In the United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
___________________________________________________________
Docket Number: 04-56244
(DC
No: CV 04-01857 RGK,
Los Angeles Western
Division)
___________________________________________________________
Pierre Genevier
Plaintiff – Appellant (ProSe)
V.
US Citizenship and Immigration Services
Defendant
And
Los Angeles County Department of Public
and Social Service
California Department of Social Service
Defendants - Appellees
On appeal from the order of the US
District Court dated May 18 2004
(and related order dated July 29 2004)
Reply to Appellees’ briefs
Pierre Genevier
423 East 7th Street, RM 528
emails: p_genevier@yahoo.com,
Los Angeles, CA 90014 pierre.genevier@laposte.net
Table of contents
I Statement of the case. P.
4
II Comments on LASS ‘Statement
of the case’ paragraphs. P. 4
A Comments on the ‘undisputed material facts’ paragraphs. P. 4
B The nature of the ‘misrepresentations’
in this case. P. 5
III Comments on LASS ‘Arguments’
sections. P.
6
A Comments on section A. P.
6
B. The comparison of the case with
existing legal authority. P. 6
1) Misrepresentations involving risks of
physical harm P. 7
2) Reference to Michael J. By through
Trout case. P. 8
3) Reference to the Schonfeld case. P.
8
C. The silence on GC 815.2. P.
9
D. The punitive damages. P. 10
E. The remarks concerning the immunity
granted by GC 821.6. P. 10
IV Comments on CASS ‘Arguments’
paragraphs. P.
11
V Conclusion P.
14
This reply (and its 7 copies) is filed with a copy of the letter sent to
appellees to informed them of the extension of time to reply to their briefs
(see page 18).
Table of authority
Federal Cases
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, [427 US 445 456 Pp 13-16
(1976)] P.
12
Goldberg v.
Kelly [397 U.S. 254 (1970)] P. 12
Kimel et al.
v. Florida Board of regents et al. [139 F. 3d 1426 (2000)] P. 12
Lapides v.
Bd. Of regents [122 S. Ct. 1640 (2002)] P. 13
Nevada
Dept. of Human resources et al. V. Hibbs et al. [273 F. 3d 844 (2003)] P.
12
Tennesse v.
Lane [541 US ---, 124 S. Ct. 1978(2004)] P. 12
State Cases
Michael J.
By and Through Trout V. Los Angeles County,
Dept. of
Adoption (app. 2 Dist 1988) 247 Cal. Rptr. 504-513 P. 8
Schonfeld
v. City of Vallejo (1974) 50 cal App. 3d 401, 404 411, P. 8
123 Cal. Rptr. 669.
Scott v. County of Los Angeles [(App. 2 Dist. 1994)
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 27 Cal. App. 4th 125] P. 11
Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth (Cal. Dec. 2003) WL 229 65516 P. 10
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002)27 Cal. 4th 1112,
1127 P. 9
Statutes
Government code 815 P. 4, 9
GC 815.2 P. 4, 5, 9, 10,14
GC 818.8 P. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9
GC 821.6 P.
10, 11
GC 822.2 P.
9, 10
GC 3294, 825 P.
4, 10,14
Constitution
11th Amendment P. 11, 12, 13, 14
14th Amendment P. 11,12, 13
Miscellaneous
California Form of Pleading and Practice (CFPP). P. 9
West’s Annotated California Code of Government, code 1-939
(WACCG). P. 11
I Statement of the case.
This is an appeal from the District Court Order
dated May 18 2004 (and related order dated July 29 2004). The appellant’s brief (containing all the
details on the case) was filed on September 16 2004 after the Appeal Court
granted the appellant’s motion to appeal in forma pauperis. On September 27 and 28 2004, the two
appellees, LA County DPSS (referred to LASS) and California Dept. of Social
Services (CASS), filed their answering briefs in which they asked the Court to
affirm the District Court order. The
object of this reply is to comment shortly the two appellees briefs, and to
confirm the conclusions of the initial appellant brief.
II Comments on LASS ‘Statement of the Case’ section.
A Comments on the ‘undisputed material facts’ paragraphs.
The purpose of a lawsuit or an appeal is
not to dispute what is written in the ‘Civil Code’. The Californian politicians vote the laws (Civil Code,), and,
only they, can change these laws and codes.
But judges (you and your colleagues) have the responsibility to
interpret the different articles of law described in the Civil Code to take
your decision on specific cases and to make the civil code more precise for the
judgment of other cases.
So it obvious that
GC 815, 818.8,, or 3294 are ‘undisputed’. It is also obvious that the purpose of the appellant brief is not
to dispute them, but to analyze the applicability of GC 815.2 instead of GC
815, to analyze the nature of the misrepresentations in this particular case
and the nature of the misrepresentations for which GC 818.8 is not applicable,
and to present the different ‘precisions’ or comments made by Supreme and
Appeal Courts judges on this GC 818.8 article and on similar cases or
wrongdoings.
And no, it is not
undisputed that the California cases have determined that GC 818.8 gives the
immunity to public entities for all types of misrepresentations (as
written in Appellees’ brief on page 9).
‘California cases have’ not
‘determined that the immunity conferred
on public entities pursuant California Government Code 818.8 applies to’ all types of ‘intentional and negligent deceit and misrepresentation, …’ ,
there are cases for which this immunity does not apply or hold.
The LASS clearly ignore the details
presented on the exceptions to GC 818.8, the existence of GC 815.2, and the
remarks associated with the applicability of this GC 815.2 statute. Similarly, it ignores the California Supreme
Court definition of the term ‘misrepresentation’
in the context of GC 818.8, which demonstrates that the arguments presented by
the appellant are valid. The California
reporter 247 discusses all these issues in the Michael J. case and explains
that the immunity under 818.8 is not ‘absolute’.
B The nature of the ‘misrepresentations’ in
this case.
As mentioned in the
appeal’s brief and earlier pleadings, the California Supreme Court has
defined the word ‘misrepresentation’ used in GC 818.8, and has
clearly stated that it meant ‘interference
in the nature of common law action for deceit with financial or commercial
interests’ -which is not the type of case described in the complaint - ‘and not any conduct that literally could be
called a misrepresentation such as misleading turn signal by a driver or the
failure of state authorities to disclose…’ – which is the type or nature of
the misrepresentation described in the complaint.
A (intentional) lie
or misrepresentation of facts and laws that leads (for the victim) to the loss
of social benefits necessary to survive is not a conduct
that affect the financial and commercial interest of the victim, it is a
conduct that is life threatening for the victim and that affects directly
his/her health. Therefore, it is
a conduct similar to giving a wrong direction to a driver that
will lead to an unavoidable accident causing death or serious physical
injuries. This is explained in the
appellant brief, but ignored by the by the Appellee, LASS.
III Comments on LASS ‘V Argument’ sections.
A Comments on section A.
When the Appellee, LASS, (or the District
Court) writes ‘LASS cannot be held liable for misrepresentation’, it
implies or it means that it is not possible (or it is impossible) for the LASS
to be held liable for misrepresentation, which is obviously not true, since
there exists exceptions to the immunity granted by GC 818.8. It also ignores the effort of the Supreme
Court to define the term ‘misrepresentation’.
The LASS’s counsel uses, therefore, an inappropriate language to make an
incorrect point.
B The comparison
of the case with existing legal authority.
The appellee, LASS,
makes a brief comparison of the cases used in the different pleadings and the
appellant’s brief to justify that the immunity does hold in this case, but its
remarks are not supported by any precise reference to the complaint (or
appellants pleading) or by any meaningful explanation about the nature of the
misrepresentations or the area in which these misrepresentations took place
although this is obviously a key element to determine the applicability of
818.8, as seen above and in the initial brief.
1) Misrepresentations involving risks of
physical harm.
For example, in its reference to the Johnson case, it writes
‘Appellant/s allegation in his complaint,, clearly manifest that there were
no peril of physical harm of which he was not cognizant nor were they a type of
peril that would not be readily discoverable by an endangered person….’, but
it forgets to comment the precise references made by the appellant in his
appeal brief or reply to earlier motion.
It also makes no precise reference to the parts of the complaint in
which the risks and damages associated with the wrongdoings are described. It simply states that there is no such risk
of physical harm or perils described in the complaint!
The appellee states also that the
appellant definition of ‘physical harm is excessive in scope’, but this
is not true. There are several ways to
kill one person, starving a person to death or giving AIDS or other deadly
diseases are ways as efficient as shooting someone in the head. Similarly there are several ways to
physically harm someone, subjecting someone to malnutrition that has grave
consequences on this person health, or force someone to sleep in the street (or
in ‘indecent’ shelters) to put him/her at risk of being attacked or killed are
some ways to physically harm someone.
Finally, It is clearly stated in the
complaint that one of the objectives of the wrongdoings was to make the
appellant loose (illegally) his refugee status, so since the refugee status is
a matter of life and death, and is granted when an individual is at great risk
of being victim of more persecutions if he is obliged to return to his country,
the effort to make the appellant loose his refugee status creates necessarily a
serious risk of physical harm for him.
2) Reference to Michael J. By through
Trout case.
The LASS also ignores the fact that
Michael J. By through Trout is a case of misrepresentation that took place in
the social services area and is therefore closely related to the
present case. In this case the
Appeal Court has noted that the immunity for intentional misrepresentation did
not apply because ‘such a proceeding is not a commercial transaction’. Similarly, the attribution of social
benefits is not a commercial transaction, and therefore the immunity granted by
818.8 does not apply (the Michael.. decision is consistent with the definition
given by the Supreme Court, see above p. 5).
Finally, refugees (and homeless) like a
prospective adoptee are an extremely vulnerable population, and lying to end
prematurely the refugee assistance has grave consequences for the refugee like
lying on the health of the prospective adoptee has grave consequences for the
parents and adoptee involved in the adoption process. It is not fair to take advantage of the weakness of refugees,
homeless, adoptee or possible parents who offered to put their resources and
emotional support to help an adoptee.
3) Reference to the Schonfeld case.
Finally, the LASS
finishes its comparisons of cases with the Schonfeld case. It appears that the law-book used by the
appellant (California
Form of Pleading and Practice) is
imprecise on this particular legal case (even refers to an incorrect date
‘1974’), and that several different issues were addressed by the court in this
case. It seems the court confirms that
the immunity given by GC 822.2 does not hold for
misrepresentation involving employees guilty of actual malice and corruption,
and confirms that the immunity given by GC 818.8 holds for fraudulent
concealment.
The California Form of Pleading and
Practice omits (probably voluntarily) to specify that the immunity refers to GC
822.2, it simply states ‘immunity for
misrepresentation’ without specifying GC 822.2 or GC 818.8. For the appellant, it made sense that the
immunity granted by GC 818.8 should not hold when the employees are guilty of
corruption and actual malice, otherwise it would be a deliberate encouragement
to harm, vex, annoy and rob the poor instead of serving/helping them. In Schonfeld there were no allegation of
corruption or actual malice against the city manager, therefore the court
granted the immunity, but it is not the case here.
C. The silence on GC 815.2.
In its paragraph B,
the LASS repeats that, because of GC 815, it cannot be held liable for the
wrongdoings described, but it ignores again the remarks made in the appelant’s
brief about GC 815.2 that make public entities liable when their employees can
be held accountable (or liable) for their wrongdoings and when they act within
the scope of their employment. The
section GC 815.2 is mentioned in 8 different pages and even in the title of one
of the paragraphs, but the LASS totally ignores it and the arguments presented
with it, this means that the appellant’s arguments are valid.
The case used by the LASS, Zelig v. LA
County, describes the
complaint of a woman whose child was shot dead by her ex-husband
in the LA Court house, it is of course a very tragic case, but not related to
the present case describing intentional lies and other grave wrongdoings to
rob a refugee homeless of the most
basic social benefits necessary to survive.
Similarly, in the Eastburn case, the court concluded that the dispatcher enjoyed
immunity under section 1799.107, and therefore that the dispatcher employer was
immune under section 815.2, which is not the case here because the appellant
has explained that the employees did not enjoy the immunity under 822.2 because
they are guilty of corruption and malice.
The LASS never denied that the complaint described that the employees
are guilty of corruption and actual malice (because the punitive damages are
asked on this ground).
D. The punitive damages.
Again the LASS
repeats its arguments without commenting the explanations given by the
appellant about the possibility (for counties) to pay punitive damages given by
GC 825, and it does not comment the fact that the punitive damages are
addressed against the employees (also called defendant) responsible for the
wrongdoings (who are guilty of corruption and malice) and acting within the
scope of their employment.
E. The remarks concerning the immunity
granted by GC 821.6.
In its section D, the LASS
mentions that it is not liable for damage resulting from a judicial or
administrative proceeding, but the article 821.6 apply for the proceeding that
are instituted and prosecuted by public employees, which is not the case
here. As the appellant has mentioned in
his previous pleadings, he is the one who filed a complaint at the
administrative court, so it is not the LASS that instituted or prosecuted the
complaint.
Moreover, the damage is due
to the LASS refusal to follow (and the lies about) the regulation, the
procedures and the order of the judge, to the refusal to pay the benefits
associated with his refugee status (housing assistance, cash benefits,) to keep
him homeless, and to the obligation for the appellant to complain over and over
against the LASS and CASS, but it is not directly due to the proceeding
itself (the administrative law judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff as
explained in the complaint, and the LASS did not even file a rehearing request!).
Finally,
according to the Scott v. County of Los Angeles case, section 821.6 did not
immunize social workers for not following the regulation, parallel to the
administrative proceeding, see Note of decisions no. 23 for section 821.6 in
the ‘West’s Annotated California Codes Government 1-939’, which states ‘Statute
immunizing public employee from liability for institution or prosecution of
judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his or her employment
did not apply to immunize county social worker from liability for failing to
comply with regulations…’
IV Comments on CASS ‘Argument’ section.
In its briefs, the CASS repeats that the
11th amendment bar this suit at the federal court without commenting
the appellant’s remarks concerning the violation of the right to a due process
guaranteed by the 14th amendment, the timeliness of the removal and
the dismissal without prejudice. It
cites several cases which do not address the conflict between the immunity
granted by the 11th amendment and the right guaranteed by the 14th
amendment to support its claim (that the 11th amendment bars this
suit), although there are several specific cases that address this
particular issue.
For example, in Goldberg
v. Kelly [397 U.S. 254 (1970)] ‘The Supreme Court held that the interest of
the eligibility recipient in the interrupted receipt of public assistance,
which provides him with essential food, clothing, housing, and
medical case, coupled with the state’s interest that it not be erroneously
terminated, clearly outweigh the state’s competing concern to prevent any
increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens.’
Or in Tennesse v.
Lane [1978 (2004)], a case about congress’s enforcement power under section
5 of the 14th amendment, Tennessee argued that the 11th
amendment prohibited the suit and filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held the eleventh
amendment violated the victim fundamental right guaranteed by the due process
clause of the 14th amendment. In Kimel
et al v. Florida board of regent et al.
(2000), the court held that section 5 of the 14th amendment does
grant Congress the authority to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.
This last case uses Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
which says ‘ the 11th amendment does not bar a back pay award to petitioners
… since the amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies
are limited by enforcement …the substantive provision of the 14th amendment,
which themselves embody significant limitation on a state authority. Congress in determining what legislation is
appropriate for enforcing the 14th amendment may ,, provide for suit against
states that are constitutionally impermissible in other context.’
More recently, in Nevada Dept. of human
resources et al. v. Hibbs et al. (2003), the ninth circuit court has reversed a district court decision
granting immunity under the 11th amendment (on the ground that it
did not violate the right guaranteed by the 14th amendment), and the
Supreme Court affirmed the 9 circuit court’s decision.
Finally, in Lapides v. Bd. of Regents
(2002), the court held that waiver (of 11th amendment immunity) is
appropriate when State Attorney General, authorized to bring a case in Federal
Court, has voluntarily invoked that Court jurisdiction. In this present case, although the State
Attorney did not remove the case to the federal court, it certainly did not
oppose the removal (and the US Attorney removed the case, most probably with
the State Attorney ‘informal’ consent), so the State Attorney General has
waived the 11th amendment immunity when it did not oppose (and
therefore authorized) the removal of the case.
[In fact it is the appellant that
explained that the removal was not compatible with the 11th
amendment (because it would force the State of California to be judged at the
Federal court without its consent) in his motion to remand!]. The CASS also did not contradict the fact
that there are no independent and separate causes of action, so since there are
several cases that respond to the question presented in this appeal and support
that the right to a due process prevents states from using the 11th
amendment immunity, the District court decision should be reversed.
V Conclusion.
It appears clearly that the
appellees’ arguments are very imprecise, and that the appellees omit - on
purpose- to address the main arguments presented or main issues raised in the
appellant’s briefs like the fact that the misrepresentation took place in the social
services area and are not related to a ‘commercial transaction’, the fact that
the misrepresentation are collateral to negligence in the performance of
operational tasks, the fact that GC 815.2 apply because the employees are
guilty of corruption and malice, the fact that GC 825 gives the possibility to
counties to pay punitive damages, the conflict between the 11th
amendment and the right to a due process, the timeliness of the removal, and
the fact that the dismissal of the CASS without prejudice is inappropriate in
this case.
These deliberate omissions demonstrate
that the appellant’s arguments are valid, and that the appellees are liable and
deserve no immunity for the wrongdoings described in the complaint. Therefore, the appellant confirms his
initial brief’s conclusions. The
District Court order should be reversed and the causes of action against
the LASS should be remanded for further proceeding (with leave to
amend). The use of the 11th
amendment is unconstitutional in this case, and the cause of action against the
CASS should be remanded for further proceeding (or at the very least the
dismissal should be without prejudice to give a chance to the plaintiff to
re-file his complaint at the State Court).
Dated: October ,
2004
By :
_____________
Pierre Genevier
Certificate of compliance pursuant to Fed.
R. App. 32 (a) (7) (C) and Circuit rule, rule 32-1 for case no: 04-56244
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. O. 32 (a) (7) (C)
and Ninth circuit Rule 32-1, I certify that the attached brief is
proportionally spaced, has a type face of 14 points and contains 3659 words
(421 lines).
Dated October , 2004
By :______________
Pierre Genevier
Statement of related cases
Appellant is aware of no related case
pending before the court.
Certification of Service
The undersigned hereby certifies that on October 2004, he personally delivered 2 copies of
the foregoing (brief) to the following (or their representatives):
Mrs. Debra Khantamour, Attorney for the Los Angeles County, DPSS (defendant), at 5850
Canoga Avenue, suite 600, Woodland Hills, CA 91367, Fax : (818) 380 0028.
Mrs. Jung D. Shin, Deputy Attorney General for the CA Department of Social Services
(defendant) (State of California), 300 South Spring, Suite 5212, Los Angeles,
CA 90013, FAX : (213) 897 2810.
_____________
Pierre Genevier