used to deprive the poor of justice. And the dishonest LA law and OHL, which are used to rob the poor of their rights to justice and to cause them very serious prejudice, also allow judges (prosecutors,) to have a privileged relationship with lawyers, and are therefore among the main causes of the corruption and clutter of justice [**no 19-20**]. The dishonest behavior of lawyers, who take advantage of the LA system and of OHL in different ways, is also a cause of the justice system's corruption as showed it the case of the wiretapping of Mr. Sarkozy that I described above [**no. 21-24**]. Without an exceptional situation like the one described in the wiretapping case of Mr. Sarkozy, it is absolutely impossible to highlight the arrangements between judges (prosecutors) and lawyers which constitute acts of corruption; and solicitor-client privilege is also used by lawyers to (or attempt to) evade prosecution [**no 22**]. (1) To develop a new

more efficient and less expensive LA system (like the one I propose to develop), which would make it possible to completely abandon the OHL, to develop a working methodology for lawyers and judges specializing in LA, and to clarify the role of lawyers (in particular a clarification of the principle of confidentiality of the conversations between the lawyer and his client), (2) to make judges and prosecutors more easily criminally and civilly responsible for the violations of human rights and the harm they cause in the context of legal proceedings, (3) to punish more severely dishonest behavior by parties (... which implicitly or genuinely encourage judges or prosecutors to cheat), (4) to improve the functioning and quality of decisions of human rights courts such as the ECHR, and (5) to significantly improve the information and computer systems of justice (including human rights courts as ECHR...) and make better use of the most advanced technologies [AI ..., see Task force on justice report, PJ no 83, ch. 5], are therefore among the measures that I recommend to fight the corruption and clutter of justice systems, and to improve the functioning and efficiency of our justice systems [see **no 26**].

3) The political dimension and the consequences of my accusations of crimes against humanity.

87. My accusations of crime against humanity of persecution linked to the dishonesty of the LA law in France have an indisputable political dimension and important national and international consequences. First (and as explained in my letters from 2020), the situation related to (a) my accusations of crimes against humanity, (b) to the (project) proposals that I made in 1997, then 2005 -2006, and 2015 (and after...), and (c) the serious injustices I have suffered since 1993 (because of the dishonest LA law, among others) constitute *a threat to international peace and security*, and justifies the competence of the UN Security Council [on the basis of Chapter 7 (art. 39) of the UN Charter, **no. 31**]. Second, the national consequences of my accusations against the LA law are serious (1) because, among other things, the dishonest LA law and (related) OHL have been used to cover up and encourage criminal behaviors on the part of politicians and business leaders, and they have been a major cause of the serious injustices (and moral harassment from the courts) that I have suffered since 1998, which prevented the realization of my 1997 project proposal [INCO project on the transfer and integration of statistical data which had many advantages for the international community, **no 33-36**] and, more recently, which prevented me from working more actively on - and defending more effectively - my project for the development of a new LA system and my other proposals presented to the UN (among others); and because these accusations against the LA law allow us to accuse certain politicians and high judges (…) who participated in the maintenance of the dishonest LA law (…) of having committed the crime against humanity of persecution, and this accusation of a crime against humanity could have serious political consequences in France, in particular possible loss of elections for certain deputies and Mr. Macron [**see nos. 37-38**].

88. The international consequences of my accusations against the LA law and of crime against

humanity are also serious (a) because France regularly sanctions other countries for violations of human rights or of international conventions, and (b) because, in my opinion, my accusations of crimes against humanity remove all legitimacy from France to unilaterally sanction other countries as it does it. In general, certain unilateral sanctions in response to crimes or human rights violations committed by some countries (a) which are sometimes used by Europe and the United States, (b) which impoverish the sanctioned countries, and (c) which allow (sanctioning countries) to derive economic or political benefits, could be considered as a willingness to profit from these crimes or rights violations committed, and therefore result in the commission of the offense of concealment-for-profit, and, in my opinion, should be avoided as much as possible (**see no 41-43**). I think it is better to promote (a) dialogue (within international institutions, among others), and (b) global actions that improve the situation everywhere in the world like the ones I recommend (see details above at **no. 43**). In addition, unilateral sanctions that impoverish a country, do not help the victims (most of the time, on the contrary) and can also have negative consequences on other countries (and particularly on poor countries) and on the achievement of 2030 goals, which must also be avoided.

89. Finally, my accusations of crime against humanity of persecution (and against the dishonest LA law) have consequences on the UN Secretary General 2021 selection process (1) because Mr. Macron has a clear interest in ensuring that no one talk about the subject of my accusations against the LA law and of crimes against humanity, and of my proposals to improve the LA system, and he has a veto power at the UN Security Council; and (2) because, among others, the OHCHR and the UN secretariat have been informed of the dishonesty of the LA law (…), of the dishonest behavior of France (and of French leaders and politicians), and of my proposals to improve LA systems around the world, and they remained silent on these subjects (and denied me the human rights defender status), despite the many benefits of my proposals to improve LA systems [**no 54-62**]; and this may highlight a possible problem of lack of independence (...), or affect the relevance of certain aspects of Mr. Guterres's vision statement; I would therefore be grateful to Mr. Guterres if he provided his position on the LA related topics and my related remarks on his vision statement [**no 48-49, 67-80**]. Also the imprecise decision of the ICC on my complaint, which (a) completely ignores the precise description of the elements of the crime that I made in my letter of 23-1-20, (b) does not provide any precise motivation or analysis which would have been useful to the Security Council in assessing the situation I described to it, (c) is unfair to the many victims, and (d) covers up the dishonesty (ii) of French judges and leaders responsible for maintaining the LA law [or at least (ii) of the LA law], justifies, among other reasons, that the Security Council transfers the situation related to my charges of crimes against humanity to the ICC to obtain a detailed and public legal analysis of the charges against the LA law and of crimes against humanity and widen the period to be taken into account [**no 48-51**, and see also **no 83, 84**].

4) The many advantages of my proposal to improve the LA systems and my 2016 platform.

90. The proposal to develop (a) a new, more efficient and less expensive LA system which could be used by all countries and (b) the 2 global computer applications making it possible to implement this system in all countries that wish to use it, has many advantages for all countries and for the UN. First, of course, it solves an important problem, namely helping the poor to come forward and defend themselves more effectively in court, and ensure respect of their basic rights; secondly, it also makes it possible to fight more effectively the corruption of justice (and of society), and the clutter of justice, and, more generally, to improve the functioning of justice; and finally, it also has significant indirect advantages since it helps to better fight organized and transnational crime, terrorism, poverty, and unwanted immigration, and contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security. This proposal also fits well into the UN data strategy, and can be considered as a (cross-pillars) data action that generates useful data in different priority areas of the UN, human rights, peace and security, SDG, and allow us to put in place analytical tools that increase the value of data for countries and the UN. If I was chosen to the position of CITO (and if you wish), I could supervise the writing of precise specifications of this proposal during the 1st year of office, and work with the Security Council (and the UNGA) for the implementation of the project and the development of recommendations to be made to the countries.

91. My 2016 platform, which proposed to put the Internet at the center of our strategy to help countries achieve their development goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement, presented several proposals that remain relevant today as (a) the creation of a new IO dedicated to the Internet responsible for, among other functions, Internet governance, and (b) the development of global Internet applications to solve problems common to all countries [such as (a) the proposal to improve the LA systems, and (b) the proposal to develop a new websites pricing system (which takes into account the use of resources, revenues and profits generated with the Internet…), and the global applications making it possible to calculate these new tariffs for owning a website and to record the data related to each website owner, no 63-65]. The proposal (to create a new Internet IO and a new pricing system for websites) can also be considered as a (cross-pillars) data action since it would generate a significant amount of data related to the use and functioning of the Internet which would be essential to make good decisions to improve the governance and functioning of the Internet, to reduce the digital divide, and to fight against cybercrime (among others). I would therefore be grateful to the leaders of UN member states, and in particular to Mr. Biden, if they asked the United Nations secretariat to do a detailed analysis of this proposal; and if I was chosen to the position of CITO, I could (at the request of the member countries of the UNGA) supervise the detailed study of this proposal (costs, revenues, benefits…, functional organization chart of the new IO…) and present the (general) specifications of the new pricing system for domain names and the IT systems necessary to implement it during the first year of service.

5) Comments on the recent UN work and Mr. Guterres' vision statement.

a) My candidacy for the position of CITO and the proposals that I present to support it.

92. Mr. Guterres' vision statement does not mention the possibility of developing global computer applications that could help us to solve some specific problems (like the proposal to improve the LA systems that I am making), and the capital role that this proposal (the development of global IT applications) could play in various fields of UN specialties (maintenance of international peace and security, human rights, SDG, etc.); I have therefore taken the liberty of commenting on Mr Guterres' vision statement and the recent work of the UN to highlight the many advantages of the proposals I have made in the area of using the Internet to help UN member states to achieve their 2030 goals. And, if I was chosen to the position of CITO, and if you felt that some of the proposals that I made were useful, I could [in addition to the functions of CITO listed in the job description, supervise the writing and] present to you: before the end of the 1st year of function (1) detailed specifications of the new LA system and the 2 global applications necessary to implement it anywhere in the world; and (2) a detailed proposal (organization, cost, income, etc.) for the creation of a new international organization dedicated to Internet governance (and responsible for, among other functions, the proper functioning of the Internet, and the maintenance of global Internet applications allowing us to solve specific problems common to all countries ...) including detailed specifications of the new pricing system for websites (which takes into account the use of resources ...), and the global computer application necessary to calculate this tariff and to collect important information on websites' owners; and, before the end of the 3rd year in office, (3) a (proposed) list of global Internet applications to be developed in areas of importance to the UN and its member states [which would help (a) to solve specific problems important and common to all countries, (b) to achieve the 2030 objectives, and (c) to accelerate the achievement of the data strategy]; and a strategy to improve our international information systems in the economic and financial fields, an action which is essential for considering the development of the alternative to market capitalism. And I could also work with the Security Council (and the UNGA) to improve the legal aid and justice systems around the world.

b) The merits of my accusations of crimes against humanity and the requests made to the Security Council.

93. I would be grateful to the member countries of the Security Council (1) to take into account the new arguments and information provided above in their assessment of the situation related to my accusations of crimes against humanity described in my 2 letters of 2020, and (2) to organize the necessary vote to transfer the situation to the ICC and to obtain a detailed and public legal study of the various elements to be taken into account for the launch of an investigation (including the assessment of the unconstitutionality of the LA law in France, and of the material jurisdiction of the ICC). And I would also be grateful to Mr. Biden if he: (a) admitted - and corrected - the grave injustice I suffered in the USA between 2002 and 2011, and (b) supported the project to improve the LA systems around the world and the demands made to the Security Council related to this subject of dishonest LA law in France.

6) Conclusion.

94. As with my last letter, I plan to translate this letter into English (I think it will take about 3 weeks to do this, maybe more); but if by chance one of the UN experts in French to English translation had (a) some free time, (b) a computerized translation system that could speed up the translation of this letter, and (c) the desire and the possibility to help translate this letter, I would be grateful to you if you asked him/her, and I would, of course, be very grateful to him or her if he/she did so and sent me his/her translation so that I can verify that everything corresponds well to what I wanted to say, and format the letter to be able to send it to you faster. And I would be (as before) grateful to you if you (especially Mr Bolkzir and Mr Daems) could send this letter to your (their) colleagues (members of the UNGA, members of the Parliamentary Assembly...) which I cannot reach (due to their large number).

95. While thanking you in advance for your interest in this letter, I remain

Your sincerely,

Pierre Genevier

PS. : If you have difficulties accessing attachments through web links, let me know, and I will email you the PDF versions of the documents. Concerning the translation, several times I proposed the French and English version of the attachment I referred to, in particular for the attachment no 0 (letter to the ICC of 10-2-21), no 1 (letter of 23-11-20) and no 2 (letter of 10-7-20), but, most of the time, I only proposed the link for the French version of these letters, so if you prefer to read the English version of these letters, please use the link at the top of the letter in the Object paragraph. I am sorry for the many translation errors I made, I had very little time to translate this letter, so please if a phrase or a paragraph seems unclear, refer to the French version of the letter to make your own translation of the sentence.

Attachments.

PJ no 0 : Lettre du 10-2-21 à la CPI, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/plainte-art-15-CPI-FR-10-2-21.pdf].
version anglaise de la lettre du 10-2-21 à la CPI (0.2), [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/plainte-art-15-CPI-EN-10-2-21.pdf].
Accusé réception de la CPI pour la lettre du 10-2-21 (0.3), [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/AR-let-CPI-preli-exam-2-3-21.pdf].
Décision de la CPI du 6-5-21 (0.4), [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/decision-CPI-6-5-21.pdf].
Courriel de la CPI du 3-12-20 (0.5), [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-212/courriel-cpi-30-11-21.pdf].
How to submit CPI du 30-11-20 (0.6), [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf3-2-212/Art-15-how-to-submit-CPI-2020.pdf].
PJ no 1 : Lettre du 23-11-20, [(1.1) http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-CPI-UNSC-COE-reqno3-5-FR-23-11-20.pdf ;
version anglaise (1.2) http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-CPI-UNSC-COE-reqno3-5-EN-23-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 2 : Lettre du 10-7-20, [(2.1) http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pace-UNSC-EU-reqno2-FR-10-7-20.pdf ;
version anglaise (2.2) http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pace-UNSC-EU-reqno2-EN-10-7-20.pdf].
PJ no 3 : Réponse du Royaume Uni du 2-9-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/rep-UK-For-off-2-9-20.pdf].

PJ no 4 : Lettre du 15-5-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-Co-EU-CEDH-reqvsFR-15-5-20.pdf].

Les 5 Requêtes à la CEDH de 2020.

PJ no 5 : **1ème Requête** à la CEDH envoyée le 19-3-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/req-cedh-vs-france-18-3-20.pdf].
PJ no 6 : Annexe de la 1ère requête du 19-3-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/annex-formulaire-CEDH-18-3-20.pdf].
PJ no 7 : Pièces jointes à la 1ère requête du 19-3-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/lien-int-PJ-req-1-CEDH-3-2-21.pdf].
PJ no 8 : Observations sur la recevabilité et le fond du 30-4-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/obs-rec-fond- reqno1-CEDH-30-4-20.pdf].
PJ no 9 : Lettre envoyant les observations 30-4-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-fax-receva-CEDH-30-4-20.pdf].
PJ no 10 : Décision de la CEDH sur la requête 1, 26-11-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/dec-no-15564-20-CEDH-26-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 11 : **2ème Requête** à la CEDH envoyée le 23-6-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/reqno2-art-17-cedh-vsFR-23-6-20.pdf].
PJ no 12 : Annexe de la 2ème requête du 23-6-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/Annex-reqno2-art17-CEDH-23-6-20.pdf].
PJ no 13 : Pièces jointes à la 2ème requête du 23-6-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/lien-int-PJ-req-2-CEDH-3-2-21.pdf].
PJ no 14 : Lettre au greffier du 23-6-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-gref-CEDH-scaned-23-6-20.pdf].
PJ no 15 : Décision de la CEDH sur la requête 2, 26-11-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/dec-no-15564-20-CEDH-26-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 16 : **3ème Requête** à la CEDH envoyée le 6-11-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/req-no3-cedh-vs-FR-30-10-20.pdf].
PJ no 17 : Annexe de la 3ème requête du 6-11-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/annexe-form-reqno3-CEDH-3-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 18 : Pièces jointes à la 3ème requête du 23-6-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/lien-int-PJ-req-3-CEDH-3-2-21.pdf].
PJ no 19 : Décision de la CEDH sur la requête 3, 17-12-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/dec-no-50015-20-CEDH-17-12-20.pdf].
PJ no 20 : **4ème Requête** à la CEDH envoyée le 6-11-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/req-no4-cedh-vs-FR-30-10-20.pdf].
PJ no 21 : Annexe de la 4ème requête du 6-11-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/annexe-form-reqno4-CEDH-3-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 22 : Pièces jointes à la 4ème requête du 23-6-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/lien-int-PJ-req-4-CEDH-3-2-21.pdf].
PJ no 23 : Décision de la CEDH sur la requête 4, 17-12-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/dec-no-50018-20-CEDH-17-12-20.pdf].
PJ no 24 : **5ème Requête** à la CEDH envoyée le 6-11-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/req-no5-cedh-vs-FR-30-10-20.pdf].
PJ no 25 : Annexe de la 5ème requête du 6-11-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/annexe-form-reqno5-CEDH-3-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 26 : Pièces jointes à la 5ème requête du 23-6-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/lien-int-PJ-req-5-CEDH-3-2-21.pdf].
PJ no 27 : Lettre au greffier du 6-11-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-gref-CEDH-scaned-6-11-20.pdf].
PJ no 28 : Décision de la CEDH sur la requête 5, 17-12-20, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/dec-no-50021-20-CEDH-17-12-20.pdf].
PJ no 29 : Lettre à la CEDH du 25-9-20 ; [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-dem-for-req-3-5-CEDH-24-9-29.pdf].

Les Requêtes à la CEDH de 2016, 2012 et de 2001.

PJ no 30 : **Requête de 2016**, plus décision, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/req-cedh-vs-fra-et-dec-8-6-16.pdf].
PJ no 31 : Pièces jointes à la requête de 2016, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/lien-int-PJ-req-2016-CEDH-3-2-21.pdf].
PJ no 32 : **Requête de 2012**, plus décision, [http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/req-cedh-vs-fra-et-dec-2012.pdf].
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